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INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST ISSUE 
 
Ambassador Roger G. Harrison, Ph.D. 
 
 




This journal has come into existence to provide a 
forum for discussion of an intellectual and policy 
foundation for U.S. activities in space.  It is open 
to all legitimate points of view and to 
contributions from policy makers, operators, 
academics, and the private sector.  Although the 
Center for Space and Defense Policy is located at 
the Air Force Academy, no preference will be 
given in these pages to the Air Force’s position 
on space policy.  We are not advocates but 
academics, and conceive our contribution as 
providing Air Force and government leaders with 
situational awareness about thinking in other 
sectors of the space community, as well as in 
other spacefaring nations. 
 
There have been three great visions of America’s 
role in space and each can be associated with the 
President who emphasized that vision: 
Eisenhower’s conception of peaceful uses of 
space that focused on the collection of 
intelligence data, Kennedy’s call to manned space 
exploration, and Reagan’s reconceptualization of 
the strategic role of space known as the Strategic 
Defense Initiative.  All were products, to some 
degree, of the competition of the Cold War.  All 
served as organizing principles that rallied public 
support on the one hand, and rationalized 
government space programs on the other.  And all 
were honed during long periods of intellectual 
incubation in free and open discussions like those 
this journal is intended to propagate.   
 
But it has been twenty-three years since Reagan 
espoused his vision and since then the Cold War 
ended, new spacefaring actors have emerged, and 
both the geopolitical importance of space and the 
number of actors increasingly reliant upon it have 
expanded many fold.  Technology now makes 
possible activities that were difficult to imagine in 
1983, although perhaps not yet the impenetrable 
anti-ballistic missile shield that President Reagan 
foresaw.  Despite these changes – or, perhaps, 
because of them – no vision of space future has 
arisen to give coherence to our space activities, 
and to rally the sort of public support needed for 
the multi-year funding such activities require. 
 
There are, of course, some areas of general 
agreement.  All agree that circumterrestrial space 
is becoming more crowded, and that this trend 
will likely accelerate.  All agree that in some 
areas – and particularly in communications, 
positioning, navigation and timing, and 
intelligence gathering – space provides 
considerable comparative advantages.  All agree 
that space is a potential arena for military 
competition, and that such competition – if it 
occurs – will be extraordinarily expensive.  And 
most would agree that the days of practically 
unlimited resources for space are over, that 
private investment will now be more selective, 
and that future government space programs will 
be competing for pieces of a budgetary pie which 
is unlikely to grow and might very well shrink.  
 
But there are also areas of broad disagreement, or 
perhaps lack of clarity.  For example, although 
there remains broad public support for the notion 
of manned space flight, the sort of enthusiasm 
which once made possible the extraordinary 
financial and technological effort to land a man 
on the Moon is no longer as much in evidence.  




Exploration been comprehensively integrated into 
a wider vision of the U.S. role in space, and 
without such context, it may well prove more 
difficult to build and sustain public support. 
 
By the same token, while there is an emphasis in 
U.S. national space policy on maintaining 
freedom of action in space, there is no consensus 
on what that aspiration implies, or what – in 
terms either of 
hardware or policy – 
will be necessary to 
achieve it.  Some see 
a forceful assertion of 
U.S. military power 
in space as necessary, 
some think it 
unavoidable, while 
others view it as 
counterproductive.  
Finally, while most agree – with greater or lesser 
enthusiasm – that some regime of regulation will 
be necessary in space beyond the rudimentary 
ones that now exist, there is disagreement on 
whether the United States should retain a special 
status within this regime, especially in the 
military sector.  Some argue that our insistence on 
maintaining freedom of action in the military 
realm dooms the possibility of imposing order on 
the competition of spacefaring nations; others 
contend that no such order is possible without the 
enforcement of law that only the United States – 
with freedom to act as it deems necessary – can 
guarantee. 
  
It is not the business of journals but of national 
leaders to rally the nation for the challenge of 
space, to set priorities and to settle bureaucratic 
disagreements.  Indeed, if America succeeds in 
establishing an intellectual vision for the next 
stage of its activities in space, it will doubtless be 
a product of a President’s vision and persistence, 
as our last three concerted efforts in space have 
been.  The foundation for taking the next steps in 
space will be improved by vetting these steps 
through the process of open and honest 
intellectual debate.  Fostering that debate is the 
mission the Center for Space and Defense 
Studies, through  its   textbook,   this  journal, and 
its other activities, has set for itself.
there is an 
emphasis in U.S. 
national space 
policy on freedom 
of action but no 
consensus on what 
that implies 
iv 
Space and Defense, Fall 2006 
 
Space and Defense, Fall 2006, pp. 1-14. 
Center for Space and Defense Studies 
Department of Political Science, US Air Force Academy 
1 
 
AN INCHOATE PROCESS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 










As the breadth and depth of military activities in 
space expand, demands are growing to regulate 
these activities at the international level.  In some 
cases, these demands stem from the recognition 
that broader national security operations in space 
are moving away from a legacy of being 
dominated by secret intelligence activities and in 
the direction of more open military activities.1  In 
other cases, they are driven by the efforts of arms 
control advocates to roll back the “weaponization 
of space.”2  Regardless of the underlying 
motivations, the demands for international 
regulation are going to grow, and the debate will 
turn increasingly to the matter of how to proceed. 
 
Recognizing that a limited number of 
international agreements to regulate both civilian 
                                                
     1The Eisenhower Administration initiated U.S. national 
security operations in space with a preference for 
intelligence activities with the signing of NSC 5520 on 20 
May 1955.  For a history of these early policies, see Walter 
A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political 
History of the Space Age (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997).  For the text of NSC 5520 and 
related documents, see John M. Logsdon, ed., Exploring the 
Unknown, vol. 1, Organizing for Exploration (Washington, 
D.C.: NASA SP-4407); John M. Logsdon, ed., Exploring 
the Unknown, vol. 2, External Relationships (Washington, 
D.C.: NASA SP-4407, 1996); and Stephanie Feyock, 
compiler, National Security Space Project, Presidential 
Decisions Documents (Washington, D.C.: George C. 
Marshall Institute, 2006), pp. 1–20. 
     2Michael Krepon (with Christopher Clary), Space 
Assurance or Space Dominance?  The Case Against 
Weaponizing Space (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson 
Center, 2003). 
and military activities in space already exist, there 
are a number of options available to U.S. and 
foreign policy makers.3  A brief survey of these 
options was made available to the public by the 
Institute of Air and Space Law at McGill 
University in Montreal, Canada, in 2005.4  This 
survey serves as a good guide to the available 
options and as a starting point for assessing the 
strength and weaknesses of each one, particularly 
at the international level.5 
                                                
     3Among the existing international agreements are the (1) 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, of 1967; (2) Agreement 
on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and 
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 1968; 
(3) Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects of 1972; (4) Convention on 
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 1975; 
(5) Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1979; and (6) Treaty 
Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in 
Outer Space and Under Water of 1963.  As a result, there is 
also a rich body of international law related to activities in 
space.  A source of this body of law, although by no means 
the only one, is the Legal Subcommittee of the United 
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS).  The  records   of  the  Legal Subcommittee are 
available at: UNOOSA Legal Subcommittee.  
     4“Policy and Legislative Options for Parliamentarians 
Regarding Possible Deployment of Further Military 
Capabilities in Outer Space,” (Montreal: McGill University, 
Institute of Air and Space, Faculty of Law, June 2005). 
     5The McGill University study includes options for 
purely domestic laws and regulations.  This article will 
focus on the options available for the international 
regulation of military activities in space and touch on U.S. 











The weakness of the McGill University study is 
that it treats the options discretely and not in the 
context of a broader international political 
process.  This is not to say that the study implies 
that one of the options may be pursued only at the 
expense of the others, but that it does not describe 
an inchoate process by which the unilateral 
actions and non-actions of individual states result 
in a form of common law.6  The results of this 
inchoate process may evolve into formal 
agreements, depending on circumstances. 
 
In fact, much of what passes for the practical 
international regulation of military space 
activities today has emerged from an inchoate 
process.  The formal agreements are less 
important in influencing the conduct of military 
activities in space.  For example, nations have 
chosen not to take military actions against 
satellites flying over their territories in times of 
peace, although they certainly do so against 
military aircraft that penetrate their airspace 
without authorization.  As a result, nations treat 
territorial airspace in military terms in a way that 
is fundamentally different from how they treat 
outer space, even though there is no formal 
international agreement that distinguishes 
between the two.7  This critical distinction, while 
broadly accepted by states today, resulted from a 
process utterly lacking in formality and order.  It 
stemmed from nothing more than emerging 
patterns of behavior.  This is not to say that the 
inchoate process will never lead to a formal 
                                                                               
government policy guidance regarding military activities in 
space, but it will not address the domestic legislative and 
regulatory options. 
     6Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the 
English Language defines inchoate, among other ways, as 
“not organized; lacking order.” 
     7This distinct treatment of outer space and territorial 
airspace emerged despite contentions by the U.S. Air Force 
that both were part of a continuum.  For a description of the 
Air Force’s views on this issue, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, 
Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the 
Military Uses of Space, (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 
2003), pp. 37–59. 
agreement or that formal agreements are 
inappropriate in all instances.8 
 
Assessing the Options 
 
Despite this weakness, the McGill University 
study provides a point of departure for exploring 
how this inchoate 
approach to regulating 
military space activities at 
the international level may 
be pursued in the future.  
Such an exploration starts 
with assessing the 
strengths and weaknesses 
of five discrete options for 
the international regulation 
of military space activities. 
 
Maintain Existing Legal Regime for 
 Regulating Military Space Activities 
 
The process for establishing international 
regulation of military activities in space is not 
devoid of formal treaties and other international 
agreements.  This body of formal agreements is 
anchored by the Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, of 1967, frequently referred to 
simply as the Outer Space Treaty.9  While the 
                                                
     8The United States recently cast the sole vote in 
opposition to a United Nations General Assembly 
resolution to develop additional transparency and 
confidence-building measures regarding activities in outer 
space.  The broad scope of the resolution and the open-
ended agenda it establishes invited U.S. opposition.  A 
more narrowly drawn resolution on transparency and 
confidence-building measures, however, could serve U.S. 
interests if it codifies a clear pattern of behavior that has 
served U.S. interests to date.  For a text of the resolution, 
see “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: 60/66.  
Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer 
space activities,” 61st plenary meeting, 8 December 2005.  
     9For the text of the Outer Space Treaty and a brief 
description of the negotiating history, see United States 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and 
Space and Defense, Fall 2006 
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content of the Outer Space Treaty is far broader 
than the regulation of military activities in space, 
its provisions include a number of limitations on 
such activities.  Article IV prohibits the 
placement of weapons of mass destruction in 
orbit around the Earth, on the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, or anywhere else in outer space.  
The same article also prohibits the placement of 
military installations, the conduct of weapons 
tests, and the conduct of military maneuvers on 
the Moon and other celestial bodies. 
 
Other treaties are more appropriately described as 
arms control treaties that contain provisions 
related to military activities in space.  For 
example, Article I of the 1963 Treaty Banning 
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in 
Outer Space and Under Water, commonly 
referred to as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 
prohibits the conduct of nuclear weapon test 
explosions in outer space.10 
 
Continuing to observe the existing regime of 
international agreements regulating military 
activities in space is essentially an argument for 
maintaining the status quo.  The most common 
argument against this option is that the existing 
legal regime is not broad enough and that some 
military activities currently not prohibited by the 
regime should be banned.  These arguments most 
frequently come from those seeking to limit U.S. 
military options in space.  Among the activities 
that some would seek to ban are the development, 
testing, and deployment of anti-satellite weapons 
and space-based non-nuclear ballistic missile 
defense interceptors.11 
 
                                                                               
Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the 
Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, 1990), pp. 52–63. 
     10For the text of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and a brief 
description of the negotiating history, see ibid., pp. 37–49. 
     11L. Skotnikov, Permanent Representative of the Russian 
Federation, Statement at Plenary Meeting of the Conference 
on Disarmament, “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer 
Space,” 26 August 2004.  Cited hereafter as Skotnikov 
Statement. 
Other arguments against simply maintaining the 
legal status quo assume there are fundamental 
shortcomings in the current regime’s existing 
provisions or the potential for significant 
advantages derived from new approaches.  If the 
current legal regime contains errors of omission, 
as some contend, it almost certainly contains 
errors of commission.  For example, Article IV of 
the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of 
military installations on the Moon.  Simply 
accepting the status quo in perpetuity in this case 
assumes that the United States will never have a 
compelling security interest in placing a military 
installation on the Moon.  At a minimum, it is 
plausible that the United States will find such an 
interest at some point in the future. 
 
Strengthen Existing International Legal 
Regime for Regulating Military Space Activities 
 
This option would identify ways to broaden the 
application of the existing international legal 
regime regarding military space activities that fall 
short of amending existing agreements or 
negotiating new ones.  Among these are (1) 
seeking universal state participation in all five 
multilateral space law treaties; (2) using the 
consultative mechanism in Article IX of the Outer 
Space Treaty to regulate military activities in 
accordance with proper interpretations of the 
Treaty; (3) increasing transparency regarding 
military activities in space by expanding the 
information that state parties provide under the 
1975 Convention on the Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, or Registration 
Convention; and (4) adding a dispute settlement 
mechanism to the procedures of the International 
Telecommunications Union, particularly with 
regard to preventing “harmful interference” with 
military space missions.12 
 
In substantive terms, this option suffers from the 
same shortcomings as those that apply to the 
option of maintaining the international legal 
                                                
     12Institute of Air and Space, “Policy and Legislative 
Options,” pp. 7–10. 
Spring, “An Inchoate Process for Regulation of Military Activities in Space” 
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status quo.  Fundamentally, it leaves little room 
for addressing developing problems regarding the 
regulation of military activities in space or for 
remedying existing problems within the 
international legal framework.  The proper scope 
of interpretation under the various applicable 
treaties, and most particularly those in the 
category of regulating both civilian and military 
activities in space, is simply too narrow. 
 
Further, any 
attempt to go 
beyond the 
traditional scope 
of interpreting a 
treaty will be very 
risky.  In the 
United States, the 
Senate, which has 
the constitutional 
authority to 
consent to the ratification of treaties, may quickly 
conclude that a far-reaching reinterpretation of an 
existing treaty is an attempt to circumvent it.  
This is because the executive branch is legally 
bound to execute a treaty ratified by the Senate in 
a manner that is consistent with its terms.  
Substantive changes in a treaty require formal 
amendment, subject to Senate advice and consent.  
As a result, a proposal to expand significantly the 
reporting requirements under the Registration 
Convention by interpretation, for example, could 
prompt objections from the U.S. Senate.13 
 
The Senate also has been particularly reluctant to 
approve treaties with far-reaching security 
implications that include mandatory dispute 
                                                
     13Compliance with the Registration Convention has been 
spotty.  The issue of obtaining compliance with Convention 
should not be confused with the issue of expanding the 
substantive requirements of the Convention through 
reinterpretation.  The Senate is not likely to object to efforts 
to obtain compliance, while it is likely to object to certain 
reinterpretations.  For an explanation of the problems of 
compliance with the Registration Convention, see Jonathan 
McDowell, “Adherence to the 1976 Convention on 
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.” 
settlement powers lodged in international 
organizations.  This issue is a contributing factor 
in the U.S. determination not to ratify the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.14  An 
attempt to establish such a mechanism under the 
International Telecommunications Union will 
likely meet similar objections. 
 
Adopt New Multilateral Agreements to 
Regulate Military Space Activities 
 
This approach would remedy perceived 
shortcomings in the existing legal regime for 
regulating military activities in space by formally 
amending the regime, in many cases by treaty.  
Substantive proposals to do this include: (1) 
amending the Registration Convention to expand 
transparency, which, as noted above, would 
attempt to do so by interpretation; (2) a 
multilateral treaty establishing a code of conduct 
governing military activities in space;15 (3) a 
multilateral agreement to ban a specific type of 
space-based weapon, such as an anti-satellite 
weapon; and (4) a multilateral agreement to ban 
comprehensively all types of “space-based 
weapons.”16  The strength of this approach is that 
it affords states the opportunity to address the full 
array of issues regarding the conduct of military 
activities in space. 
 
The process of negotiating new agreements, 
however, has a fundamental drawback.  Leaving 
aside the specific objections to specific future 
agreements, including issues of verification and 
enforcement, the problem with new treaties or 
formal agreements is that the negotiation process 
is too blunt and inflexible to make immediate 
contributions to strengthening U.S. national 
                                                
     14Marjorie Ann Browne, “The Law of the Sea 
Convention and U.S. Policy,” (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2 
March 2004), p. 10. 
     15For a comprehensive description of a code of conduct 
governing activities in space, see “Code of Conduct for 
Outer Space,” (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson 
Center). 
     16Skotnikov Statement. 
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security relative to space-based activities.  
Technological advancements are too rapid to 
regulate through this process.  This is the case 
despite the relatively long timelines for the 
development and deployment of space systems.  
The negotiations will generally lag behind the 
technological advancements. 
 
The alternative is to negotiate sweeping 
prohibitions without understanding what 
technologies may be applicable.  This alternative 
will lead to confusion and ultimately prove 
unable to stand the test of time.  For example, 
Article V of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty sought to ban the development, 
testing, and deployment of all possible ABM 
systems or components based in space, among 
other places.  Article VI sought to ban giving 
non-ABM systems an ABM capability.17  ABM 
Treaty negotiators, recognizing this problem, 
attached Agreed Statement D to the Treaty.18  
This statement conceded that the prohibitions 
included in the Treaty would be subject to further 
negotiations if ABM technologies “based on 
other physical principles” emerged.  This 
contradiction led to an explosive debate over the 
“narrow” and “broad” interpretations of the ABM 
Treaty in the United States.19  In an extraordinary 
step, the United States withdrew from the ABM 
Treaty in 2002.  While many important treaties, 
including the ABM Treaty, contain withdrawal 
provisions, exercising the withdrawal provisions 
is rarely done.  The sweeping nature of the 
prohibitions included in the Treaty was a 
                                                
     17For the text of the ABM Treaty and a brief description 
of the negotiating history, see United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agreements, pp. 157–161. 
     18Ibid., p. 162. 
     19For a brief description of this debate, see Lt. Col. Peter 
L. Hays, United States Military Space: Into the Twenty-
First Century INSS Occasional Paper 42, (USAF Academy, 
Colo.: Institute for National Security Studies, September 
2002), pp. 92-95. 
contributing factor in President George W. 
Bush’s decision to withdraw.20 
 
Adopt New Military Space Agreements 
 at the Bilateral or Regional Level 
 
This option attempts to limit the procedural 
complexity stemming from the negotiation of 
broad-based multilateral treaties.  It also 
recognizes that the preeminent forum for such 
broad-based negotiations, the United Nations 
Conference on Disarmament, is ineffective.21  
This option also recognizes that even broadly 
accepted arms control agreements can be 
negotiated by a few states at the outset.  The 
Limited Test Ban Treaty, for example, was 
initially negotiated by a five-state subcommittee 
of the Conference on Disarmament in 1955.22 
 
The chief shortcoming of this option is the same 
as the option above.  The negotiation process is 
likely to remain lengthy, and the pace of 
technological advancement is all but certain to 
outstrip the pace of negotiations.  This approach 
also carries the inherent shortcoming that the 
geography of space makes it an unlikely subject 
for bilateral or regional negotiations that could 
later have global applications.  For example, 
negotiations to set demarcations of territorial 
waters between states have helped to establish 
more broadly accepted principles on rights of 
transit for shipping.  Space does not offer a 
similar opportunity.  In fact, regulating military 
activities in space is best suited to a broadly 
participatory set of negotiations if a formal 
negotiating process is the preferred approach.  
Otherwise, the bilateral and regional process 
could become unwieldy, particularly if more 
states engage in activities in space. 
                                                
     20Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
“Administration Missile Defense Papers,” (Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, July 2001). 
     21Task Force on the United Nations, “American Interests 
and UN Reform,” (Washington, D.C.:  United States 
Institute of Peace, 2005), pp. 74 and 84. 
     22United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, pp. 37–44. 
Spring, “An Inchoate Process for Regulation of Military Activities in Space” 
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Adopt Unilateral Declarations 
 
Arms control advocates sometimes point to this 
approach as a means for initiating a diplomatic 
process that will prevent the “weaponization of 
space.”  Specifically, they point to Russia’s 
October 2004 unilateral declaration at the United 
Nations Conference on Disarmament that it 
would not be “the first [state] to deploy any 
weapons in outer space….”23  In fact, the option 
of pursuing unilateral declarations is the one most 
in keeping with the inchoate process for 
regulating military activities in space. 
 
The critical difference between the option of 
issuing unilateral declarations and the inchoate 
process is that the inchoate process is far broader, 
both substantively and in the means of pursuit.  
Substantively, the inchoate process is not focused 
exclusively or even predominantly on arms 
control.  At the outset, President Dwight 
Eisenhower sought to use the inchoate process to 
establish the freedom of passage for vehicles 
through space.24  His effort had little to do with 
arms control but much to do with monitoring the 
Soviet Union. 
 
Moreover, unilateral declarations are but one 
effective procedural tool available to the inchoate 
process.  Other tools include unilateral actions, 
collective actions, and joint declarations.  In fact, 
unilateral and collective actions are the most 
effective because the pattern of behavior that 
emerges is likely to have the most powerful 
impact on regulating military activities in space.  
In this case, the cliché that actions speak louder 
than words is clearly applicable.  Further, the 
inchoate process, unlike the option of issuing 
unilateral declarations, is anything but 
transparent.  Many of the actions the United 
                                                
     23Center for Defense Information, CDI Russia Weekly, 
(Washington, D.C.: CDI, 14 October 2004). 
     24R. Cargill Hall, “National Space Policy and Its 
Interaction with the U.S. Military Space Program,” in 
Military Space and National Policy: Record and 
Interpretation (Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall 
Institute, 2006); and McDougall, Heavens and Earth. 
States has taken in space were based on secret 
presidential directives and National Security 
Council documents.25 
 
Past Operation of the Inchoate Process 
 
Recognizing that the inchoate process has been 
used extensively in the past to regulate military 
activities in space is essential to understanding its 
merits as a procedural approach for regulating 
such activities in the future.  Depending on this 
approach in the future will not represent a sharp 
departure from the approach that has been used to 
date.  Three examples demonstrate why this is so. 
 
Dominance of Intelligence 
 Operations over Military Operations 
 
As noted, the Eisenhower Administration sought 
to establish a U.S. national security presence in 
space for intelligence reasons more than for 
military reasons.  This determined national policy 
rendered international agreements to regulate 
national security activities 
in space problematic, 
given that the relationship 
between intelligence and 
the diplomatic process is at 
best tenuous.  This 
limitation served to 
restrain such diplomacy 
even in the narrower area 
of regulating military 
activities in space.  For 
example, it is unclear at what point an 
intelligence activity becomes a military targeting 
activity.26  In the end, both the United States and 
the Soviet Union came to accept such satellite 
                                                
     25R. Cargill Hall, compiler, “Presidential Decisions: 
NSC Documents, Supplement: Newly Declassified 
Excerpts,” (Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall 
Institute, National Security Space Project, 2006). 
     26The Soviet Union, for example, rejected President 
Eisenhower’s “Open Skies” proposal in 1955 in part 
because it viewed such monitoring as a targeting activity.  
See Hall, “National Space Policy and Its Interaction with 
the U.S. Military Space Program,” p. 2. 
the inchoate 
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monitoring without a specific international 
agreement legitimizing these activities.  In short, 
the pattern of behavior between the two 
superpowers was a more powerful driver than the 
diplomatic process. 
 
This is not to say that the predominant role of 
intelligence activities in space closed off all 
formal diplomacy for regulating military 
activities in space, just that formal agreements 
followed the pattern of behavior established 
primarily by the United States and the Soviet 
Union.  Article IV of the 
Outer Space Treaty 
banned the deployment of 
weapons of mass 
destruction in space and 
prohibited the placement 
of military installations on 
celestial bodies such as 
the Moon.  Further, there 
were limited provisions in later treaties that did 
extend legitimacy to space-based intelligence 
activities.  For example, Article XII of the ABM 
Treaty barred interfering with “national technical 
means of verification” of the Treaty’s provisions, 
and Article V of the 1972 Interim Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain 
Measures with Respect to the Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms contained a similar 
provision.27  The limited areas of formal 
agreement, however, meant that the process of 
tacitly accepting national security activities in 
space, consistent with the inchoate process, was 
the dominant approach to international regulation. 
 
Lack of Demarcation Between  
Territorial Airspace and Outer Space 
 
To this day, there is no formal treaty or non-treaty 
international agreement that defines the upper 
limit of territorial airspace and the lower limit of 
                                                
     27For the text of the Interim Agreement, see United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agreements, pp. 169–171. 
outer space.  The Outer Space Treaty does not 
include a definition.  Nevertheless, states have 
generally come to accept that there is a 
fundamental difference between the two and 
behave in a way that tacitly acknowledges that 
there is some kind of demarcation line. 
 
The lack of a formal definition, generally 
speaking, has not led to unintended conflicts or 
destabilizing actions between or among states.  
While the fact that there exists a zone where 
aircraft cannot fly due to the lack of atmosphere 
and where satellites are unable to maintain orbit 
contributes to this fortunate outcome, it is also an 
argument that demonstrates the strength of the 
inchoate process for regulating military activities 
in space.  The informal and unstructured 
approach to regulating military activities in space, 
even with respect to something as simple and 
fundamental as establishing the geographic 
definition of space, has produced few adverse 
outcomes. 
 
Distinctions between Space and Celestial  
Bodies as International Territory and 
 Space Vehicles as Sovereign Property 
 
This example demonstrates how the inchoate 
process can lead ultimately to formal 
international agreements.  At the outset of the 
space age, it was unclear whether space was an 
extension of territorial airspace.  It was also 
unclear whether satellites, like national flag 
vessels on the high seas, would be afforded the 
protection of sovereign property.  As the United 
States and the Soviet Union, by their behavior, 
came to accept outer space as international 
territory, they also behaved in a way that treated 
their satellites as sovereign property. 
 
In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) adopted Resolution 1721, which called 
for national authorities to register satellites with 
international authorities.28  In 1963, the UNGA 
adopted Resolution 1884, which designated states 
                                                
     28Hays, United States Military Space, pp. 80–81. 
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as the responsible powers for all activities in 
space and sought to assign states jurisdiction 
regarding spacecraft.29  The issue of national 
jurisdiction over spacecraft was formally codified 
in the Outer Space Treaty in 1967.30  Agreements 
requiring the return of satellites to the launching 
state (Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, 
the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space), establishing 
liability for the damage caused by satellites and 
other spacecraft (Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects), 
and registering satellites (Convention on 
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space) were adopted in 1968, 1972, and 1976, 
respectively.31 
 
While national entities were ultimately given 
jurisdiction over the spacecraft they launched or 
registered by formal agreements, these 
agreements followed the behavior patterns 
established primarily by the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  They did not establish initial rules 
in abstract terms that the early space powers were 
then forced to observe. 
 
The Moon Agreement and Proceeding 
with Formal Agreements First: An 
Example of Overreaching? 
 
If formal agreements followed established 
patterns of behavior regarding national 
jurisdiction over satellites and other spacecraft, 
the opposite approach was taken to prohibit 
claims of sovereignty over and the emplacement 
of military installations on the Moon and other 
celestial bodies.  Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty prohibits claims of sovereignty, and 
                                                
     29Ibid., p. 80. 
     30Ibid., pp. 81–86. 
     31Institute of Air and Space, “Policy and Legislative 
Options for Parliamentarians Regarding Possible 
Deployment of Further Military Capabilities in Outer 
Space,” p. 5; see also M.V. Peterson, International Regimes 
for the Final Frontier (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 2005). 
Article IV prohibits the placement of military 
installations.  The Outer Space Treaty was 
opened for signature in 1967 and entered into 
force in 1968, well before Neil Armstrong’s July 
1969 Moon landing. 
 
The general prohibitions regarding celestial 
bodies established in the Outer Space Treaty were 
strengthened and specified in the Agreement 
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies.32  Commonly referred 
to as the Moon Agreement, it was opened for 
signature in 1979 and entered into force in 1984.  
The United States has opted not to join, and only 
12 states are currently participants; an additional 
four states have signed the Agreement but have 
yet to ratify it.33 
 
The mere fact of such limited participation in the 
Moon Agreement should serve as a warning 
about attempts to regulate either commercial or 
military activities in space by initially adopting 
sweeping prohibitions that are not based on at 
least an initial pattern of behavior by relevant 
states.  In addition, circumstances serve to 
indicate, although do not prove, that limitations 
imposed by the relevant provisions of the Outer 
Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement have 
curtailed efforts to develop the Moon, whether for 
economic or military gain.  Klaus Heiss of High 
Frontier, for example, has argued that 
technological advancements should make it 
feasible to reap both economic and national 
security gains from a permanent human presence 
                                                
     32For the text of the Agreement, see United Nations 
Treaties and Principles on Outer Space: Text of Treaties 
and Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly (New York: United Nations, 
2002), pp. 27-35. 
     33U.S. Department of State response to author’s query, 
24 May 2006.  The following states have ratified the Moon 
Agreement: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Kazakhstan, 
Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, and Uruguay.  The following states have signed 
the Moon Agreement but have not ratified it: France, 
Guatemala, India, and Romania. 
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on the Moon.34  Yet attempts to develop the 
Moon have not been made.  The current 
circumstances certainly suggest that the 
prohibitions regarding the exploitation of the 
Moon that are present in both the Outer Space 
Treaty and the Moon Agreement have been a 
contributing factor in the lack of a determined 
effort to establish a permanent human presence 
on the Moon.  The opportunity costs derived from 
this lack of effort are incalculable. 
 
The Inchoate Process: How It May 
Work in the Future 
 
Past use of the inchoate process for the regulation 
of both broader national security and narrower 
military activities in space provides compelling 
evidence that this process can continue to work in 
future.  The inherent flexibility and adaptability 
of this process mean that advances in technology, 
changes in the threat and other political 
circumstances, and changes in military 
requirements will not undermine its effectiveness 
as a tool.  The same characteristics will reduce 
the risks to national security resulting from 
miscalculation or mistake in negotiating and 
entering into formal treaties and other 
international agreements. 
 
As the United States continues to use the inchoate 
process to regulate military activities in space, it 
should observe seven guiding principles. 
 
Establishing Clear and Determined National 
Policy.  Precisely because an inchoate process for 
regulating military activities in space at the 
international level is informal and open-ended, it 
requires a clearly defined and visionary national 
policy toward space.  Only a clear national policy 
can specify properly the patterns of behavior that 
will define the scope and content of international 
regulation of future military activities in space 
that serves the national interest.  The visionary 
                                                
     34Klaus P. Heiss, “Tapping the Wealth of the Moon,” 
The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Vol. 
29, No. 1 (Spring 2004). 
and determined leadership of President 
Eisenhower at the outset of the space age served 
to drive the inchoate process regarding the 
international regulation of all national security–
related space activities for several decades.  This 
is not to say, however, that all aspects of this 
policy will be transparent to foreign states and the 
public at large.  President Eisenhower’s policy 
was no less clear or determined because major 
portions of it were kept secret. 
 
The pillars of this national policy should 
include—but should not necessarily be limited 
to—the following: 
 
Adopting a maritime-based model.  Past actions 
regarding the management of U.S. military 
activities in space have been more in keeping 
with the maritime tradition than with the 
application of air power.  Roughly speaking, the 
United States has treated outer space more like 
the high seas than territorial airspace.  It has 
treated satellites and other spacecraft more like 
naval vessels in international waters.  The 
exception has been the treatment of celestial 
bodies, particularly the Moon.  The maritime 
tradition assumes that unclaimed territories would 
be subject to national appropriation as a natural 
outgrowth of the process of exploration.  Ties to 
the appropriated lands, both commercial and 
military, were maintained through the application 
of sea power. 
 
U.S. national policy 
regarding military 
activities in space 
should sustain and 
expand upon the 
traditions already 
partially established 
regarding the treatment of outer space and 
satellites and spacecraft.  Regarding the military 
exploitation of celestial bodies, and most 
particularly the Moon, U.S. policy should move 
away from existing precedents and toward a 
policy more in keeping with the maritime 
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tradition.  Specifically, the United States should 
seek to obtain practical control over high-value 
areas of the Moon, although the point at which 
this will require changing the existing web of 
international agreements regarding the Moon and 
other celestial bodies is unclear. 
 
Defending the homeland against attacks from 
and through space.  The highest priority of any 
nation’s defense policy is to protect the homeland 
against attack.  It matters little, from the broad 
perspective, whether such attacks originate from 
across borders on land, from the sea, through the 
air, or through space. 
 
Today, the greatest threat to the U.S. homeland 
from space is ballistic missiles.  Since most types 
of these missiles spend significant portions of 
their flight times in space, the most effective 
defenses will likewise be deployed in space.35  
U.S. policy should direct the military to deploy 
effective space-based interceptors for countering 
ballistic missiles in flight as soon as possible. 
 
Ensuring the survivability of space assets.  The 
U.S. Navy’s first order of business is to design, 
build, and deploy vessels that can operate in the 
maritime environment and defend themselves 
against attack.  This means that the Navy must 
also maintain a fleet that is large enough for the 
loss of vessels to natural causes or purposeful 
attack not to render the Navy incapable of 
fulfilling its missions. 
 
The same approach should apply to U.S. military 
spacecraft.  They should be designed to protect 
themselves through both active and passive 
defenses.  This starts with a robust capability to 
detect, track, and target any and all threats to their 
                                                
     35For a detailed description of how best to counter 
ballistic missiles with space-based interceptors, including 
how to address issues related to the international regime 
governing military activities in space, see Missile Defense, 
the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century, 
Report of the Independent Working Group on Missile 
Defense (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, 
Mass., and Washington, D.C., 2006). 
survival.  U.S. policy should further direct that 
the fleet of spacecraft is large enough that 
replacements may be deployed quickly and 
efficiently in the event of losses. 
 
Protecting space lines of communication.  The 
Navy recognizes that the seas are places through 
which international military forces and commerce 
transit.  Despite the fact that international waters 
are outside the national jurisdiction of the United 
States, the Navy takes it upon itself to provide the 
practical means to insure the security of these 
channels of activity by confronting states that 
make unjustified territorial claims or that take 
forceful action to interrupt peaceful transit.  
Space also hosts important channels of military 
and commercial activity.  These channels are 
expanding in both volume and importance.  U.S. 
policy should insure that U.S. space forces are 
capable of protecting these channels against 
attack.  The task of protecting space lines of 
communication can start with the development of 
military capabilities to protect U.S. government 
and commercial satellites against attacks designed 
to curtail operations or disrupt their orbits. 
 
Protecting rights of passage and commerce.  
From the outset of the space age, it has been U.S. 
policy to establish the right of passage through 
space.  This policy has been largely successful.  
This makes space functionally equivalent to the 
sea regarding the exercise of these rights. 
 
It is critical to recognize that, ultimately, these 
rights at sea are protected not by international 
agreements that proclaim them, but by the might 
of the U.S. Navy.  International agreements 
proclaiming the same rights regarding space will 
likewise prove insufficient to protect them.36  
U.S. military power must be sufficient to counter 
                                                
     36For discussion of the complex relationship between 
military and civilian operators in space, see Elizabeth 
Waldrop, “Integration of Military and Civilian Space 
Assets: Legal and National Security Implications, Air Force 
Law Review, Spring 2004. 
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any significant challenges to these rights, both by 
states and non-state actors. 
 
Maintaining the ability to project power through 
space.  Projecting U.S. power over the sea has 
been a key Navy task since shortly after the 
founding of the nation.  During World War II, the 
German government revolutionized warfare when 
it demonstrated its ability to project military 
power through space by launching V-2 rockets.  
The United States and the Soviet Union came to 
dominate this capability during the Cold War by 
fielding large numbers of nuclear-armed ballistic 
missiles.  Many nations are now following suit by 
fielding their own ballistic missiles. 
 
In the future, power could well be projected 
through space by means other than ballistic 
missiles.  These could include manned space 
planes and directed energy weapons.  U.S. policy 
should therefore direct that the military maintain 
an unquestioned advantage in the means of 
projecting power through space.  This is not to 
say that procuring and deploying these 
capabilities will be an easy task.  Ultimately, it 
will depend on bringing the relevant technologies 
to maturity. 
 
Adopt Flexible Tactics 
 
If the inchoate process for regulating military 
activities in space at the international level 
demands a determined national policy to make it 
useful in furthering the national interest, it also 
requires flexible tactics.  The chief advantage in 
the process’s informality is that it will not result 
in the establishment of international rules that 
redound to the nation’s disadvantage following 
the occurrence of unforeseen events. 
 
Therefore, U.S. policy should not allow the 
appearance of inconsistency to prevent it from 
adopting new and different approaches to 
maintaining its military advantage in space.  For 
example, a U.S. technological breakthrough on a 
flexible and cost-effective means for removing 
space debris may allow an approach to protecting 
space lines of communication that emphasizes 
mitigation over prevention.  Indeed, responding 
to such developments should be seen as a natural 
part of the establishment of a pattern of behavior 
that will form a sturdy basis for the international 
regulation of military activities in space.  It is in 
keeping with the common-law tradition in the 
domestic setting. 
 
Recognize the Preeminence of State  
Sovereignty as the Core of the Inchoate Process 
 
A rational process for regulating military 
activities in space at the international level must 
be based on recognition of 
the preeminence of state 
sovereignty.  The system 
of state sovereignty is 
under attack from forces 
below and above; it needs 
to be defended.37  The 
forces that are attacking 
state sovereignty from 
below are those of civil 
conflict and chaos and are 
not relevant to the issue of 
regulating military activities in space.  On the 
other hand, the forces attacking state sovereignty 
from above are quite relevant. 
 
Leaders of the United Nations Secretariat and 
UN-related organizations are demonstrating an 
ambition to override state sovereignty by 
arrogating to them the power to arbitrate disputes 
between states.38  The inchoate process is ideally 
                                                
     37For forceful arguments in favor of shoring up the state 
system, see Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Case for Sovereignty: 
Why the World Should Welcome American Independence 
(Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 2004), and George P. 
Shultz, “A Changed World,” The Henry A. Kissinger 
Lecture at the Library of Congress, 11 February 2004, as 
transcribed by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. 
     38The mandatory dispute settlement procedures under the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea are 
prime examples of this arrogation of power.  This example 
is particularly relevant to the issue of the international 
U.S. policy 
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suited to thwarting this arrogation of power 
because it is largely incompatible with the 
creation of international organizations that have 
every incentive to expand their authority.  Under 
no circumstances should the United States enter 
into a treaty or other international agreement that 
gives an international organization the authority 
to arbitrate disputes between participating states 
regarding military activities in space.  At most, 
the powers of such international organizations 
should extend only to mediating such disputes. 
 
Account for the Presence 
 of Private Assets in Space 
 
Clearly, space is not the exclusive domain of 
governments.  Private entities have an extensive 
presence in space as well.  The inchoate process 
for regulating military activities in space provides 
sufficient flexibility to allow national authorities, 
and most specifically military authorities, to 
establish responsibilities for defending privately 
held assets in space.  Ultimately, it is the private 
sector’s use of space that will generate wealth and 
prosperity. 
 
The proper role of national militaries in defending 
the space-based assets of private citizens is not 
entirely clear at this time.  In the case of the 
United States, the military has not focused as 
much attention on defending the privately held 
space assets of U.S. citizens or corporations as it 
has on defending government assets that will 
provide direct support to space-related and other 
military operations.39  This is not solely an issue 
of national policy.  The responsibilities the U.S. 
military assumes in this area are likely to set the 
                                                                               
regulation of military activities in space because these 
dispute settlement procedures could be used to curtail U.S. 
Navy operations.  See Baker Spring, “The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,” testimony before the 
House Committee on International Relations, 12 May 2004. 
     39For example, the military’s Joint Doctrine for Space 
Operations hardly mentions the military’s role in defending 
the interests and assets of private U.S. citizens operating in 
space.  See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Space 
Operations, Joint Publication 3-14, 9 August 2002. 
standard for other nations.  The inchoate process 
for regulating these activities at the international 
level will allow national militaries to establish the 
pattern of behavior that can win broad 
understanding and support. 
 
Recognize that Intelligence Activities 
 in Space are Becoming Less Dominant 
 
At the outset of the space age, intelligence 
activities dominated military activities in space.  
The inchoate process was particularly suited to 
this circumstance because much of this 
intelligence activity was presumed to be “extra 
legal” and beyond the reach of formal 
diplomacy.40  Clearly, the dominance of 
intelligence activities in space is ebbing, and the 
direct military uses of space are coming to the 
fore.  Nevertheless, the inchoate process for the 
international regulation of national security and 
military activities in space can continue to be 
effective even though more open military 
activities in space are becoming the more 
powerful driver. 
 
Given the more open nature of presumably legal 
military activities, however, the pressure to adopt 
formal regulations at the international level will 
grow.  On balance, giving in to this pressure will 
be unwise.  The U.S. military, although in a 
somewhat different manner, will be able to take 
advantage of the flexibility inherent in the 
inchoate process, as the intelligence community 
has to date.  This is not an argument in favor of 
the military adopting methods more in keeping 
with the intelligence community, but to recognize 
that the inherent flexibility in the inchoate process 
will provide the military wider opportunities to 
adapt to technological advances and international 
political developments in space. 
 
 
                                                
     40R. Cargill Hall, “National Space Policy and the U.S. 
Military Space Program,” p. 2; and Gerald M. Steinberg, 
Satellite Reconnaissance: The Role of Informal Bargaining 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983). 
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Focus on Facilitating the Conduct of  
Military Space Activities, Not Limiting Them 
 
A key advantage of the inchoate process for 
regulating military activities in space is that it 
affords the U.S. military greater freedom of 
action.  Many, however, view the process of 
regulating military activities in space 
predominantly as an arms control exercise.41  
Arms control is designed to deprive national 
militaries of their freedom of action.  On the other 
hand, not all international regulations, particularly 
those that are informal and observed as a matter 
of practice, limit freedom of action.  For example, 
international regulation that establishes rights of 
passage will increase the military’s freedom of 
action.  Such regulations, generally speaking, are 
not products of an arms control process. 
 
While space arms control can have a role in the 
international regulatory process, it should be 
pursued cautiously and applied narrowly.  
Generally speaking, the United States should be 
conscious of two things regarding space arms 
control:  First, competitor states, recognizing the 
U.S. lead in military space capabilities, will 
attempt to use arms control to buy time and 
ultimately to catch up with the United States; and, 
second, a space arms control agreement will serve 
the national interest if it effectively blocks an 
unwelcome advancement by a competitor state 
while not denying the U.S. military a valuable 
capability. 
 
From this perspective, a nonproliferation 
approach to space arms control is likely to be 
superior to comprehensive bans on certain 
weapons or systems.  An effective 
nonproliferation policy, for example, could result 
in an approach that encourages states to abandon 
programs for deploying their own space systems 
in exchange for select services provided by U.S. 
systems.  The access to such services would be 
curtailed if the services were used for 
                                                
     41Michael Krepon, Space Assurance or Space 
Dominance? 
inappropriate purposes.  Such a nonproliferation 
policy does not necessarily require formal treaties 
or agreements. 
 
Consider that Space is Already “Weaponized” 
 
Certain arms control advocates argue that if the 
United States takes certain steps, such as 
deploying space-based missile defense 
interceptors or anti-satellite weapons, it will be 
the first to weaponize space.  This argument is 
based on the assumption that space is not now 
weaponized.42  Inconvenient for the proponents of 
this view is the fact that space was weaponized at 
the time the Germans launched the first V-2 
rocket during World War II.  The clever use of 
definitions, such as one that excludes ballistic 
missiles, is designed to make it appear that the 
United States will be acting in a provocative way 
if it takes these steps. 
 
This line of reasoning 
is flawed.  For 
example, it would 
assert that for the 
United States to defend 
its territory against a 
missile attack that has 
already been launched 
if the defensive 
interceptors are located 
in space is somehow 
provocative.  By this 
logic, the initial launch 
of the missile attack by 
a U.S. enemy is not provocative.  The space-
based defensive response is defined as 
unacceptably provocative.  U.S. civilian and 
military leaders, under certain circumstances, 
must be prepared to explain to the public that the 
steps they are taking regarding military activities 
in space are reasonable and entirely in keeping 
with similar military actions in other contexts, 
                                                
     42Jeffrey Lewis, “What If Space Were Weaponized?  
Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios,” Center for 




U.S. lead in 
military space 
capabilities, 
will attempt to 
use arms 
control to buy 
time 
Spring, “An Inchoate Process for Regulation of Military Activities in Space” 
14 
 
such as operations on land, at sea, and in the air.  
Otherwise, these leaders must be prepared to 
explain to the public, in the wake of an attack, 
why they did not utilize all available measures to 
defend the nation.  
 
The Inchoate Process and the Path 
Ahead 
 
The drive to regulate military activities in space 
at the international level is nothing new, and 
those concerned about strengthening U.S. military 
capabilities in space need not necessarily resist 
the effort in all instances.  The key to whether 
specific international regulatory efforts contribute 
to or undermine the relative military advantage of 
the United States in space will depend on how 
and to what end these efforts are undertaken. 
 
The United States has little to fear from an 
international regulatory process that is inchoate.  
From a position of strength, the U.S. military can 
use this process to establish patterns of behavior 
that largely accommodate its mission 
requirements.  On the other hand, the military has 
much to fear from formal agreements that include 
sweeping provisions. 
 
On the positive side, the U.S. military is likely to 
find that certain international regulatory measures 
actually enhance its ability to achieve its aims.  
Achieving positive outcomes depends on the U.S. 
military’s understanding clearly what it aims to 
achieve in space and acting deliberately in 
achieving those aims.  In most instances, and 
perhaps in spite of vocal opposition, other states 
are likely to accept those actions as a new 
standard of behavior governing the actions of all 
militaries in space.  In the end, the U.S. military 
may find that the inchoate process for regulating 
military activities in space will help it to attain an 
as yet unrealized capability of mastering space. 
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The question of what constitutes the proper 
military uses of space is not just a debate over 
space weapons and attacks on satellites.  It is a 
debate that sheds light on the fundamental 
decisions that states and their citizens will have to 
make over the next century as we both explore 
and exploit space for its scientific, strategic, and 
economic value.  Furthermore, the context of this 
debate changes year to year as the physical and 
political environment of space changes. 
 
Complicating the debate is the fact that while 
prescriptions for response to the changing space 
environment differ, the goal for most of those 
involved is the same: maintaining reliable access 
and use of space for all peaceful actors – 
including militaries.  Arguments surrounding 
space weapons or treaties normally do a great 
disservice to the fact that most of the participants 
in these debates agree on more things then they 
perhaps realize. 
 
Before attempting to lay out what we believe to 
be the most reliable and stable U.S. strategy for 
reaching this goal, it is important to review some 
of the basic facts that provide a backdrop to this 
debate. 
 
The Space Environment 
 
The specter of space warfare currently is not the 
main threat to global space assets.  Today, the 
main culprit is space itself.  Rather than a benign 
haven, space is a hazardous place fraught with 
potential dangers to fragile satellites and 
spacecraft.  
 
Satellites orbiting Earth have to contend with a 
variety of natural dangers on almost a daily basis.  
Significant hazards that can disable or damage 
satellites include solar radiation, geomagnetic 
storms, and ionization.  Satellite operators have to 
monitor continually the effect of the space 
environment on the upper reaches of the 
atmosphere, which can expand and drag down 
Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites.   
 
Further, as more and more states and commercial 
users seek to exploit the advantages provided by 
space systems for both economic gain and 
military applications; usable near-Earth space is 
beginning to become crowded.  With the increase 
in the number of states owning and operating 
satellites from two – the United States and the 
Soviet Union – during the Cold War to 41 today 
(a number that is growing),1 the potential for 
interference, collisions, tensions, and competition 
is increasing.  There are some 813 known 
working satellites on orbit, with about a dozen 
states able to launch their own satellites.2  The 
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Theresa Hitchens, “International Satellite Innovation and 
Cooperation,” presentation to Military Satellites 2006, 
Washington, D.C., 18 April 2006, CDI Military Satellites 
2006. 
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growing population of satellites and satellite 
operators – including commercial actors not 
responsible to any one government – could lead 
to increasing conflict over access to desired 
orbital slots, radio frequency interference, and 
liability for malfunctions or collisions that 
damage other satellites.  Already, several states 
have made decisions about uses of radio 
frequency spectrum and satellite launches that 
have resulted in spats with other spacefaring 
countries – and in some worrying cases, states 
have questioned the legitimacy of the voluntary 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
process for parceling out spectrum usage and 
orbital slots for communications satellites.3  
Another complicating factor could be the 
emergence of a true space tourism industry, 
which would raise new issues for deconflicting 
launches and tracking space objects.  
 
The proliferation of satellite technology is not 
only horizontal but also vertical – meaning that 
the level of technological sophistication among 
space actors is growing, with more and more 
states acquiring capabilities such as high-
resolution imagery, high-speed, broadband 
satellite communications and low-cost, highly 
maneuverable microsatellites.4  This dual-
pronged proliferation of satellite technology has 
subsequently resulted in more states applying 
space capabilities to the military sphere, possibly 
leading to increased suspicion and tension among 
spacefaring powers.  In particular, U.S. defense 
officials have expressed concern about possible 
threats to U.S. space systems, as well as the 
growing need to prevent potential adversaries 
from deriving military benefit from space systems 
in times of conflict.  In addition, with a number of 
                                                
     3Indonesia, China, the United Kingdom, and Russia are 
among those countries who have been involved in disputes 
over orbital slots; for an overview of the ITU process and 
challenges to the regime see, Theresa Hitchens, Future 
Security in Space: Charting a Cooperative Course, 
(Washington D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 
September 2004), pp. 39-50. 
     4Hitchens, “International Satellite Innovation and 
Cooperation.” 
spacefaring powers now discussing schemes for 
conducting manned research on the Moon, 
asteroids or other planets, the potential for 
disputes about access to planetary resources is 
again emerging as an issue of discussion and 
debate among experts.  
   
But it is widely agreed that 
the greatest “environmental” 
threat currently facing space 
operations is orbital debris.  
U.S. Air Force Space 
Command currently tracks 
over 9,4005 manmade space 
objects routinely, and has 
detected some 4,500 more 
that cannot yet be positively 
identified or routinely tracked.6  The objects that 
can be tracked reliably by the Space Surveillance 
Network’s 30-odd radars and optical facilities 
range in size from large satellites down to objects 
ten centimeters in diameter.7  Even more 
threatening is the amount of smaller-sized debris 
that cannot be seen, or can only be detected 
momentarily.  Nuts, bolts, paint flecks, and frozen 
droplets of un-burned rocket fuel all whiz around 
the Earth at speeds approaching seven to eight 
kilometers per second.  At these speeds (and at 
greater relative speeds), debris impacts have the 
effect of liquefying metal and causing 
catastrophic failure of satellites.8  For example, 
on 29 March 2006, the Russian Ekspress AM11 
communications satellite stopped operating; the 
cause was determined as a hypervelocity debris 
                                                
     5NASA, Orbital Debris Quarterly News, Sara Portman, 
ed, Volume 10, Issue 1, January 2006, p. 7.  See also U.S. 
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Fact Sheet, Space 
Control:Reentry Assessment and Space Surveillance (last 
updated March 2004) Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: U.S. 
Strategic Command Public Affairs Office. 
     6Author email exchange with a NASA official.  
     7STRATCOM Fact Sheet, “Space Control: Reentry 
Assessment and Space Surveillance.” 
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impact.9  Such impacts, particularly in 
Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) where the satellite 
(and most other large communications satellites) 
was stationed, are rare; National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) computer models 
predict only about ten catastrophic collisions over 
the next 200 years.10  But according to a recent 
study by NASA debris experts J.C. Liou and 
Nicholas Johnson, even without any new 
launches, the debris population will increase in 
the coming centuries.11  “In reality the situation 
will undoubtedly be worse, because spacecraft 
and their orbital stages will continue to be 
launched,” Johnson said.12 
 
The U.S. Air Force understands the danger of 
debris generation and the unintentional negative 
consequences that debris can have.  Deputy 
Under Secretary of the Air Force Gary Payton 
recently spoke out against debris generating anti-
satellite weapons, stating, “We’d be fools to 
actually get into the kinetic energy anti-satellite 
business.  It would be hugely disadvantageous for 
the U.S. to get into that game.”13  Nonetheless, 
there remain those in the U.S. national security 
community promoting the use of debris-creating 
kinetic energy anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and 
space-based kinetic energy interceptors for 
attacking ballistic missiles, as well as weapons 
based in space that in and of themselves, by 
virtue of their on-board fuel and desirability as 





                                                
     9SpaceDaily.com, “Russian Satellite Failure Caused by 
Space Garbage,” 17 April 2006, accessed from Russian 
Satellite Failure Caused by Space Garbage. 
     10Mike Toner, “Final Frontier Littered with Junk,” Cox 
News Service, 27 February 2006. 
     11J.C. Liou and N.L. Johnson, “Risks in Space From 
Orbiting Debris,” Science, Vol. 311, 22 January 2006. 
     12Toner, “Final Frontier Junk.” 
     13Jeremy Singer, “USAF Interest in Lasers Triggers 
Concerns About Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Space News,  
1 May 2006. 
The Way Forward 
 
The above facts about the current “state of space” 
leave U.S. decision makers with a weighty 
dilemma:  how best to guarantee reliable access 
and use of space for all peaceful actors, including 
the U.S. military, while at the same time 
preventing dangerous and destabilizing behaviors 
in space or conflicts that threaten space assets.  
 
Some believe that the deployment of ASATs and 
space weapons now, before there is a recognized 
or developed threat, would serve to dissuade any 
use of force against potential U.S. targets in 
space, as well as improve ground-strike 
capabilities.  Others believe that space is an 
inherent sanctuary and that the proper response is 
a pre-emptive arms control treaty, barring all 
weapons, not just weapons of mass destruction,14 
from space.  In our view, the best approach to 
ensuring future security in space can be found 
somewhere in the middle of this spectrum.  
Establishing good practices by all actors, based 
on solid behavioral norms and the rule of law, are 
at the heart of the approach laid out below. 
 
If space is a sanctuary, this is due to political will 
as well as technological and economic 
limitations.  During the Cold War, the United 
States and the Soviet Union – after testing, and in 
some cases temporarily deploying, space 
weapons – realized the intricate linkage between 
space assets and nuclear forces and the inherent 
dangers of deeming satellites legitimate physical 
targets.  The primary issue was one of stability: 
with space assets (i.e. spy satellites) serving as 
key strategic nuclear warning systems, any 
actions that were perceived by either side to 
threaten their secure functioning could have dire 
consequences, including accidental nuclear war.  
                                                
     14The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 banned the stationing 
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some debate as to whether the “peaceful purposes” dictum 
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conventional weapons in space is not proscribed. 




Thus, neither side moved to deploy permanently 
either anti-satellite weapons or weapons based on 
orbit.  While the Cold War is over, the dynamics 
of the space-nuclear stability equation have 
changed little – with the only issue being the 
emergence of new space and nuclear weapons 
players who arguably have tense and inherently 
less stable relations among each other than did 
the United States and Soviet Union.  
 
In addition, although access to space is growing, 
it always has been and remains today a very 
expensive place to operate and satellites are high-
cost, high-value assets, meaning that cost 
considerations are always at the forefront in 
weighing national security tradeoffs.  A risky 
security environment for satellites would 
inevitably raise costs for all space actors. 
 
The fact of the matter is that space as it relates to 
national security cannot be treated the same as the 
Navy treats the sea or the Air Force treats the sky.  
It is physically different, and the concepts of 
dominance and superiority have fundamentally 
different meanings and connotations in space.  
The laws of physics and the globalization of 
space access dictate that no one nation, one 
person or one entity can “own” space; and, more 
importantly, means that the actions of any one 
actor in space cannot fail to have direct 
repercussions upon the space-based assets of 
others.  The physical and cost environments of 
space described above alter the threat perceptions 
of states and create a large gap between policy, 
capability, and political will.  By this, we mean 
that policies that call for space weapons cannot, 
by themselves, remove the technological 
roadblocks to develop those weapons, nor can 
they necessarily create the political and 
diplomatic impetus to actually pay for or use 
them.  Even if such weapons are technically, 
economically and politically feasible, the use of 
anti-satellite or space-based weapons are likely to 
cause more harm than good to the future access to 
and use of space across the board, especially if 
the weapon is debris-generating or if it can easily 
be countered with a low-cost debris-generating 
weapon. 
 
Debris-generating weapons, in particular, present 
a lose-lose situation, as Payton outlined above.  
Further, there is a danger that the advent within 
the U.S. military of dedicated ASAT weapons 
using temporary and reversible means, while 
directly avoiding the debris problems of kinetic or 
high-powered directed 
energy weapons and 
certainly preferable to such 
destructive weapons, could 
lead other states to choose 
less advanced, cheaper 
means to counter U.S. 
technological superiority.  
Much as we see in Iraq with 
relatively low-cost 
improvised explosive device 
(IEDs), the rules of warfare will be hard to dictate 
in space, as they are on the ground.   
   
Moreover, because space is a global commons 
and most satellites are used for civil or 
commercial activities, warfare in space would be 
certain to debilitate its use for near- and mid-term 
economic and scientific development.  The rise of 
tensions and the threat of warfare would undercut 
future cooperation on space exploration, and thus 
hamper long-term scientific development that 
would benefit future generations.   
 
For all of these reasons, we hold that a space war 
fighting strategy based on dedicated ASATs and 
space-based weapons would undercut, rather than 
enhance, U.S. national security and global 
security in space.  Present U.S. policy and 
strategy should instead be focused on establishing 
good practices and the rule of law in space in 
order to foster a stable basis for interaction 
among space actors. 
 
Unfortunately, as fears about the security of space 
assets grow, several states – led by the United 
States but also including China, India, and Israel 
space cannot 
be treated the 
same way the 
Navy treats the 
sea or the Air 
Force treats 
the sky 




– are debating the need to both protect their space 
assets and prepare for space war by building 
capabilities to disrupt or destroy the space assets 
of potential enemies.  This insecurity is in itself 
dangerous because it threatens to lead to a vicious 
circle whereby one nation reacts to “defend” 
against a perceived threat, leading a second 
nation to feel threatened by the first’s defensive 
actions and take its own “defensive” actions that 
further escalate the tensions – or even create 
tensions that were not present in the first place.  
 
At the same time, we cannot ignore that U.S. 
space assets – including its important military 
assets – are vulnerable, and may be subject to 
future threats.  This is a serious issue and one that 
requires a coherent effort to address.  A strategy 
to protect global space access and keep space free 
from warfare does not, and should 
not, require the United States to 
accept victimization and be left 
defenseless.  There are common 
sense steps that leadership in the 
United States can take to ensure 
the safety and security of its space 
assets.  Furthermore, there are 
steps that the United States can take in concert 
with its political and economic partners to 
increase all states confidence in secure and 
peaceful access to space. 
 
Improve Space Surveillance and 
Tracking 
 
One of the immediate, and most important, ways 
that space security can be improved would be 
through an improved, better-structured system for 
space surveillance and tracking.  “Seeing” what is 
going on in space is critical for detecting and 
monitoring space debris, as well as for following 
satellites and spacecraft in order to predict and 
avoid potential collisions.  It is also important for 
diagnosing satellite failures, and for detecting and 
monitoring potential deliberate threats against 
space assets.  Effective space surveillance would 
also be the underpinning for the development of 
an international space traffic management regime 
(discussed below).  Finally, space surveillance 
and tracking provides an essential element in any 
effort to build confidence and dampen threat 
perceptions by increasing transparency among 
actors.  
 
Unfortunately, surveillance and tracking 
capabilities currently are not sufficient.  There are 
technical limitations that require concerted efforts 
to overcome.  Finding and reliably tracking space 
objects, especially debris, remains a major 
challenge, requiring a network of radar and 
optical sensors and complex computer modeling 
capabilities to project orbital trajectories.  Neither 
of the world’s two major space surveillance 
networks, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network 
(SSN) and the Russian Space Surveillance 
System (SSS) can reliably track 
debris smaller than ten centimeters 
in diameter (the size of a baseball) 
in LEO, even though debris as small 
as one centimeter in diameter can 
cause catastrophic damage to a 
satellite.  Further, neither system 
can reliably detect or track objects 
smaller than about one meter in diameter in the 
critical GEO where most of the world’s 
communications satellites are stationed.  Neither 
the SSN nor the SSS is able to track space objects 
in real time, as this would require much larger 
numbers of sensors.  Finally, as an artifact of the 
Cold War, neither the U.S. nor Russian network 
provides good coverage of near-Earth space in the 
Southern Hemisphere since each network was 
optimized to focus on the other side’s space 
systems.15 
 
Process issues for sharing space launch and space 
surveillance data also are becoming a question as 
more space actors emerge.  Only the United 
States routinely shares space surveillance data 
with other space actors, and that process has 
become more complicated due to increased 
concern in the United States about the security of 
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its own space assets.  While the international 
space industry has informal protocols for 
communications about the launch, subsequent 
whereabouts and health of commercial satellites, 
there is not a routine, codified process for data 
and information sharing in existence.  Current 
international instruments for registering satellite 
launch and radio frequency/orbital slot allocations 
– maintained by the United Nations (UN) and the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
respectively – are poorly complied with and 
inadequate.      
 
Further, the fact that the U.S. Air Force’s SSN 
has a de facto monopoly on surveillance and 
tracking data unfortunately is perceived by a 
number of space actors outside the United States 
as a potential problem.  There are emerging fears, 
including among U.S. allies and friends, that a 
U.S. decision to refuse to provide data could 
impinge on other state’s ability to access space; 
or that data provided by the U.S. may not be 
reliable, as was the case with U.S. intelligence 
provided to the international community in the 
run up to the American invasion of Iraq.  While 
we are not making a value judgment on the 
validity of such fears, the fact that such 
perceptions exist is, in and of itself, a worrisome 
development with regard to the growing level of 
tension among space actors.  
 
Thus, as critical first steps towards both 
protecting U.S. space assets and for ensuring 
future access to space for all, the United States 
should take a leadership role in addressing space 
surveillance needs.  This should include technical 
research and development to improve the 
capabilities of the SSN, particularly with regard 
to detecting and tracking smaller sized space 
debris and gaining more clarity about the 
environment in GEO.  Fortunately, the U.S. Air 
Force has made space surveillance – and what the 
service dubs “space situational awareness,” a 
term that includes satellite monitoring and 
diagnostics – a high priority.  For example, the 
service is working to improve its network of 
ground-based telescopes to enhance images 
digitally and make it easier to combine the 
images obtained with other sources to create more 
detailed pictures.16  Unfortunately, several other 
key programs are in trouble.  The Space Based 
Space Surveillance (SBSS) system – expected to 
comprise four or five satellites carrying optical 
sensors for tracking objects in LEO and designed 
to augment the ground-based network which 
cannot see through cloud cover – is behind 
schedule and the single space surveillance 
satellite it is supposed to replace is likely to reach 
the end of its life before the first satellite of the 
new system can be launched.17  Another satellite 
effort, called the Orbital Deep Space Imager and 
designed to detect and track objects in GEO, was 
canceled by the Air Force in early 2006.18  The 
Air Force should redouble efforts – and the 
Congress should support those efforts – to speed 
SBSS and retarget funding to the Orbital Deep 
Space Imager as soon as possible, among other 
efforts to robustly fund required updates to the 
SSN. 
 
With regard to data sharing, the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DOD) should move more rapidly to 
set clear processes and guidelines for its new 
Space-Track program for disseminating orbital 
data to other states, commercial users and 
researchers.  Interim guidelines have been put 
forward, but it remains unclear how the system 
may work in future.  In addition, DOD should 
reverse its policies aimed at applying restrictions 
on how approved users publish and redistribute 
the data and analyses based on the data.  
Currently, researchers must have written 
permission from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense to pass on or publish data gathered 
through Space-Track, including basic data such as 
the number of debris in the current SSN catalog.  
The basic orbital elements of any space object – 
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News, 27 February 2006. 
     18Ibid. 




that in the past were published by NASA free to 
anyone who wanted to view them – are of next to 
no use to those who might wish to target 
satellites; further a determined attacker could find 
ways to do so without access to that data.19 
 
U.S. government and DOD officials should also 
be encouraging other states to build capacity, 
particularly in the area of sensors and collision 
avoidance models.  Although there is naturally 
some concern on the part of the 
intelligence and military space 
community about improved capabilities 
on the part of non-U.S. actors leading to 
potential threats to U.S. satellites, there 
also could be some value to additional, 
complementary space surveillance 
assets.  For one thing, non-U.S. data 
could be used to verify findings by the 
SSN – something that in a crisis 
situation could be very helpful 
politically.  Several European countries 
currently operate radar and telescope 
facilities that are used, on an occasional 
basis, to detect and track debris.  Indeed, the 
European Union and the European Space Agency 
are contemplating a program to link current 
European assets into a unified network that could 
function independently of the U.S. SSN.  The 
United States should work with its European 
allies to encourage such a program, but at the 
same time urge the Europeans to craft a network 
that would fill current gaps in the SSN and that 
would function at least partially in tandem with it.  
This would require that the U.S. space 
surveillance community move away from its 
cultural proclivity toward excess secrecy; and that 
the Europeans suppress any knee-jerk anti-
American reaction to the idea of 
complementarities.  But there is no reason that 
space surveillance data provided by overlapping, 
but separate networks, could not be produced in a 
fashion that would protect necessary secrecy 
                                                
     19Theresa Hitchens “Safeguarding Space: Building 
Cooperative Norms to Dampen Negative Trends,” 
Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 81, Winter 2005, p. 59. 
regarding national capabilities but at the same 
time allow wide sharing of basic, critical data.20 
 
Finally, the U.S. government should work with 
the commercial satellite industry – and the 
international community – to establish clear 
processes for industry-to-industry 
communications, and to build and support a more 
robust system for registering satellite operations 
data.  For example, immediate efforts should be 
undertaken to improve (and improve 
compliance with) the UN Satellite Registry, 
including requiring registrants to report 
when an object has moved from its initial 
insertion orbit, becomes dysfunctional or its 
orbit begins to decay.  In addition, the 
United States should resurrect, on a 
multinational basis starting with those states 
capable of space launch, its moribund 
bilateral effort with Russia to develop a 
process for pre-launch and post-launch 
notification.  The U.S.-Russia agreements 
were primarily aimed at providing 
transparency about ballistic missile launch, 
but were quite detailed and the data exchange 
proposed would be inherently applicable to space 
launch and the prevention of interference or 
collision.21   
                                                
     20Theresa Hitchens, “The Next Galileo Flap?  EU Space 
Surveillance Move Provides Opportunities, Challenges, for 
U.S.,” Space News, 16 May 2005. 
     21For more information regarding the June 2000 U.S.-
Russian Joint Data Exchange Center and the subsequent 
December 2000 U.S.-Russian Pre- and Post-Launch 
Notification Agreement, see: Lt. Col. Peter L. Hays, USAF, 
United States Military Space:  Into the Twenty-First 
Century, INSS Occasional Paper 42, USAF Academy, 
Colo.: Institute for National Security Studies, September 
2002, p. 96,; and U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, 
“Memorandum of Understanding on Notification of Missile 















Redundancy and Protection 
 
Multiple reports have pointed to the 
vulnerabilities that stem from the United States’ 
increased dependency on space assets for military 
operations, homeland security, and economic 
prosperity.  These include the 2001 “Report of the 
Commission to Assess United States National 
Security Space Management and Organization,” 
chaired by Donald Rumsfeld prior to his 
appointment as U.S. defense secretary, and 
known as the Space Commission Report.  The 
report famously warned of the potential of a 
“Pearl Harbor” in space, and stated: “[The] 
present extent of U.S. dependence on space, the 
rapid pace at which this dependence is increasing 
and the vulnerabilities it creates all demand that 
U.S. national security space interests be 
recognized as a top national security priority.”22  
It is true that U.S. satellite systems have both 
inherent, and unfortunately sometimes 
engineered, vulnerabilities – both with regard to 
the basic space environment and to potential 
deliberate attacks.  The prescription for resolving 
this situation is the development and 
implementation of a coherent strategy for both 
protection of space systems – including their 
terrestrial nodes – as well as for providing 
redundant capabilities both in space and 
terrestrially.  
 
On this front, there already has been slow 
progress.  In recent years, DOD officials have 
been particularly worried about the vulnerabilities 
of commercial satellites, given that the military is 
heavily reliant on commercial providers for its 
own communications needs – especially in 
wartime, when some 65-80 percent of military 
communications is carried over commercial 
bandwidth.23  A February 2004 report by a special 
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Space Management and Organization, 11 January 2001, 
(hereafter, Space Commission Report), p. ix. 
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Satellite Task Force of the President’s National 
Security Telecommunications Advisory 
Committee (NSTAC) highlighted commercial 
satellite vulnerabilities, including the lack of 
encrypted uplinks and downlinks.24  DOD 
subsequently launched a sustained effort to work 
with the CEOs of major commercial providers to 
come up with criteria and commercial best 
practices to address security concerns and 
establish reporting processes for problems.25  This 
effort should continue to receive priority U.S. 
government attention, and be expanded to include 
working with U.S. allies and friends.  Not only 
are many commercial satellite providers 
multinational companies, but also allied satellite 
capabilities are crucial to joint operations in times 
of crisis and war.  In addition, in Europe there is 
an increasing awareness of the importance of 
satellite services to security and to European 
militaries – an awareness that should help provide 
a foundation for any U.S.-led efforts to build 
processes that would underpin mutual security 
interests. 
 
The use of redundant systems and subsystems, 
terrestrial back-up links, unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAV), high altitude airships, and on-
orbit spares can help to alleviate single point 
failures and also provide needed emergency 
assets.  Again, the U.S. Air Force in particular has 
recognized the potential value of non-space 
systems for providing space-like capabilities and 
is actively pursuing UAVs and high-altitude 
solutions.26  Initiatives such as the Operationally 
Responsive Space (ORS) program,27 designed to 
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ensure rapid access to space and reconstitution of 
lost satellites, and the advent of microsatellites 
that can be networked to provide the same 
functionality as one large satellite, also could be 
used to help to alleviate these failure points – as 
well as provide a revolutionary improvement in 
satellite costs and capabilities.  However, it 
should be stated that both ORS systems and 
microsatellites could also be weaponized, and the 
perception that such technologies are being 
developed for offensive or destructive purposes 
must be balanced by responsible rules for their 
use (see below).  That said, more priority – and 
funding – should be placed on finding ways to 
prevent satellite capabilities from 
becoming single point failures for 





Many of the tensions during the Cold 
War were dampened to some degree 
by civilian space cooperation 
between the Soviet Union and the United States.  
The transparency gained by both sides and the 
subtle shifting in perceptions that came in the 
wake of Apollo-Soyuz also cannot be discounted.  
But joint missions such as Apollo-Soyuz 
provided not just the political appearance of 
cooperation; they also laid the groundwork for 
substantive Russian-U.S. cooperation in space 
today.  Without cooperation during the Cold War, 
and smart engagement with Moscow immediately 
after the fall of the Soviet Union, the United 
States would most likely lack access to the 
International Space Station in light of the current 
state of the Space Shuttle fleet. 
 
Today, while there is no “cold warrior” 
competitor to the United States, civilian 
cooperation with states such has China would 
give each nation an opportunity to gauge each 
other’s plans in space.  Many in the U.S. 
                                                                               
see Jeremy Singer, “Responsive Space,” Air Force 
Magazine, Vol. 89, No. 3, March 2006,.  
government understand the benefits of 
cooperation, including from a strategic and 
intelligence context.  Recent discussions of 
cooperation with China on space endeavors, 
including the visit to China by NASA 
administrator Michael Griffin, are positive steps 
in building economic and strategic confidence 
between the two states at a time when the two 
militaries seem to be on a collision course with 
regard to space. 
 
However, there are still major barriers to 
international cooperation – not only with China – 
that one day may lead to conflict.  Current export 
regulations, such as the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 
while designed to ensure that select 
technologies do not reach the hands of 
those wishing to attack U.S. targets, 
also has the unintended consequence of 
limiting the amount of beneficial 
cooperation that can occur between 
states in the space arena.  ITAR not 
only restricts cooperation between the 
United States and China, but between 
the United States and its allies as well as U.S. 
companies and any foreign entity.  These export 
restrictions do not just limit the amount of 
business that can be done between states; they 
have also been identified as contributing causes to 
the failure of missions.  For example, following 
the recent failed NASA DART (Demonstration of 
Autonomous Rendezvous Technology) mission 
designed to test automatic maneuvering in space, 
the mishap investigation board pointed to ITAR 
regulations that created “perceived restrictions” in 
what NASA engineers could discuss with the 
foreign designers of a main component that was 
found to be a root cause of the malfunction.28   
 
International cooperation between non-U.S. 
companies is still proceeding but at a glacial pace.  
The United States would be wise to re-evaluate if 
                                                
     28NASA, “Overview of the DART Mishap Investigation 
Results,” 15 May 2006, The full report itself was not 












ITAR regulations governing space activities, 
particularly commercial and civil activities, are 
still in the best interest of U.S. companies and 
international security, especially if those 
regulations prevent cooperation that can lead to 
valuable confidence building measures.  The 
measures in train to find ways to cooperate with 
China, while protecting genuine national security 
concerns, also must be continued, prioritized, and 
supported by Congress and across the U.S. space 
community. 
 
Code of Conduct 
 
The 2001 Space Commission Report also 
contained an important, but oft-overlooked 
recommendation: 
 
The U.S. will require…engaging U.S. allies 
and friends, and the international community, 
in a sustained effort to fashion appropriate 
“rules of the road” for space.29 
 
Rules of the road, or codes of conduct, are not 
new to the military sphere.  They are tried and 
tested ways to shape behaviors and avoid 
dangerous misunderstandings and conflicts.  
Perhaps the most successful and famous set of 
rules of the road is the 1972 Incidents at Sea 
Agreement (IncSea), signed between U.S. 
Secretary of the Navy John Warner and his Soviet 
counterpart.  Thirty other navies signed 
subsequent agreements.30  Today, the 
administration of President George W. Bush and 
the U.S. Armed Forces champion a number of 
executive-level codes of conduct designed to 
fight proliferation of dangerous materials 
necessary for the construction of weapons of 
mass destruction (e.g. – the Proliferation Security 
Initiative and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency Code of Conduct on the Safety and 
Security of Radioactive Sources). 
 
                                                
     29Space Commission Report, p. 18. 
     30Michael Krepon, “Ground Rules for Space,” Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2005, p. 68. 
A code of conduct for space would not have to be 
negotiated in a multinational forum like a treaty, 
nor would it need to be subject to ratification in 
the U.S. Senate.  A sustained effort on the part of 
the United States would only require finding 
another state, or states, willing to agree upon 
appropriate rules.  It could even be argued that if 
the United States unilaterally declared that it 
would follow certain rules in space, other states 
would join, based on U.S. space leadership.  
However, due to the current political context, an 
international effort, even if limited to a select 
number of countries, would be preferable to a 
unilateral declaration. 
 
Key elements of a code of conduct for 
responsible spacefaring states would include 
debris mitigation, traffic management, and the 
preannouncement of dangerous maneuvers such 




The United States has been a leader in the arena 
of space debris mitigation, fully supporting and 
promoting international efforts to develop a 
voluntary set of guidelines for space operators.  In 
2002, the Inter-Agency Space Debris 
Coordinating Committee (IADC), comprising the 
space agencies of China, France, Germany, India, 
Italy, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, plus the 
European Space Agency (ESA), issued a set of 
technical guidelines for debris mitigation.  Those 
proposed guidelines were submitted to the UN 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS) for consideration by member states.  
After several years of political jockeying, a less 
technically specific version of the IADC 
guidelines were crafted by a working group in 
June 2005 and accepted by COPUOS’s Scientific 
and Technical Subcommittee at the organization’s 
March 2006 meeting.31  The voluntary guidelines, 
                                                
     31United Nations Press Release, “Outer Space Scientific 
and Technical Committee Concludes 43rd Session in 
Vienna,” UNIS/OS/329, March 8, 2006; author 




which include a provision pledging signatories to 
avoid the intentional destruction of space objects 
that would create long-lived debris,32 are now 
being reviewed by individual national 
governments and are expected to be finally 
approved in 2007.33  Not only should the United 
States accept these guidelines, but it should also 
continue to push for more progress in the 
international arena.  One effort that the United 
States could lead would be military-to-military 
discussions among spacefaring states aimed at 
pledging to uphold strictly the mitigation 
guidelines including during weapons tests.  In 
addition, the United States should work with 
other spacefaring states to establish, based on the 
voluntary guidelines, legal structures that could 
reinforce compliance with best debris practices at 
the international level – so as to create a level 
playing field for industry and at the same time 
avoid backsliding, particularly by those states 
seeking entry to the international market by 
offering cheap launch and satellite services to the 
detriment of voluntary rules which are perceived 
to increase near-term costs.  For example, a 
working group at COPUOS’s legal subcommittee 
should be stood up to explore how the Liability 
Convention could be used, or amended, to 
enforce strictures against debris creation.  In the 
meantime, debris mitigation guidelines would be 




Space traffic management is also an arena where 
there is slow progress toward creating rules-based 
processes that could help avoid interference, 
collision, and conflict in space.  Since 2001, U.S. 
                                                                               
conversations, 30 March 2006, with a government official 
who attended the meeting. 
     32Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 
“Intercessional Meeting of the Working Group on Space 
Debris of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee: 
Progress Report of the Chairman of the Working Group on 
the Results of the Intercessional Meeting,” 
A/AC.105/2005/CRP.18, 16 June 2005.  
     33Author conversations with a government official who 
attended the meetings, 30 March 2006. 
and international industry and scientific 
organizations have been examining the issues 
involved with coordinating space launch and on-
orbit operations – many of which overlap with the 
discussions regarding debris mitigation.  One of 
the first major reports on the subject was issued in 
2001, following a series of workshops held by the 
American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, called “Addressing the Challenges 
of the New Millennium.”  That report highlighted 
the fact that current international laws and 
regulatory structures fall short in providing “clear 
legal guidance,” and that there exist no rules that 
“prohibit new satellites being launched into orbits 
that could later threaten existing satellites” or 
rules regarding maneuvering of spacecraft.34 
 
The most recent, and comprehensive, report was 
issued by the International Academy of 
Astronautics in 
September 2005.  The 
“IAA Cosmic Study35 
on Space Traffic 
Management” lays out 
the many space traffic 
challenges, overviews 
the current legal and 
regulatory framework, 
and puts forward a 
framework of required 
elements for 
addressing space traffic 
in the launch phase, the on-orbit operations phase, 
and the re-entry phase for debris.36  Some major 
elements of the IAA framework include 
clarifying liability for damages in outer space, the 
                                                
     34American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 
“International Space Cooperation: Addressing Challenges 
of the New Millennium,” 6th International Space 
Cooperation Workshop Report,” International Activities 
Committee, March 2001, p. 9. 
     35The term “cosmic” study means that the report has 
been approved by the IAA Board at its highest level. 
     36Kai-Uwe Schrogl and Petr Lala, coordinators, “ IAA 
Cosmic Study Space Traffic Management,” International 
Academy of Astronautics, 18 September 2005, Executive 
Summary, pp. 1-11. 
the United  












establishment of “right of way rules” for objects 
on orbit, establishing prioritization rights for 
maneuvering, notification pre-launch, upon 
maneuvering and when de-orbiting (as noted 
above) and a number of debris mitigation 
mechanisms mentioned previously in this 
article.37  The study concludes that by 2020 “an 
inter-governmental agreement could be drafted, 
building on but not replacing the principles 
incorporated in the existing space treaties. . . .  
This international inter-governmental agreement 
would comprise a legal text, which cannot be 
changed easily, and technical annexes, which can 
be adapted more easily, (modeled on the texts of 
the ITU….)”38 
 
The United States could, and should – as it has 
done in the debris mitigation issue – take a 
leadership role in building off the IAA work 
toward a coherent legal framework governing 
space traffic management.  This would benefit the 
U.S. commercial satellite industry by establishing 
a level playing field for space operations and 
would benefit U.S. civil and military space 
programs by establishing a process for avoiding 
conflicts and improving transparency regarding 
other space actors.  A key priority for ensuring 
space security in the future will be just that:  
establishing norms of behavior and rules of law 
that can govern the activities of space actors in 
peacetime, including conflict resolution 
mechanisms, sanctions, and appropriate military 
responses for those who would seek to threaten 





The IAA report also recommends a concept 
called “zoning” and in tandem the importance to 
notify other satellite operators of planned 
maneuvers.  Zoning would be the space based 
analog of a common naval and ground-based 
military interaction, namely “special caution 
                                                
     37Ibid. 
     38Ibid., p. 10. 
areas.”  For example, the 1989 Prevention of 
Dangerous Military Activities Agreement 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
calls on land forces to initiate and remain in 
constant contact if they are within predefined 
areas.  While zoning in space would have to have 
a different physical implementation than special 
caution areas on the ground, the concept would 
increase security by reducing tensions and 
perceived threats.  Essential to a monitored and 
verifiable zoning implementation would be 
improved space surveillance capabilities (as 
described in the previous sections). 
 
As confirmed by DART, even planned civilian 
maneuvers in space can result in collisions.  It is 
therefore important that responsible spacefaring 
states agree to pre-notify each other before any 
dangerous maneuvers – such maneuvers would 
have to be defined by the states agreeing to the 
rule, but may include docking, repair, or close 
proximity autonomous operations.    
 
Codes of conduct exist for almost every sphere of 
military operations and international cooperation 
– except space.  Space also deserves such rules of 
the road.  While no rule can prevent bad actors 
from breaking them, an agreed upon code of 
conduct will encourage good behavior, increase 
confidence in international relations, reduce 
tensions, and provide the legal and international 





It is also in the best interest of the United States 
to maintain responsible hedges against an actor 
who would choose to break the code of conduct 
or shatter the long-standing informal space 
weapons moratorium.  These hedges would serve 
as both a deterrent and retaliatory function, 
allowing the United States to quickly respond to 
unwise actions of a state or a non-state actor. 
 




The United States already has overwhelming 
conventional capability that can serve as a hedge 
against states.  Since attacks on satellites can be 
viewed as attacks on a state itself, under 
principles of self-defense, the United States 
would theoretically have the right to attack 
terrestrial targets of any nation or actor 
responsible.  This can readily be achieved with 
the current arsenal of strike weapons.  In addition, 
if the leadership in the United States decided that 
it must respond “in kind” to an attack on its 
satellites, and that such action outweighs the 
consequences of using such a weapon, it could 
adapt a number of current elements of its arsenal 
for the mission – including missile defense 
interceptors, maneuverable microsatellites, and, 
in particular, jamming equipment that interferes 
with a satellite’s uplinks and/or downlinks.  The 
latter option is one that is perhaps most useful in 
the real world, given the dual-use, multinational 
nature of the satellite population, because it 
would allow reinstatement of the satellite’s 
functions once hostilities were over.   
 
The last element of a hedging strategy is 
responsible research and development of space 
negation capabilities, which stops short of testing 
and deployment.  Unlike the Cold War when 
testing of nuclear weapons was required to 
demonstrate deterrence, the fact that satellites can 
be targeted and destroy is indisputable.  While 
testing may increase confidence in a certain 
weapon system, this is outweighed by the 
negative political and perhaps debris-generating 
consequences of such tests, thereby reducing 
confidence in the availability and reliability of 
U.S. satellites themselves – and the weapon 
systems which they support.  Research on basic 
technologies (many of which have dual-use 
potentialities in any case) makes sense; taking 
weapons out of the lab and testing them does not. 
 
Some would argue that a President needs as many 
options available as possible during a crisis 
situation, and therefore the United States must 
test and deploy space weapons now to be 
available when needed.  However, the usefulness 
of ASATs and space-based weapons in a crisis 
situation is unclear at best; taking out a satellite 
would certainly not ratchet down tensions, and in 
fact could lead to immediate retaliation on U.S. 
space assets.  U.S. security is best served by an 
international security environment that is free of 
space weapons, so it makes little sense for the 
United States to be the first to undermine the 
current status quo.  Further, it is a fact of life, and 
a fact of international 
security, that 
sometimes refusing 
to close one’s options 
results in less, not 
more, stability in 
relations with others.  
A hedging strategy is 
prudent only as long 
as it is constructed so 
as to avoid 
prompting others to 
fear that it is a cover 




The Vision for Space Exploration outlined by 
President Bush in 2004 calls for a large expansion 
in human exploratory missions.  It also seeks 
international cooperation and commercial 
partnerships to help reach this goal.  In parallel to 
the planned technological research and 
development that must be undertaken to realize 
this vision and efforts to seek partnerships to 
make it a reality, it would also be wise to begin 
discussions on what rules and codes should 
govern such exploration in future.  Such 
confidence-building measures would not only be 
needed to guarantee that states, individuals, and 
the private sector have the correct distribution of 
rights, responsibilities, and opportunities in space 
but that any increased exploration and scientific 
and commercial exploitation does not open new 
avenues of conflict.  Discussions about other 
modes of confidence building regarding 
the last element of 
a hedging strategy 




of testing and 
deployment 




exploration would be perfectly legitimate for the 
United States to press with other states seeking 
partnership roles in NASA’s program. 
  
Negotiate a Weapons Ban 
 
Once the above steps are undertaken, and to some 
extent completed, states could then come together 
and negotiate banning the deployment of some or 
all ASATs and space weapons.  This would not 
be the goal of the above steps, but instead, such a 
treaty-based arms ban would complement and re-
enforce already agreed upon rules and practices – 
such as the moratorium on testing and 
deployment and the linking of debris to the 
Liability Convention.  Further, such negotiations 
could happen on a step-by-step basis.  For 
example, since space debris is a clear and present 
danger to all space actors, it seems obvious that it 
would be in everyone’s self interest to craft a 
treaty designed to prevent the testing, 
deployment, and use of debris-creating weaponry.  
Such an agreement could also provide a basis for 
any further discussions about arms control in 
space.  Important, and not to be dismissed, issues 
that would require serious and difficult 
negotiations include the feasibility of a sweeping 
ban on conventional space weapons and the 
verification of compliance.  It should also be 
noted that states will only sign treaties if it is in 
their best interest and if doing so will result in a 
net security gain.  It is to be hoped that an 
increase in shared exploration, monitoring, 
perceived mutual interests, and security and 
stability in space will lead states to the conclusion 
that breaking the space weapons taboo would be a 
step backward.  Thus, our approach to the issue of 
weapons bans is to see that possibility only as a 
follow-on to establishing the necessary 
foundation of peaceful norms, behaviors and 






America’s Leadership Role 
 
This article sets out elements of a possible 
framework for ensuring long-term security in 
space in a manner that would support and even 
improve U.S. national security and global space 
security.  The central core of our concept is the 
belief that it is critical to protect reliable access to 
and use of space for commercial, civil, and 
military actors around the world, and make way 
for new actors as well, so that humankind can 
continue to benefit from the life-saving services 
provided and the knowledge gained by space 
assets.  This framework relies on the 
establishment of norms of behavior, best 
practices, and rules of law.  It is arguably the case 
that the technology revolution of the past two 
decades as applied to the use of space has 
outstripped the normative and legal instruments 
set up primarily during the 1960s.  Space is too 
important to allow a kind of Wild West situation 
to evolve (or perhaps devolve) among space 
actors.  Unfortunately, the present rhetoric in the 
United States that emphasizes a strategy of space 
dominance and control – and ultimately war 
fighting “in, from, and through space” – is fueling 
tensions rather than dampening them.  We believe 
that the United States instead should be a leader, 
as it traditionally has been here on Earth, in 
developing and applying behavioral norms and 
the rule of law in space.  And the time for 
embracing such a leadership role is now, before 
the negative trends toward competition and 
conflict in space accelerate and the situation 
becomes much more complicated and difficult to 
address.  It is our hope that a broadening and 
deepening of the current debate about space 
weaponization among policy makers, military 
leaders, lawmakers, and the public will establish a 
better understanding of the requirements for 
space security, and the criticality of ensuring a 
stable and peaceful space environment for all 
actors.  No one can own space, and neither can 
any one be safe in space without ensuring the 
safety of all.  
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As U.S. space capability came of age in the early 
1960s it made substantive arms control negotiations 
possible.  Arms control proponents like to argue that 
treaties, in turn, legitimated spy satellites by 
acknowledging their existence and sanctioning their 
use for verification.  But the half-century old 
relationship between satellite technology and arms 
control has hardly been marked by such reciprocity.  
While satellite technology has enabled arms control, 
arms control has imposed nontrivial constraints on 
America’s strategic exploitation of outer space.  In 
bureaucratic terms, Department of Defense (DOD) 
exploitation of outer space has been retarded by 
State Department instruments that were only 
possible because of military exploitation of space. 
That in itself is hardly novel.  The military and 
diplomatic instruments of American power are 
notoriously uncongenial partners.  The bureaucratic 
orientations of State and Defense are governed by 
differing, often hostile habits of thought.  They 
represent domestic and international networks with 
political, indeed partisan, characteristics.  Each has a 
global footprint and a crisis management perspective 
that frequently negates the perspective of the other.  
Moreover, the two bureaucratic cultures tend to 
perceive policy options in either-or terms.  When 
challenges arise abroad, this cultural bifurcation 
typically casts U.S. response options in mutually 
exclusive terms:  will the U.S. response be military 
or diplomatic – as if the zero-sum nature the 
“choice” were an eternal verity.  
 
 
Must it always be so?  What if diplomacy designed 
space-related international regimes to enhance the 
security of U.S. satellites and the integrity of their 
vital data streams?  What if the resultant American 
freedom of action in outer space were employed not 
just in compliance with such a framework but in 
enforcement of it?  What if the two processes could 
rise above their zero-sum traditions and actually 
supplement one another?  In fact, such a strategic 
partnership is both possible and necessary – possible 
because diplomacy and space control share the 
unambiguous common purpose of enhancing U.S. 
national security; necessary because space control is 
more than a military challenge.  Because it also 
involves civil, commercial, and diplomatic interests, 
space policy must culminate in enforceable regimes 
that take account of each.  The analogous 
relationship between sea control and maritime law 
demonstrates both the possibility and the necessity.   
By outlawing repugnant activities like slave trading, 
drug smuggling, and terrorism on the high seas,1 
maritime law establishes the very frame of reference 
from which naval rules of engagement begin.  The 
law’s jurisdictional protocols, identification 
                                                
     1“High seas” is a legal term of art for international 
waters.  National sovereignty extends 12 miles from a 
nation’s shores according to the UN Law of the Sea.  
Certain environmental protection and national security 
rights extend to a 200-mile limit under the 1958 Geneva 
Convention.  Thus, it is commonly understood that the high 
seas, over which sovereignty may not be claimed, begin 
beyond the 200-mile limit.  
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procedures, and signals of purpose and intent tell 
coast guards and navies when and how to act.  
Falsely flagged or unflagged vessels can be hailed, 
interrogated, boarded, seized, disabled, or even 
destroyed.  Flagged ships in U.S. territorial waters 
must be aided if they are in distress and may be 
challenged only under specified circumstances.  The 
diplomatic and military instruments of U.S. power 
thereby interact to the benefit of both toward a 
common strategic purpose. 
This relationship, so deeply embedded in maritime 
history and tradition, is not presently mirrored in 
the realm of outer space, and indeed that is the first 
challenge that space control proponents must face.  
One obstacle will be the longstanding bifurcation of 
space assets between those classified for national 
security purposes and those that perform 
conventional or nonmilitary missions.  The former 
has included reconnaissance satellites since the day 
President Eisenhower defined the two mission areas 
as separate.  In 1958, when Eisenhower 
compartmentalized spy satellites and fostered 
creation of the United Nations (UN) Committee on 
the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, the United States 
faced a single strategically closed adversary who 
was demonstrably capable of manipulating foreign 
images of its strength or weakness.  Understandably, 
strategists under these conditions elevated strategic 
information – the capacity to observe an otherwise 
opaque threat – to the tier of U.S. interests ranked as 
vital.  But that judgment held sway when U.S. space 
assets were physically beyond the reach of 
technology and their physical protection therefore 
less urgent.   
Eisenhower’s “Peaceful Uses of Space” policy 
spawned national and international institutions, 
which spawned space law agreements that are now a 
half century old.  Recognizing the constructive 
achievements of sea law, these early instruments of 
space law emulated their predecessors’ founding 
principles.  Like the premise that all nations share 
the right to transit the high seas peacefully, for 
example, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty assigns 
international status to outer space.  Just as flagging 
laws tell civil and military authorities whose laws 
will prosecute illegal maritime behavior, space 
outlaws are subject to the laws of the state from 
which they embarked.  In both cases the violators 
relinquish their entitlement to protection from any 
state. 
But if the sea-space analogy can be sustained in 
regard to the premises of law, it fails catastrophically 
when the discussion turns to the enforcement of 
law.  What if an acknowledged space crime cannot 
be traced to a given state or to a state party to the 
Outer Space Treaty?  True, the space law violator 
would still be subject to after the fact enforcement 
measures just as maritime criminals can be 
prosecuted upon return to port.  But punishment 
after-the-fact is universally recognized inadequate in 
regard to sea law, which aims to negate the 
consequences if not the act itself before its effects 
are achieved.  While prosecution after-the-fact may 
be conceivable in the case of outer space law, the 
instruments of crime prevention are neither in place 
nor under serious discussion.  The resultant capacity 
differential suggests that peaceful behavior is 
strategically less important in outer space than at 
sea.  Since that has become an impossible 
proposition to defend, the rationale for capacity 
differential must lie in the non-strategic realm. 
To achieve the space control objectives outlined by 
each of the past five 
administrations, space 




negation of effects as 
well as after-the-fact 
punishment.  To the 
extent that the sea 
control analogy is 
useful, however, it must be international law that is 
enforced, not just national strategy.  But that will be 
possible only if the law is structured in support of 
strategy and vice versa.  That approach to space 
strategy will require a holistic outlook that takes 
account of the diplomatic perspective instead of the 
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terms.  For either perspective to be relevant the 
framework must be oriented toward the 
advancement of what is clearly a vital U.S. national 
security requirement – secure access to and freedom 
of action in outer space. 
 
Space Technology’s  
Contribution to Arms Control 
 
Arms control was a largely academic exercise in the 
service of U.S. public diplomacy before the first 
successful Corona satellite mission in 1960.  The 
most militant Cold War U.S. national security policy 
ever articulated – NSC-68 in 1950 – began with the 
straightforward presumption that the American 
people would insist “that the free world be 
continuously prepared to negotiate agreements with 
the Soviet Union on equitable terms.”2  Presidents 
Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy struggled 
mightily to reconcile that political reality with Soviet 
disdain for any agreement that would advance U.S. 
security.  A central ingredient of that bilateral 
dynamic – from an operational as well as a public 
relations standpoint – was therefore “verification.”   
There were two 
problems with this 
model.  First, 
verification was not the 
real impediment.  As 
long as the Union of 
Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) 
defined itself as the 
“antithesis” of the 
postwar international status quo, Soviet leaders 
could hardly accept legal arrangements designed to 
institutionalize a secure western industrial order.  To 
do so would cast doubt on the communist regime’s 
already questionable claims to legitimacy.  Second, 
any U.S. effort to negotiate in the face of that reality 
would encounter an operational challenge that was 
                                                
     2S. Nelson Drew, ed., NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of 
Containment (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1994), pp. 
76-80. 
related to verification.  Soviet negotiators would 
arrive at a negotiating table fully informed on a 
bilateral balance of power that was still subject to 
wide speculation in the West.  That would be 
disadvantageous under any conditions, but Soviet 
negotiators would also represent a government that 
was both organized and inclined to conduct 
orchestrated campaigns of clandestine 
noncompliance.  
Theory had it that this gaping chasm between a 
constitutionally open and a strategically closed 
society could be bridged if monitoring provisions 
allowed U.S. observation of Soviet compliance.  
Efforts to construct such a bridge from 1945 to 1965 
were as creative as they were futile.  Truman’s 1946 
Baruch Plan3 made a unilateral U.S. nuclear 
disarmament proposal contingent upon Soviet 
acceptance of international inspection rights.  
Eisenhower offered the Soviets blueprints of 
American defense facilities, access to American 
airfields, and unimpeded overflight rights using any 
collection equipment needed, if they would accept 
his 1955 “Open Skies” proposal.4  Kennedy tabled 
one on-site inspection proposal after another at the 
UN’s Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission.  
Each was unequivocally rejected. 
In truth, the pre-Corona U.S. national security 
dilemma involved a threat assessment challenge 
what was far more fundamental than the verification 
challenge.  The intelligence community (IC) knew 
in the mid-1950s of an energetic Soviet 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) research 
and development (R&D) program, but had “no firm 
current intelligence on what particular guided 
missiles the USSR is presently developing or may 
                                                
     3Bernard M. Baruch, 14 June 1946, UN Atomic Energy 
Commission.  U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 23 June 
1946, “Proposals for an International Atomic Development 
Authority.” 
     4Statement by President Eisenhower at the Geneva 
Conference of Heads of Government: Aerial Inspection and 
Exchange of Military Blueprints, 21 July 1955.  The 
Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 
1955 (Department of State publication 6046, 1955), pp. 56-
59.  Documents on Disarmament, 1954-1959, pp. 486-492. 
analysts could 
only extrapolate 
from what they 
knew of German 
and U.S. ballistic 
missile programs 
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now have in operational use.”  To estimate the 
missile threat, analysts could only extrapolate from 
what they knew of German and U.S. ballistic missile 
programs and Soviet progress in other fields.  These 
indirect indicators, paired with speculation on Soviet 
intentions, were all that underpinned threat 
projections.  As a result, the 1954 National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) would acknowledge that 
“estimates of missile characteristics and of dates of 
missile availability must be considered as only 
tentative, and as representing our best assessment in 
light of inadequate evidence in a new and largely 
unexplored field.”5 
Conditions would change little through the 
remainder of the decade.  Years of clandestine 
reconnaissance overflights,6 including the U-2 
program beginning in 1956, provided the IC with 
piecemeal imagery of Soviet deployments, but 
“insufficient direct evidence to establish the scale 
and pace of the present Soviet ICBM production and 
deployment program….”  Through 1960, NIEs 
would rely “on various indirect forms of evidence 
and on argument and analysis deduced from more 
general considerations.”  The data were so 
ambiguous that the Air Force could predict 150 
Soviet ICBMs by mid-1961 and 700 by mid-1963, 
while the Army and Navy were estimating 50 and 
200 respectively with the State Department splitting 
the difference.7 
                                                
     5“NIE 11-6-54: Soviet Capabilities and Probable 
Programs in the Guided Missile Field,” in Donald Steury 
ed., Estimates on Soviet Military Power, 1954 to 1984, 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 
1996). 
     6For a partial account of U.S. Cold War reconnaissance 
missions, see Robert L. Goldrich, “Cold War Shoot-Down 
Incidents Involving U.S. Military Aircraft Resulting in US 
Casualties,” Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, July 
1992. 
     7“NIE 11-8-60: Soviet Capabilities and Probable 
Programs in the Guided Missile Field,” Donald Steury, 
Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic 
Forces, 1950 to 1983,” (Washington, D.C.: Center for the 
Study of Intelligence, 1996). 
The U.S. arms control agenda of those years 
involved highly publicized proposals and dialogues, 
none of which addressed deployed weapons.  
Grandiose discussions of mutual disarmament and 
comprehensive nuclear test bans became 
commonplace while serious discussion was 
constrained to modest limits on proliferation, testing 
in the atmosphere and in space, and rules of the road 
for uncontested regions like Antarctica and the 
seabed.  Ostensibly, discussion of actual weapons 
was prohibited because the United States could not 
verify Soviet compliance, and because no Soviet 
interest was served by removing that obstacle.  
Disclosure of the more fundamental impediment – 
that the IC was too blind to conduct garden-variety 
national security threat assessments – would hardly 
have advanced U.S. public diplomacy goals. 
The latter problem would change dramatically in 
August of 1960 when the fourteenth Corona 
mission, carrying Discoverer 14, made seventeen 
passes over Soviet and East European territory.8  
President Eisenhower and Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) Director Allen Dulles gaped in 
amazement as photographs developed from sixteen 
pounds of recovered film were delivered to the oval 
office.  That mission alone showed the President 
more coverage than all prior U-2 flights combined.  
The 1.5 million square miles of scanned territory 
revealed tanks, submarines, bombers, ICBMs, 64 air 
bases, and 26 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites.9  
According to Bud Wheelon, who later directed the 
Corona Program, for policy makers and intelligence 
analysts, “it was as if an enormous floodlight had 
been turned on in a darkened warehouse.”  Indeed, 
                                                
     8The date of the first capsule’s recovery, 18 August 
1960, was the same day U-2 pilot Frances Gary Powers was 
sentenced in Moscow for piloting the last U-2 flight ever 
flown over the USSR.  The “Discoverer 14” nomenclature 
would be retroactively changed to comport with the “KH” 
system when the Talent-Keyhole program was instituted.  
See Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell, 
eds., Eye in the Sky; The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites 
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), p. 6. 
     9William E. Burrows, “Imaging Space Reconnaissance 
Operations during the Cold War: Cause, Effect and 
Legacy,” in The Cold War Experience, the Cold War 
Website, p. 5. 
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Corona would quickly acquire the “decisive 
technology” status once reserved for World War II 
Enigma intercepts.10  Suddenly, the 1961 NIE would 
differ markedly from those that preceded it: 
Through KEYHOLE photography over the 
past three months, we have positively 
identified three ICBM complexes under 
construction.  Two are near Yur’ya and 
Yoshkar-Ola, in a region several hundred 
miles northeast of Moscow, and the third is 
near Verkhnyaya Salda in the Urals.  The 
paired, road-served pads at those complexes 
closely resemble those at Tyuratam Area C.  
Near Kostroma, in the same general region 
but closer to Moscow, the photography 
revealed a new clearing suitable for a pair of 
pads, and we believe this is possibly a fourth 
complex similar to the others.11 …[This] new 
information, providing a much firmer base for 
estimates on Soviet long-range ballistic 
missiles, has caused a sharp downward 
revision in our estimate of Soviet ICBM 
strength….  We now estimate that the present 
Soviet ICBM strength is in the range of 10-25 
launchers from which missiles can be fired 
against the United States, and that this force 
level will not increase markedly during the 
months immediately ahead.12 
 
Over and over the USSR had surprised American 
governments – from Stalin’s provocative foreign 
policy speech of 1946, to the atomic bomb test of 
1949, to the hydrogen bomb test of 1953, to the 
ICBM and Sputnik launches of 1957.  Each had 
caught the United States off guard.  In combination 
with a bellicose foreign policy and a drumbeat of 
hostile public diplomacy, these surprises achieved 
                                                
     10Albert D. Wheelon, “CORONA, A Triumph of 
American Technology,” Day, Logsdon, and Latell, eds., 
Eye in the Sky, p. 38. 
     11Kevin C. Ruffner, Corona: America’s First Satellite 
Program, (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, 1995), p. 137. 
     12“NIE 11-8/11-61: Strength and Deployment of Soviet 
Long-Range Ballistic Missile Forces,” Steury, ed., 
Intentions and Capabilities. 
their intended effect of keeping the United States in 
a state of perpetual anxiety.  Corona had, for all 
intents and purposes, ushered in the end of that era.  
A window had been opened on the opaque threat.  
Soviet overstatements about producing ICBMs “like 
sausages” would no longer manipulate U.S. anxiety 
levels.  On threat cognizance grounds alone, space 
reconnaissance had permitted the national security 
community to exhale with relief for the first time 
since 1945.   
As anticipated in NSC-68, the U.S. policy 
community could not employ such a breakthrough 
as an exclusive tool of threat assessment.  It was true 
that reliable, unilaterally controlled means of 
intelligence collection had altered the strategic 
landscape.  It was also true that such transparency 
had diminished the unilateral risk of an open society 
negotiating with a militant, hostile, strategically 
closed adversary.  Before the emergence of space 
reconnaissance the United States did not even know 
enough about the balance of power to specify the 
content of negotiations.  But within a few short years 
of Discoverer 14, American Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiators would specify 
both sides’ force levels to Soviet counterparts who 
remained silent on the matter.  This was necessary 
both because the USSR had no intention of sharing 
such information and because the Soviet 
representations of their own force levels would have 
meant little.  Red Army officials on the Soviet 
delegation would protest privately to their U.S. 
counterparts, in fact, for revealing too much 
information about Soviet forces in the presence of 
their civilian counterparts.    
Beyond verification, space reconnaissance had 
defined the limits and possibilities of arms control’s 
very substance.  Thus, SALT I would equate ICBMs 
with silos and Submarine-Launched Ballistic 
Missiles (SLBMs) with tubes on ballistic missile 
submarines.  Nor were these definitions based on the 
threat implications of these components.  The 
relationship between “weapons,” in threat 
assessment terms, and “units of account,” in arms 
control terms, would be asserted based on what 
could be seen and counted by “national technical 
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means” (NTM).  Thus, the ABM Treaty would limit 
only deployed interceptors and launchers.  The fact 
that large phased array radars (LPARs) were 
operationally essential long lead-time components 
of an ABM system, though helpful in threat 
assessment terms, was an afterthought in arms 
control terms.13 
Although space sensors would prove at least as 
valuable in practice as in theory from a threat 
cognizance standpoint, the same cannot be said 
about their contributions to verification.  This is not 
because the product is more informative for the 
former than for the latter, but because observation is 
not the same as detection and monitoring is not the 
same as verifying.  Overhead sensors can observe 
and monitor, but only policy makers can reach the 
political judgments required to 
detect and verify.  Although 
enhanced threat awareness 
would certainly strengthen 
U.S. confidence in arms 
control, none of the 
subsequent Cold War 
compliance controversies 
would have been better 
informed by better 
monitoring.  To say that space 
reconnaissance “enabled” 
arms control is therefore an understatement, but the 
reasons for this go well beyond just its role in 
verification.   
The first actual application of space-based NTM to 
arms control verification was the 1963 Limited Test 
                                                
     13President Johnson approved formal instructions to the 
U.S. SALT delegation calling for an offensive and 
defensive “freeze” to be presented as a single 
comprehensive entity.  The instructions were “drawn up on 
the assumption that in each instance we could agree to 
exclusive reliance on national means of verification.”  The 
ABM portion of the proposal would address ABM 
interceptors and launchers, but not radars.  See 
Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant 
(Rostow) to President Johnson, 29 August 1968.  Document 
277.  Johnson collection, Department of State Website.  Tab 
B to this document, “Strategic Missile Talks Basic Position 
Paper” instructs the SALT delegation. 
Ban Treaty, which relied on Vela satellites’ infrared 
detection technology to identify atmospheric nuclear 
events.  But reliance on space-based reconnaissance 
for verification also began in earnest just a few years 
after the first successful Corona launch.  In what 
looked at the time like another in a series of 
innocuous U.S. proposals, Lyndon Johnson 
proposed “five major types of potential agreement” 
in a 1964 address to the Eighteen Nation 
Disarmament Committee.  One of these would 
“endeavor to agree to explore a verified freeze of the 
number and characteristics of strategic nuclear 
offensive and defensive vehicles.”14  Arriving 
alongside Secretary of Defense McNamara’s mutual 
vulnerability doctrine, the proposal would quickly 
acquire traction.  Within six months there would be 
open discussion within the administration of using 
intelligence to support verification.  Soon a 
consensus would form by which intelligence might 
be enough by itself to evaluate Soviet declarations of 
existing launchers.15  By the end of 1964 the NSC 
would be actively contemplating a freeze on ICBM, 
SLBM, and ABM launchers verified exclusively “by 
our respective national capabilities…”16 
The State Department would have embraced this 
idea under almost any conditions, but with 
McNamara’s Pentagon on board it would gain 
momentum quickly.  The only holdout among 
relevant Executive Branch agencies would be the 
                                                
     14Message from President Johnson to the Eighteen 
Nation Disarmament Committee, 21 January 1964, 
Documents on Disarmament, 1964 (Washington, D.C., 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), p. 8. 
     15Memorandum of Conversation, 16 June 1964, Subject: 
Verification of Freeze …Discussed by the Committee of 
Principals.  Document 36, Johnson collection, Department 
of State Website. 
     16Memorandum from the Ambassador at Large 
(Thompson) to the Acting Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (Fisher), 28 November 1964.  
Subject: ACDA’s Six-Point Suggested Program to Prevent 
Nuclear Proliferation.  Document 52, Johnson collection, 
Department of State Website.  Note: Document’s 
accompanying reference material includes a 23 November 
1964 Memorandum from ACDA Director Foster to the 
Committee of Principals outlining “a renewed and broadly 
based effort to prevent nuclear proliferation.”  The fourth of 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which “held that any 
arms control agreement should provide for adequate 
verification other than by complete reliance on 
unilateral intelligence.17  But the JCS had grown 
accustomed to being overruled by McNamara on 
more pressing issues – such as conduct of war in 
Vietnam – and less than a week after this statement 
the State Department would signal to Soviet leaders 
that  
The US would be prepared to discuss the 
possibilities of placing maximum reliance on 
unilateral means of verification to meet the 
major objectives of ceasing further 
deployment of new missile and anti-missile 
launch facilities without requiring inspection 
on either party’s territory.18 
 
Weeks later, President Johnson would lay 
groundwork for public acceptance of this approach 
with seemingly offhand remarks to a group of 
educators in Nashville: 
We’ve spent $35-40 billion on the space 
program, and if nothing else had come out of 
it except the knowledge we’ve gained from 
space photography, it would be worth ten 
times what the whole program cost.  Because 
tonight we know how many missiles the 
enemy has and, it turned out, our guesses 
were way off.  We were doing things we 
didn’t need to do.  We were building things 
we didn’t need to build.  We were harboring 
fears we didn’t need to harbor.19 
 
By the end of 1967, the IC itself would confirm 
“very substantial, though of course not unlimited, 
                                                
     17Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
Secretary of Defense McNamara, JCSM-30-67; 19 January 
1967.  Subject: Questions Relating to a Possible Freeze 
Agreement on Strategic Forces.  Document 176 Johnson 
collection, Department of State Website.  
     18Telegram from Department of State to the Embassy in 
the Soviet Union, 22 January 1967.  Document 179 Johnson 
collection, Department of State Website. 
     19“Satellite Spying Cited by Johnson,” New York Times, 
17 March 1967. 
capabilities for unilateral verification of measures 
along lines now being considered for a strategic 
launcher freeze.”20  Before leaving office in January 
1969 the Johnson Administration had solidly 
coalesced behind a proposal for a unilaterally 
verified freeze on offensive and defensive launchers 
– a going-in position that did not even include ABM 
radars.21  The Administration had even agreed to 
refer to overhead reconnaissance systems as 
national (rather than unilateral or external) technical 
means of verification.22  On these grounds the Soviet 
Government would agree to a 30 September venue 
at which the United States would have tabled this 
proposal if the August 1968 Soviet Czechoslovakian 
                                                
     20From a reference to Special NIE 11-10-67 in Telegram 
From Department of State to Embassy in the Soviet Union, 
15 February 1967.  Document 181, Johnson collection, 
Department of State Website. 
     21Comments recorded at a Principals Meeting on 22 
August 1968 confirm this point.  In the course of 
discussions on how to ban Soviet upgrade of the Tallinn air 
defense system, for example, Secretary of State Rusk 
pointed out that, “at the JCS’ recommendation, we were not 
limiting radars.”  Responding to a comment that the Tallinn 
system was of little value without new radars, Navy 
Secretary Nitze “agreed, but said we were not stopping 
radars.”  See Record of Meeting of the Executive 
Committee of the Committee of Principals, ACDA-3024, 
Document 275, Johnson collection, Department of State 
Website. 
     22Dialogue at the 22 August 1968 Principals Committee 
meeting referenced above: “[National Security Advisor 
Walt] Rostow suggested that a word be picked, and then the 
delegation establish a legislative record in the talks with the 
Soviets on the meaning of the word, including reference to 
observations from satellites.  [Acting ACDA Director] Mr. 
Foster pointed out that the Soviets might object to any 
formal understanding on this point, although they had 
already agreed tacitly.  Mr. Rostow thought that in this 
critical case it might be desirable to get a formal 
understanding.  Secretary Clifford stated a preference for 
either ‘unilateral’ or ‘national’ over the word ‘external,’ 
which had been agreed upon at the last meeting.  Secretary 
Rusk said he was quite willing to return to the term 
‘national’ and that it might be useful to have an explanation 
of the meaning of the term… Summary of Actions 1: It was 
agreed that hereafter the term ‘national’ means of 
verification would be used in place of ‘unilateral’ or 
‘external.” 
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intervention had not put the entire process on hold.23  
With this groundwork in place the Nixon 
Administration would take office in 1969 and 
complete negotiation of the Interim Offensive 
Agreement and the ABM Treaty. 
Arms Control’s Contributions to Space Control 
 
At least initially, the Soviets would object 
vociferously to the proposition of uncontested U.S. 
reconnaissance over their national territory.  Within 
days of the first successful Corona launch, a Soviet 
journalist would correctly name the highly classified 
Corona, Samos, and Midas programs, labeling them 
“illegal espionage satellites.”  Such “American plans 
of space espionage [were] incompatible with the 
generally recognized principles and rules of 
international law,” and the USSR had “everything 
necessary to paralyze U.S. military espionage both 
in the air and in outer space.”24 
By now, of course, the United States was 
accustomed to such overstatements from the 
Khrushchev regime and confident that its Corona 
satellites were deployed in orbits beyond the reach 
of Soviet denial capability, at least for the time being 
– a fait accompli that significantly multiplied their 
strategic value.  Still, for the Soviets to challenge the 
satellites’ compatibility with “generally recognized 
principles and rules of international law” was hard to 
ignore.  An American U-2 pilot captured in 1960 
had gone on trial in Moscow on 18 August – the 
very day of the first Corona capsule’s recovery.  
Publicly humbled by the downing of a prima fascia 
American spy plane, Eisenhower would be hard 
pressed to explain the legal distinction between 
endo- and exo-atmospheric intrusions to the 
American public.  Even if the Soviets could not 
currently intercept the Discoverer series’ elliptical 
                                                
     23Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: 
Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 487-489. 
     24The article was written by Grigori Zhukov in 
International Affairs.  See James Oberg, “The First Soviet 
Spy Satellite,” Air Force Magazine, Jul 1995, p. 82 cited by 
Burrows, “Imaging Space Reconnaissance Operations 
during the Cold War,” p.8. 
polar flight path, their assertion of the right to do so 
framed the issue in terms more dependent on 
technology and orbital dynamics than on the legality 
of overflight. 
Eisenhower’s emphasis on secrecy, civil space 
missions, and “peaceful use of space” diplomacy, 
would be driven in large measure by these 
unresolved legal questions until the Soviets 
launched their own reconnaissance satellite on 26 
April 1962.25  Legal tensions diminished a bit further 
in 1963 when a UN Resolution set forth the basic 
components of international space law.26  The 1972 
Interim Offensive Agreement and ABM Treaty – 
SALT I – would then apply these legalities to NTM 
providing that: 
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of 
compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, 
each Party shall use national technical means 
of verification at its disposal in a manner 
consistent with the generally recognized 
principles of international law. 
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with 
the national technical means of verification of 
the other Party operating in accordance with 
paragraph 1 of this Article. 
                                                
     25The Zenit vehicle – called “Cosmos 4” for cover – 
would be placed on orbit with the same R-7 booster and 
Vostok capsule that carried Yuri Gargarin to space 12 July 
1961.  Its four-day mission would deliver 10-15 meter 
resolutions.  Burrows, “Imaging Space Reconnaissance 
Operations during the Cold War,” p. 12. 
     26Resolution 1962 (XVIII), Declaration of Legal 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Uses of Outer Space.  This Resolution 
would serve as a precursor to the Treaty On Principles 
Governing The Activities Of States In The Exploration And 
Use Of Outer Space, Including The Moon And Other 
Celestial Bodies (The Outer Space Treaty: Signed at 
Washington, London, Moscow, 27 January 1967, 
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate 25 April 1967, Ratified 
by U.S. President 24 May 1967).  The latter Treaty 
provided that space exploration be carried out for the 
benefit of all countries irrespective of their degree of 
development, and sought to maintain outer space as the 
province of all mankind free for exploration and use by all 
States and not subject to national appropriation. 
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dismissed by critics, 





3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate 
concealment measures which impede 
verification by national technical means of 





control, it would be 
pleasantly 
symmetrical to say 
that these arms 
control provisions, 
in turn, facilitated 
the free utilization 
of outer space.  While outer space assets arguably 
acquired a measure of increased legitimacy, 
however, the reality is less dramatic.  The USSR had 
no choice but to live with intrusive space 
reconnaissance in 1972 and as their technology 
matured over the next few years these agreements 
would not stand in the way of weapons that could 
negate U.S. assets.  But if this article’s purpose were 
to challenge the enforceability of international law, 
it would begin not by questioning arms control’s 
“legalization of NTM,” but with prior questions 
about whether national security can be achieved 
through negotiation at all.  In fact international law 
does serve purposes dismissed by critics, and is 
burdened by enforcement problems obscured by 
proponents.  Because treaty law involves a complex 
array of legal, diplomatic, and political 
technicalities, its specialists tend to be treaty 
proponents who embellish the “mutually reinforcing 
partnership” between “monitoring” for arms control, 
and “intelligence” for threat assessment.  This is an 
                                                
     27Article XII, Treaty Between The United States Of 
America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On 
The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM 
Treaty), Signed at Moscow 26 May 1972, Ratification 
advised by U.S. Senate 3 August 1972, Ratified by U.S. 
President 30 September 1972.  Identical language used in 
Article V, Interim Agreement between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms – an Executive Agreement signed 
in Moscow 26 May 1972. 
important point, however, because if treaties can 
enhance the security of U.S. assets in space, then 
space control strategists ought to be their strongest 
supporters.  
Let us grant that, given a choice between obscurity 
and clarity, it is better from a strategic standpoint if 
U.S. space assets are viewed as clearly legitimate.  
Additionally, let us stipulate that arms control’s 
“NTM” euphemism includes spy satellites and other 
technical collection assets.  Using the NTM 
language of the ABM Treaty as a baseline, real 
world cases still permit the following fundamental 
generalizations:  
• These provisions’ stated purpose was to 
provide “assurance of compliance with the 
provisions of this Treaty,” not to sanction 
NTM’s observation of noncompliance, or of 
activities not explicitly addressed in the 
treaty.   
• Interference with NTM was prohibited, but 
only when NTM was “providing assurance of 
compliance with the provisions of this 
Treaty.”  
• The only deliberate concealment prohibited 
was that which would “impede verification of 
compliance with the provisions of this 
Treaty.” 
• The provisions never specified what NTM 
encompassed, indicated how the parties could 
distinguish between use of NTM for 
verification and other intelligence activities, 
or addressed what could be done legally if the 
offended party determined that activities were 
not NTM verification. 
Before these provisions were agreed to in 1972, of 
course, there were far fewer grounds on which to 
call space based collection assets legal.  Indeed, 
when the U-2 was shot down over Soviet territory in 
1960, the first U.S. reaction was to publicly deny 
that it was a spy plane, and Soviet proof to the 
contrary was a major diplomatic embarrassment.  
Still, for arms control proponents to say that these 
agreements legalized space based intelligence 
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collection – even as it related strictly to arms control 
– was overstated and self-promotional.  To illustrate, 
consider the case histories of two relatively 
insignificant real world U.S. compliance issues of 
the mid-1970s:28 
• In 1974, the United States observed a 
substantial increase in the concealment of 
Soviet strategic weapons programs.  Though 
presumably foreclosed by SALT I’s non-
concealment provisions, a charge of violation 
would have required proof that “these 
measures prevented verification of 
compliance with agreed provisions.”  Rather 
than facing that obstacle, U.S. policy makers 
dropped the issue altogether noting that “there 
no longer appeared to be an expanding pattern 
of concealment activities associated with 
strategic weapons programs.”   
• In 1975, the United States analyzed Soviet 
actions alleged to have “blinded” U.S. 
reconnaissance satellites – a practice 
seemingly foreclosed by SALT I’s 
noninterference provisions.  This too was 
deemed compliant on grounds that U.S. 
monitoring capability related to the 
agreement’s provisions “had not been 
affected by these events.” 
Beyond the questionable security afforded U.S. 
space assets by arms control measures, the treaties 
that refer to NTM are bilateral ones between the 
United States and USSR.  At least a dozen states, 
many of whom are openly hostile to U.S. interests, 
are now capable of accessing outer space.  In this 
context it is worth recalling that the multilateral 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) – for 
which U.S. Senate advice and consent was denied in 
1999 – relied not on national technical means but on 
an internationally controlled seismic network.  
Indeed, a number of states, led by China, resisted 
                                                
     28U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs; 
July 1979; Special Report No.55; Compliance with SALT I 
Agreements.  Emphases added. 
provisions that would sanction national intelligence 
sources.29  As China’s representative put it: 
On the issue of national technical means 
(NTM), China had consistently opposed in the 
past two years and more the concept of 
allowing NTMs to play a role in the CTBT 
verification regime, particularly in triggering 
of on-site inspections.30 
 
Eventually, in what it described as “a major 
concession,” China would grant allowance for 
“purely technical NTMs to play a supplementary 
role.”  Thus, inspection requests could appeal to 
NTM only if they specified “all data upon which the 
request is based” thereby exposing sources and 
methods of collection.  Even then, the political 
decision to act on such a request would rely 
exclusively on international data. 
The fact that space assets have been in common use 
by a variety of states for four decades probably earns 
                                                
     29The question at hand was whether NTM could be used 
to trigger complex provisions related to on-site inspections 
(OSI) of suspect activities.  A demand for inspection (which 
would be tightly managed by the suspected state) required 
31 votes on the 50-member CTBT Executive Committee.  
Paragraphs 5, Section A, of Article IV of the CTBT 
specifies a monitoring regime consisting of international 
seismic stations, consultations, on-site inspections (OSI), 
and confidence-building measures.  But Paragraph 6 allows 
that “no State Party shall be precluded from” using NTM.  
The Administration’s Article-by-Article Analysis 
acknowledges that “During the negotiations, some states 
argued that NTM should not be an authorized method for 
verifying Treaty compliance…” but that paragraph 37 of 
Section D of Article IV allows OSI requests based on 
NTM.  Paragraph 37 of Section D of Article IV allows use 
of NTM in OSI requests, which must contain “information 
pursuant to Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol.”  
Paragraph 41 of the Protocol, Part II, provides that OSI 
requests must include geographical and vertical coordinates 
of the location of the event, boundaries of the area to be 
inspected, . . . the time of the event that triggered the 
request, and all data upon which the request is based. 
     30Statement by H. E. Mr. Sha Zukang, Ambassador of 
the People’s Republic of China for Disarmament Affairs, 
Head of the Chinese Delegation to the Conference on 
Disarmament, at the Plenary Meeting of the CD, 1 August 
1996.  Transcript from PRC Permanent Mission at Geneva. 
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beyond arms control’s 
limited positive 
contributions to U.S. 
freedom of action in outer 
space, several of its 
provisions simply 
foreclose U.S. strategic 
options 
them more legal stature than they can acquire 
through formal law.  But in the final analysis, with 
or without law, the assets we call “NTM” are 
operated by intelligence services for clandestine 
espionage purposes.  Their effectiveness is enhanced 
not by the genuineness of the other side’s approval, 
but by the other side’s ignorance of when and how 
they are operating.  Most states will do all they can 
to disallow espionage intrusions at times and places 
of a curious observer’s choosing.  Decisions of 
whether or not to negate such intrusions may be 
affected by extant international standards, but, as 
shown, those standards are conditional.  The same 
qualifiers that limit well-intended noninterference 
and non-concealment provisions will apply, at the 
offended state’s discretion, to choices of whether to 
negate any intelligence collection activities it 











to its narrowly limited use in support of specific 
arms control provisions, and primarily in a bilateral 
context.  In other words, arms control has advanced 
the interests of – at most – arms control.  Proponents 
are thereby equipped to defend a treaty’s 
verifiability on grounds that intelligence garnered 
therefrom will be “admissible.”  But the record 
demonstrates that how behaviors are categorized, 
what standards of evidence will apply, and the 
nature of proof itself are all political issues.  Thus, 
even to the extent that it relates to arms control, 
NTM legalization contributes little or nothing to 
U.S. freedom of action in outer space.   
Beyond arms control’s limited positive contributions 
to U.S. freedom of action in outer space, several of 
its provisions simply foreclose U.S. strategic 
options.  Some – like the Outer Space Treaty’s 
prohibition of weapons of mass destruction on orbit 
– impede no strategic options of immediate interest 
to the United States.  Others – like the ABM 
Treaty’s prohibition of U.S. territorial defense, or “a 
base for such a defense” against ballistic missiles – 
have been of more immediate concern.31  Although 
the treaty permitted limited ABM testing, the United 
States explicitly agreed in 1972 “not to develop, test, 
or deploy ABM systems or components which are 
…space-based….”32  That provision outlawed 
specific, vitally important U.S. options for the 
strategic exploitation of outer space.  In the real 
world, a broader extra-legal ABM Treaty regime 
featured a plethora of self-imposed political 
restrictions that limited U.S. freedom of action far 
beyond the treaty’s explicit terms.  
One example of a self-imposed constraint on U.S. 
space exploitation involves the “broad 
interpretation” debate over the ABM Treaty’s 
testing restrictions.  The issue first arose in 1985 
when the Defense Department realized that for all of 
its restrictions on research and development the 
treaty had left open the door to testing space-based 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) components that 
employed “other physical principles.”33  At DOD’s 
request, State Department Legal Affairs Advisor 
Abraham Soafer had analyzed the treaty language, 
intent, and negotiating record, and ruled that such 
latitude had been left in the treaty – at Soviet 
insistence despite U.S. efforts to restrict future 
technologies.34  Had the Soviets exercised these 
                                                
     31Article 1, ABM Treaty. 
     32Article V, ABM Treaty.  Emphasis added 
     33Refers to the ABM Treaty’s Agreed Statement D: “In 
order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy 
ABM systems and their components except as provided in 
Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event 
ABM systems based on other physical principles and 
including components capable of substituting for ABM 
interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are 
created in the future, specific limitations on such systems 
and their components would be subject to discussion in 
accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance 
with Article XIV of the Treaty.”  Emphasis added. 
     34The initial study was conducted by former New York 
assistant district attorney Philip Kunsberg at the request of 
Undersecretary of Defense Fred Iklé and Assistant 
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rights themselves, in other words, the U.S. 
compliance adjudication machinery would almost 
certainly have ruled it permissible.  After National 
Security Advisor Robert McFarlane aired this 
interpretation in a televised news interview on 6 
October 1985,35 news reports described a 
contentious high-level interagency conflict over the 
issue. 
While legal experts in the State, Defense and 
Justice Departments had accepted the 
Pentagon interpretation even before 
McFarlane spoke, U.S. diplomats and [North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization] NATO allies 
were appalled.  They protested that the 
Administration position, coming only weeks 
before next month’s Geneva summit meeting 
between Reagan and Soviet Leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev, would doom any chance for 
negotiating an arms-control agreement.  
[Secretary of State George] Shultz suggested 
to the White House that if McFarlane were 
making policy for so sensitive a matter on 
television, then Reagan would seem to have 
no need for a Secretary of State.  Reagan 
convened a White House meeting… described 
by Administration sources as 
“acrimonious.”36 
 
Despite his own legal advisor’s counsel, Shultz 
publicly challenged McFarlane’s reading on three 
grounds having nothing to do with treaty 
provisions.37  First was “the outrageous way this 
matter had been handled procedurally, which 
                                                                               
Secretary of Defense Richard Perle.  There was no doubt, 
according to Kunsberg’s report, that the U.S. had sought a 
tight ban on “exotic” future ABM systems except those in 
fixed land-based mode, but that the Soviets had consistently 
rejected the broad ban advocated by the United States.  See 
Don Oberdorfer, “ABM Reinterpretation: A Quick Study,” 
Washington Post, 22 October 1985, A-1.  
     35Interview with National Security Advisor Robert C. 
McFarlane, Meet the Press, NBC-TV, 6 October 1985.  
     36“Resolving a Star Wars Skirmish,” Time, 28 October 
1985. 
     37George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph; My Years as 
Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1993), pp. 580-1. 
amounted to a usurpation of presidential authority.”  
Second was Shultz’ view that it “was not the 
traditional position of the United States or the 
position of our allies; …and it was certainly at odds 
with the current Soviet view.”  While one might 
question the relevance of these arguments, they were 
political judgments well within the purview of a 
Secretary of State.  The third premise of Shultz’ 
opposition, however, was factually incorrect.  Shultz 
believed that because Reagan’s Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) “was a research program… we 
could address the questions that we needed to 
answer within the confines of the ABM Treaty.”  In 
truth, the “broad interpretation” would have vastly 
expanded the United States right to test space-based 
technologies most in need of testing.  But Shultz 
convinced himself that adherence to the traditional 
“narrow” interpretation “would give us the best of 
both worlds.”  
We would be able to research the key 
questions of strategic defense.  We would also 
have something to fall back on and to bargain 
with by “clarifying” the treaty.  So all this 
flurry of concern could be made to be useful 
to us.38 
 
Since SDI space components did not require testing 
by this State Department logic, the unarguably legal 
U.S. right to do so could be traded for the State 
Department’s more immediate diplomatic interests.  
Speaking to a NATO audience one week after 
                                                
     38Ibid. p. 581.  Emphasis added.  The same 
misunderstanding may have motivated Shultz to welcome, 
weeks later, a Soviet trial balloon offering offensive 
reductions in exchange for U.S. agreement not to exercise 
Treaty withdrawal rights for ten years.  “In my view, 
continued observance by the United States of the ABM 
Treaty while offensive reductions took place would work to 
our advantage: the prospect of SDI would keep the 
reductions coming, and SDI would still be moving along.”  
Congress had required Reagan and Weinberger to certify 
that the SDI program would be conducted in compliance 
with the ABM Treaty.  The notion that Shultz interpreted 
this political assurance as a literal statement of 
programmatic adequacy, whereby the Treaty was less than 
a showstopper for SDI’s development program is, frankly, 
shocking. 
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McFarlane’s comments, Shultz would eagerly claim 
victory in this bureaucratic battle:   
It is our view, based on a careful analysis of 
the treaty text and the negotiating record, that 
a broader interpretation of our authority is 
fully justified.  This is, however, a moot point; 
our SDI research program has been structured 
and, as the President has reaffirmed last 
Friday, will continue to be conducted in 
accordance with a restrictive interpretation of 
the treaty’s obligations.  Furthermore, any 
SDI deployment would be the subject of 
consultations with our allies and to [sic] 
discussion and negotiation, as appropriate, 
with the Soviets in accordance with the terms 
of the ABM Treaty.39 
 
Shultz had apparently convinced the President to 
adopt space-testing restrictions that were dictated, if 
at all, by his reading of the “spirit” of the ABM 
Treaty.  In so doing, he unburdened the Soviets of 
their greatest concern about the SDI program – U.S. 
pursuit of advanced space based technologies.  He 
had also added consultation with allies and 
negotiation with the Soviets to the preconditions of a 
U.S. deployment decision, demanding nothing in 
return.   
Despite the conviction throughout the executive 
branch that such latitude was legally in place, the 
United States would never test a BMD component 
under the broad interpretation of the treaty.  A 
political argument, intensified by internal 
bureaucratic discord, had been resolved by extra-
legal criteria.  Instead of expanding U.S. space 
exploitation rights, McFarlane’s ploy had so 
offended Shultz that it further restrained U.S. 
strategic latitude.  Meanwhile, in the Defense and 
Space Talks (DST), where the two sides deliberated 
such matters from 1985 to 1992, the Soviets would 
                                                
     39Shultz, “Arms Control, Strategic Stability, and Global 
Security,” Address before the North Atlantic Assembly, 
San Francisco, 14 October 1985, Department of State 
Bulletin, December 1985, pp. 20-25.  Emphasis added.  
Shultz’ citation of remarks by the President served as the 
public record of Reagan’s judgment. 
seek not just to ban research, development, and 
testing of “space strike arms,” but also to confine all 
other R&D to “the laboratory” – which would 
proscribe the testing of even ground based ABM 
components.   
Soviet insistence that these restrictions must precede 
a START agreement would outlive Ronald 
Reagan’s Presidency.  Congress would then codify 
these political restrictions in the Missile Defense Act 
(MDA) of 1991 which foreclosed a space layer of 
ballistic missile defense, required Soviet approval of 
essential non-space components, constrained 
deployable technologies, discouraged R&D funding 
for technologies that could not be legally deployed, 
and unilaterally exorcised SDI’s global implications. 
President Reagan had vetoed 1989 legislation 
precisely because Congress had refused to authorize 
his space interceptor program.  But in September 
1991 President Bush signaled the end of SDI’s 
space component by signing the 1991 MDA into 
law.  As soon as Bush agreed to the START Treaty 
on these grounds the Soviets vacated all discussion 
of treaty revisions.  Two years later Congress was 
informed:  
It is the position of the Clinton Administration 
that the “narrow” or “traditional” 
interpretation of the ABM Treaty is the 
correct interpretation and, therefore, that the 
ABM Treaty prohibits the development, 
testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-
based, space-based, or mobile land based 
ABM systems and components without regard 
to technology utilized.40 
 
To further clarify its position the Clinton 
Administration renamed the Strategic Defense 
Initiative Organization (SDIO) as the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Organization (BMDO).  While 
crediting SDI for helping to end the Cold War, 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin proclaimed “the end 
                                                
     40White House Press Release, 13 July 1993.  Emphasis 
added. 
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of the SDI decade.”41  In 1996 Clinton would veto 
funding for the military space plane, the kinetic anti-
satellite (ASAT) program, and the Clementine II 
asteroid probe, which simulated interception of 
ballistic missiles in space.42  In 1997, he signed 
agreements extending ABM Treaty restrictions on 
strategic space exploitation to a prohibition on 
“interceptors capable of intercepting theater missiles 
from air or space.43  
In short, although space technology and U.S. arms 
control policy have shared an intimate relationship 
since both came of age in the 1960s, the benefits of 
that relationship have gone exclusively in the 
direction of arms control.  That substantive 
agreements could be negotiated at all was 
attributable to satellites’ contributions to threat 
measurement.  That such agreements could be called 
verifiable was attributable to space assets’ 
monitoring precision.  But beyond failure to 
promote the security of satellites, arms control has 
imposed binding legal and political restrictions on 
U.S. space options with debilitating strategic 
implications.  The question to be answered is 
whether that outcome could be reversed by diligent 
application of diplomacy to the twenty-first century 
strategic requirement for U.S. space control.  
The Political Framework for Space Control 
 
Wars and their component battles are won by those 
who control the environment within which they are 
fought.  This is not a novel concept.  Battle zone 
control includes the governance of access and egress 
by people, supplies, and equipment.  Allied ground 
forces could seize and hold territory in Iraq and 
Afghanistan because the United States controlled the 
air above them and the sea around them.  Air and 
                                                
     41Donald R. Baucom, Historian, BMDO, “Ballistic 
Missile Defense: A Brief History,” 1997. 
     42Peter L. Hays, James M. Smith, Alan R. Van Tassel, 
and Guy M. Walsh, “Spacepower for a New Millennium: 
Examining U.S. Capabilities and Policies,” in Hays et al., 
eds., Spacepower for a New Millennium: Space and U.S. 
National Security (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000), p. 27. 
     43Testimony of David J. Smith, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, U.S. Senate, 13 May 1999. 
sea control are preconditions of terrestrial control, 
which settles conflicts.  From an operational military 
standpoint “control” of outer space is no more or 
less essential than control of other dimensions of the 
battlespace environment.   
This is offered not as a primer on the operational art, 
but as a starting point for discussion of space control 
in its proper context.  The lay public understands 
control as it relates to terrestrial, atmospheric, and 
maritime lines of communication, but is less familiar 
with the extension of these principles to outer space.  
Exotic images associated with space control, 
however illusory, are not lost on its detractors.  It 
does not mean ownership, sovereignty, occupation, 
expropriation, perpetual domination, flags planted, 
governance transferred, or access permanently 
denied.  It simply recognizes that the United States 
can permit neither the uncontested vulnerability of 
its own space assets nor the multiplied effectiveness 
of an enemy that uses commercial space services or 
employs its own satellites on orbit.  
It is nontrivial in this regard that all of the 
bureaucratic arguments over atmospheric, maritime, 
and terrestrial control are long settled.  For the Navy 
this occurred in the 19th century.  Thousands of 
American merchant ships had been attacked before 
the Navy’s West India Squadron was equipped to 
crush piracy in the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of 
Mexico.  It took George Washington two full terms 
to get Congress to fund six-ships to protect U.S. 
commerce from the Algerine Corsairs.  For the Air 
Force it was twelve decades later when the 
extension of military capability to the air required a 
public lobbying campaign for which General Billy 
Mitchell was court-martialed.  Because the 
bureaucratic bloodletting over means of control in 
these realms is over, strategists need only establish 
the functional identity of space control with air, sea, 
and land control. 
Because political consensus on controversial topics 
is measured in bipartisan terms, it is useful to note 
that in 1996 the Clinton White House assigned DOD 
responsibility for “deterring, warning, and if 
necessary, defending against enemy attack; assuring 







to the outer 
space 
argument 
that hostile forces cannot prevent our own use of 
space; [and] countering, if necessary, space systems 
and services used for hostile purposes.44  A few 
years later Clinton’s Secretary of Defense 
implemented this guidance in a Space Policy 
Directive that should resolve once and for all that 
space is a medium in which the United States must 
prepare itself for the conduct of military activity. 
It is DOD policy that space capabilities shall 
be operated and employed to: assure access to 
and use of space; deter and, if necessary, 
defend against hostile actions; ensure that 
hostile forces cannot prevent United States 
use of space; ensure the United States’ ability 
to conduct military and intelligence space and 
space-related activities; enhance the 
operational effectiveness of U.S., allied, and 
friendly forces; and counter, when directed, 
space systems and services used for hostile 
purposes.45 
 
This language clearly stopped short of Ronald 
Reagan’s 1988 policy directing DOD to “develop 
and deploy a robust and comprehensive ASAT 
capability with initial operational capability at the 
earliest possible date.”46  But for Presidents Clinton 
and Reagan to agree even in principle shows how 
far we have come toward a national consensus on 
space control.   
Because it imposed far more restrictions than its 
original proponents ever imagined, the U.S. decision 
of December 2001 to withdraw from the ABM 
Treaty under its Article XV provisions removed an 
enormous obstacle to a responsible space strategy.  
Besides its legal, political, and self-imposed 
restrictions on space control, the treaty’s outright 
prohibition of defense against attacking missiles 
added psychological and intellectual obstacles.  As 
                                                
     44Fact Sheet, National Space Policy, The White House, 
National Science and Technology Council, 19 September 
1996. 
     45Department of Defense Directive 3100.10, 9 July 1999, 
Subject: Space Policy.  
     46White House Fact Sheet, “Presidential Directive on 
National Space Policy,” 11 February 1988. 
the debate over missile defense intensified in the 
1980s and 1990s it became increasingly partisan 
with anything remotely related to military use of 
space caught in the crossfire.  As illustrated by the 
State Department’s handling of the broad 
interpretation, for example, the United States 
imposed strategically significant restrictions on itself 
based on how the Soviet Union might react to policy 
choices that were unquestionably legal in treaty 
terms.  In that case Secretary George Shultz objected 
publicly to a policy option on grounds that it had not 
previously been the traditional one.  Similarly, 
Congress prohibited ASAT testing, and President 
Clinton vetoed an experimental rendezvous with a 
meteor because both involved target engagement 
scenarios that emulated interception of attacking 
Soviet missiles.   
It was one thing for the United 
States to comply with the 
spirit of the treaty while the 
Soviets were routinely 
exceeding its letter.  But the 
seemingly infinite elasticity of 
what was included in its spirit 
went beyond good faith by 
consigning ourselves to a 
wholly different regime.  By its remarkably 
uncontroversial withdrawal notification of 2001 the 
United States unburdened itself of all such 
impediments to the strategic control of outer space. 
The Way Forward on Space Control 
 
With the bureaucratic and policy foundation in place 
for a U.S. space control regime, sea control provides 
an actual blueprint for the remainder of space 
control’s political-military edifice.  The sea – over 
which United States control is a joint product of 
diplomacy and naval operational supremacy – offers 
a particularly apt analogy to the outer space 
argument.  Oceans, like space, are seen as the 
common province of nations – a realm in which safe 
passage and access to resources are fundamental 
international rights.  Just as a ballistic missile might 
traverse outer space in a crisis, vehicles bearing 
weapons of mass destruction are routinely on patrol 
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throughout the high seas.  But the stationing of such 
weapons is banned from the ocean’s floor just as it is 
from Earth orbit.  No nation can claim jurisdiction 
over either realm but lawless behavior is condemned 
in both.   
Abhorrent activities like slave trading, drug 
smuggling, and piracy on the high seas are 
international crimes, and JCS rules of engagement 
reflect a U.S. commitment to their enforcement.  
The Navy’s readiness to carry out protection and 
denial responsibilities is both cause and effect of 
these laws’ integrity.  This capability has hardly 
brought an end to crime on the high seas, but it has 
tamed it enough for commerce, resource access, and 
marine environmental security to be counted among 
the basic entitlements of nations.  United States 
leadership has spawned a clear set of collectively 
accepted international norms for sailors and vessels 
operating in international and territorial waters.  The 
U.S. Navy has worked in tandem with the State 
Department to see that sensible operational 
principles are facilitated rather than impeded as 
these codes are crafted and refined.  The resultant 
regime defines conditions under which force may 
and may not be employed under the flags of law-
abiding nations.  Seafarers who comply with these 
standards are entitled not just to legal protection, but 
also to physical protection from vessels positioned 
to offer assistance in a crisis.   
This is how diplomacy and military preparedness 
can work together rather than against each other to 
advance vital national interests.  New and updated 
JCS rules of engagement never leave the drafting 
stage until their compatibility with the standing body 
of international law can be demonstrated.  Working 
together in support of U.S. sea control, these policies 
of diplomacy and military preparedness secure vital 
national interests while advancing rather than 
inhibiting the rights of weaker seafaring nations.  
Arms control’s international rules and procedures 
thereby protect, focus, and magnify the effectiveness 
of a U.S. military mission, while military 
preparedness strengthens the effectiveness of law.  
In combination, they advance a vital national 
security objective with unparalleled competence. 
It would not be necessary to extend this analogy to 
the requirement for space control if space were the 
exclusive domain of law-abiding states.  But 
consider the implications of a hermetic, 
impoverished, diplomatically isolated North Korea 
developing a three-stage launch vehicle.  The United 
States would surely have shared launch services as 
readily as it assisted North Korea’s commercial 
nuclear power program – not out of altruism or to 
inhibit anyone’s access to space, but out of self-
interest to inhibit its hostile exploitation.  North 
Korea’s leaders would have known this but chose 
instead to invest in autonomous means.  In strategic 
terms this was altogether logical and predictable.  
What potential adversary could possibly ignore the 
enormity of U.S. reliance on outer space assets that 
are as vulnerable and at least as vital as her 18th 
century merchant ships? 
Calls by the U.S. National Command Authority for 
military readiness “to counter, when directed, space 
systems and services used for hostile purposes” 
serve notice that no potential adversary can lightly 
ignore.  They call for investment in the means to 
protect U.S. space assets while holding those of 
other states at risk, and for legal strategies that go 
beyond weapons reductions and constraints.  In 
short, they establish criteria against which both 
policies should be measured, toward which both 
should orient their creative energies, and in the 
service of which the whole must exceed the sum of 
its parts.   
As with sea control, much of the legal infrastructure 
that would underpin space control is already in 
place.  The 1967 Outer Space Treaty47 assigns the 
same legal status to “outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies,” that maritime law 
assigns to the high seas.  This means that the Moon, 
like the oceans, is immune from ownership or 
sovereignty claims, and that any nation can go 
                                                
     47Article I of the Outer Space Treaty: “The exploration 
and use of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in 
the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of 
economic or scientific development, and shall be the 
province of all mankind.” 
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there.  How would that prevent, say, a techno-
terrorist organization from positioning itself on the 
lunar surface?  In legal terms, the answer is that the 
Outer Space Treaty requires “non-governmental 
entities in outer space” to be authorized and 
supervised “by the appropriate State Party to the 
Treaty.”  
This provision has deep roots in maritime legal 
tradition.  Standing sea law affords “free transit” on 
the high seas only to vessels flying the flag of a 
recognized authority.  The flag tells port authorities, 
warships, and other vessels which state’s laws will 
prosecute illegal behavior.  It accepts the common 
province principle, but rejects the proposition that 
anarchy must therefore reign supreme.  It reflects a 
shared preference that states or other legitimate 
entities enforce their own laws on their own 
citizens.  Although the law is international, violators 
are subject to the penalties and protections inherent 
in the legal codes of the authority behind their flag.  
By exclusion, violators acting independently 
relinquish entitlement to such protection.  An 
American taken into custody from an unflagged 
vessel within another state’s territorial waters, for 
example, may or may not be afforded the 
presumption of innocence by the offended state’s 
courts.   
Unflagged vessels can be hailed, boarded, or seized 
by those equipped and authorized to do so.  Vessels 
bearing the flags of more than one authority are not 
entitled to the protection of the state behind any of 
their flags.  Falsely flagged vessels can be boarded 
with impunity from a warship of the “true” flag 
nation.  Maritime law thereby achieves one of U.S. 
diplomacy’s fundamental objectives – protection of 
the innocent – by facilitating one of the Navy’s 
fundamental objectives – exposure of the non-
innocent.  By proscribing illegitimate military 
action, the law licenses legitimate military action.  
Arms control, in other words, points the way to rules 
of engagement.  Navies cannot act with impunity on 
the high seas, but neither can criminals.  
Legitimately flagged ships engaged in illegal 
behavior are treated as diplomatic rather than 
military problems.  Falsely or unflagged vessels are 
treated as military rather than diplomatic 
problems.     
This, of course, is the point at which sea law takes a 
course that space law is not presently equipped to 
follow.  Violators of space law could be subjected to 
a variety of enforcement, protection, and penalty 
systems, including the seizure, imprisonment, 
impoundment, or punishment of their earthbound 
elements, and comparable penalties upon returning 
to Earth.  If that system of sanctions is adequate, 
there is no need for military force in space to 
challenge nefarious actions in progress.  But the 
same could be said of maritime law enforcement, by 
which logic there would be no need for coast guards 
and navies.  The latter point – as experts on drug 
smuggling, kidnapping, weapons proliferation, 
money laundering, immigration, piracy, and slave 
trading are quick to point out – is absurd.  Indeed, 
the answer to these rhetorical questions is not only 
obvious from a U.S. standpoint, but widely agreed 
throughout the international community.  Just as the 
United States welcomed the Royal Navy’s 
advancement of nineteenth century British security 
interests in the Atlantic, law-abiding nations today 
seldom object to a U.S. naval presence in their 
regional waters. 
What if an unflagged vessel anchored a few hundred 
kilometers from a U.S. coastline were readying itself 
to fire crude short-range ballistic or cruise missiles?  
Apart from a sovereign nation’s entitlement to 
protect itself do we feel safer knowing that the 
perpetrator could be punished upon return to port?  
Or are we heartened to know that that the Navy and 
Coast Guard are trained to hail such a vessel and 
confirm its intentions before it acts?  One difficulty 
with this analogy, of course, is that international 
standards on the high seas were codified after navies 
became commonplace national instruments.  
Modern navies, in turn, arose after maritime crimes 
and national security threats became intolerable.  In 
comparison, there have been few direct assaults on 
national space assets, and the power to prevent or 
negate such assaults is held by a mere handful of 
states.  And yet, the emergence of international 
space law is well underway.   
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Table 1 lists four such instruments to which the 
United States is party, illustrating the paucity of U.S. 
enforcement options in comparison with the 
maritime equivalent of each.  In each case the 
United States has both the means and the explicit 
authority to enforce international law as it relates to 
the sea, but neither the means nor the explicit 
authority to enforce the same provision in space.  In 
the case of each law of outer space, such capability 
would contribute to U.S. space control in the same 
measure to which analogous capability contributes 
to U.S. sea control.  And in each case the integrity of 
the relevant law would be enhanced as a result of 
sanctions implied or exercised by the fact of United 
States enforcement power. 
Table 1 illustrates a less obvious point as well.  
Laws of the sea, established after national naval 
power became commonplace, were put in place – in 
part – to limit the exercise of arbitrary authority by 
powerful navies.  As such, they served an arms 
control function – leveling a playing field under no 
one’s jurisdiction.  The fact that laws of outer space 
are being put in place in advance of routine military 
force deployments suggests their enactment 
regardless of whether they are accompanied by in-
place enforcement authority.  It is not a question of 
whether or not such laws will emerge, but who will 
write them, who will enforce them, and in whose 
interest.  And at the risk of stating the obvious, it is 
also a question of what nonexistent means of space 
control will be foreclosed in the meantime.  It is 
always easier to foreclose future weapons than to 
eliminate those in being.  And, indeed, Table 1 
hardly exhausts the list of emerging space legal 
principles to which the United States is already 
party.  Additional examples include: 
• The Declaration of Legal Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Uses of Outer Space 
Sets forth the basic components of 
international space law.48 
                                                
     48Precursor to the Outer Space Treaty adopted by the 
UNGA in 1963. 
• Principles Governing the Use by States of 
Artificial Earth Satellites for International 
Direct Television Broadcasting 
Taking into consideration that such use has 
international political, economic, social, and 
cultural implications, provides that a state 
which intends to establish such a broadcasting 
service notify receiving states and should 
establish such a service only on the basis of 
agreements with those states.49 
• The Principle Relating to Remote Sensing 
of the Earth from Space 
States that such activities are to be conducted 
for the benefit of all countries, with respect 
for the sovereignty of all states and people 
over their own natural resources and for the 
rights and interests of other states.50 
• The Principles Relevant to the Use of 
Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space 
Recognizes that nuclear power sources are 
essential for some missions, but should be 
designed so as to minimize public exposure to 
radiation in the case of accident.51 
• The Declaration on International 
Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space for the Benefit and in the 
Interest of All States, Taking into 
Particular Account the Needs of 
Developing Countries 
Purpose as stated.52 
 
Each instrument of outer space law listed above and 
in Table 1 was initiated in the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space 
(UNCOPUOS).  That body was created in the 1950s 
at United States urging to highlight the peaceful 
nature of its space program.  In recent years, 
however, UNCOPUOS deliberations have adopted a 
discernible logic, grammar, and vocabulary 
pattern.53  Prominent among its recurring themes is 
                                                
     49Adopted in 1982 as UNGA Resolution 37/92. 
     50Adopted in 1986 as UNGA Resolution 41/65. 
     51Adopted in 1992 as UNGA Resolution 47/68. 
     52Adopted in 1996 as UNGA Resolution 51/122. 
     53Examples that follow are drawn from statements by 
national representatives to the UNCPUOS UNISPACE III 
Conference, Vienna, Austria, 20 July 1999. 
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the belief that “peaceful use” of outer space begins 
with its “demilitarization” – a term of art that brooks 
no distinction between reconnaissance, meteorology, 
communications, warning, navigation, ASAT, or 
battlefield command and control missions.  Military 
use of space, by this logic, is simply anathema to 
good order.  Since properly structured regulatory 
regimes would presumably be self-enforcing, new 
weapon concepts quickly acquire rogue status. 




     54United Nations Treaties; Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space; States that have signed or ratified 
as of February 1999. 
     551958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas; 1974 London Convention on Safety of Life at Sea; 1982 Law of the Seas; Customary 
International Law. 
     56The U.S. Naval Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations; NWP1-14M; FMFM 1-10; COMDTPUB P5800. 
     57Outer Space Treaty. 
     58Agreement of the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space.  Provides 
for aiding crews of spacecraft in accident or emergency landing; establishes a procedure for returning to a launching authority space 
objects found beyond its territorial limits. 
     59Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects.  Establishes launching state’s liability for damage 
caused by its space objects on the Earth’s surface, to aircraft in flight, and to space objects of other states or persons. 
     60Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.  Launching state must maintain registry of space objects and 
furnish specified data to UN.  
TABLE 1 – A Comparison of U.S. Enforcement Protocols for International Sea vs. Space Law 
U.S. Law Enforcement Mechanisms UN Space Law Parties54 International Sea Law 
Equivalent55 At Sea56 Space 
1967 Outer Space Treaty57 
122 States including 
United States 
Promotes a legal order to 
facilitate global communication 
and promote peaceful use of 
the seas based on the needs of 
all mankind – particularly those 
of developing countries, 
whether coastal or land-locked. 
The “objective territorial principle” 
recognizes the right of a nation to apply 
its laws to acts committed beyond its 
territory which have their effect in that 
nation’s territory.  Extra-territorial drug 
laws and “hovering vehicles” are legally 
reached under this principle. 
? 
1968 Rescue Agreement58 
110 States including 
United States 
Vessels must assist distressed 
persons, provide warnings, safe 
harbor, innocent passage, and 
respect to sovereign property 
Doctrines of collective and individual 
self-defense and protection of nationals 
authorize U.S. forces to protect U.S. flag 
vessels, property, and persons from 
violent/unlawful acts. 
? 
1972 Liability Convention59 
105 States including 
United States 
States must investigate injuries, 
loss of life, or damage to 
another state’s property on the 
high seas caused by a ship 
flying its flag.  Ships 
unjustifiably stopped outside 
territorial limits must be 
compensated. 
Except as noted (re liability of 
warships), “nothing in this [LOS] 
Convention affects the immunities of 
warships… operated for non-
commercial purposes.” 
? 
1975 Registration Convention60 
43 States including 
United States 
States will fix the conditions 
for the grant of its 
nationality…for the registration 
of ships in its territory, and for 
the right to fly its flag.  Ships 
have the nationality of the state 
whose flag they are entitled to 
fly.  There must exist a genuine 
link between the state and the 
ship.  Every state shall issue to 
ships to which it has granted 
the right to any its flag 
documents to that effect  
If a ship on the high seas is reasonably 
suspected of involvement in slave trade, 
unauthorized broadcasting, piracy, or 
false flagging, a warship that encounters 
it may board and verify its flag rights.  
A warning shot is a signal – usually to 
warn an offending vessel to stop or 
maneuver in a particular manner or risk 
the employment of disabling fire or 
more severe measures.   
? 
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Some proponents of this agenda, including the 
current UN Secretary General, believe the growth of 
space commerce warrants to a new UN mission of 
“preventive diplomacy,” which would extend the 
UN’s role in peacemaking and peacekeeping to 
arms race prevention and missile warning.  A 
French proposal would equip new UN agencies with 
satellites, ground stations, and data processing 
facilities for Earth observation, launch notifications, 
transparency of military operations, and arms 
control monitoring.  A Chinese Resolution would 
create a standard format for the acquisition, 
processing, and handling of remote sensing data in 
support of developing countries, demilitarize outer 
space, and equip the UN to manage atmospheric 
reentry of nuclear power sources. 61  Iran would ban 
the transmission through space of TV signals that 
broadcast values contrary to the religious and ethical 
values of other sovereign states.   
Some of these proposals build on the social benefits 
of third world access to existing assets in space for 
economic and social development.  Others appeal to 
the commercial benefits of protocols that regularize 
access to space.  Whether on humanitarian, social, or 
risk management grounds, however, each also 
promotes restrictions that would intentionally or 
unintentionally inhibit U.S. space control.  
Americans tend to regard “the law” as an 
evenhanded, dispassionately enforced instrument of 
justice.  Although that is hardly its status in places 
like North Korea and Iran, egalitarian UN principles 
entitle each member state to an objective hearing on 
the merits of its case.  None of these countries shares 
the United States sense of urgency for freedom “to 
conduct military and intelligence space and space-
related activities …and [to] counter, when directed, 
space systems and services used for hostile 
purposes.” 
       
       61UNGA Resolution 51/122, “International Cooperation and 
Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All 
States.” 
Although it is the hidden agenda behind many of 
these proposals, some are more blatant than others in 
opposing U.S. space control.  Russia, for example, 
has employed standard UNCOPUOS language to 
float a ban on creation of “space vehicles capable of 
destroying missile attack warning space systems.”62  
By focusing on warning assets that everyone 
considers sacrosanct, this provision would assign 
rogue status to a hypothetical class of ASAT 
weapons designed to place them at risk.  Since arms 
control’s verification and confidence building rules 
cannot tolerate fine distinctions between a weapon’s 
peaceful or hostile purpose, and since “creation” 
could only be defined by “observable” testing and 
development practices, a ban on early warning 
ASATs would effectively ban all ASATs.  
Ironically, this would include the very anti-ASAT 
weapons required for the Russian proposal’s 
enforcement, but that would only matter if early 
warning satellites were the real object of its 
concern.  Instead, having assigned rogue status to a 
repugnant class of ASAT weapons, Russia has 
positioned itself to champion physical limits on 
space control.   
In fact, attacks on legitimate sovereign space assets, 
let alone on early warning satellites, are already acts 
of war.  Some such attacks, especially against early 
warning satellites, would themselves warn of 
impending terrestrial aggression.  To add that these 
attacks also violate a UNGA Resolution would be 
redundant at best.  In the final analysis, of course, 
neither existing space laws nor the one proposed by 
Russia would enshroud satellites of any kind in a 
blanket of security.  Nor, for that matter, would U.S. 
space control ever permanently eliminate all anxiety 
on the matter.  Neither the United States nor the 
international community, after all, can finally 
control all behavior even under well-established 
political-military regimes governing the high seas.   
       
      62Interview comments by Colonel General Vladimir 
Yakolev, Supreme Commander of Russia’s Strategic 
Missile Forces, January 1999, FBIS, Interfax. 
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But if unsanctioned norms were its only regulator, 
the law of the sea would be the law of the jungle – a 
continuous struggle among conflicting interests 
regulated only by the balance of power. 
It may or may not be true that such anarchy exists in 
outer space today, but how are violators of 
international space norms deterred, defeated, or 
punished?  If peaceful space use cannot be secured, 
how can its military abuse be controlled?  What 
distinguishes offensive activities from defensive 
activities?  How does a right to attack no one differ 
from a right to attack everyone?  How are violators 
denied the benefits of their actions before it is too 
late?  
Nor can it be denied that there are nations who 
would feign outrage over United States exercise of 
its space control responsibilities.  But since power is 
made manifest primarily by its use, the same is true 
of any unexercised sovereign entitlement.  What if 
the United States had never yet deployed carrier 
battle groups to show force in a tense region?  Some 
governments will be threatened, jealous, or 
righteously indignant, but most would expect the 
world’s most economically, militarily, and 
technologically advanced power to structure and 
enforce rules of the road according to its interests.  
Those whose ideals comport with ours, no matter 
how “shocked” they claim to be in public, will 
welcome it as a commonplace exercise of 
leadership.  There are states throughout the world 
that would prefer it not be so, but the fact is that the 
United States operates the world’s only global blue 
water navy, and that it serves all law-abiding nations 
by enforcing collectively held standards.  To reject 
such a space regime while welcoming analogous 
laws of the sea would be an inconsistency few of 
them could long sustain. 
If the United States concurs with sentiments 
expressed in UNCOPUOS circles, a passive 
approach to its proceedings will advance U.S. 
interests.63  If not, questions arise that are worthy 
          63It is worth noting in this regard, that the U.S. 
representative to the 1999 CPUOS convention took the 
course of least resistance by stressing aspects of past and 
current U.S. space policy that are fully compatible with the  
of thought while capabilities and procedures for 
space control are being deliberated.  What space 
asset identifiers might be equivalent to the 
flagging of vessels at sea?  How might legitimate 
“identify yourself” inquiries be authenticated?  
How would distinctions between military and 
civilian spacecraft be affirmed?  What recognized 
standards would signal intrusions that violate 
established rules?  What venue might structure a 
strategically sound international space regime? 
Contrary to American ideals, legislation is not 
necessarily a neutral expression of universally held 
values and more often reflects trade-offs among 
conflicting interests.  Societal ordering schemes are 
only purchased by the expenditure of some 
individual liberties – and vice versa.  Thus, two 
fundamental truths are clear regarding the law of 
outer space.  The first is that such laws will be made; 
the second is that they will serve someone’s 
interests.  It is not clear what further limitations on 
its freedom of action in space the United States 
should accept in order to promote an expanded legal 
regime that might better serve its national interests.  
What is more clear and immediate is that the 
international community, heavily influenced by anti-
American interests, is presently deliberating norms 
that cannot be enforced and would undermine 
central U.S. interests if they were.  If space 
strategists choose not to engage that challenge – by 
staying “above it” or denying its existence – the 
rules will be made by others.  And unless we equip 
ourselves with routinely demonstrated means of 
enforcement, those rules will be enforced by others. 
Given United States’ reliance on the military and 
commercial products of space, the countless ways 
by which these can be negated, and the ease with 
which they can be employed for hostile purposes, 
space control is as challenging as it is essential.  
Military organizations are familiar with such 
challenges, but the solution to this one will require 
 
organization’s agenda.  See Statement by Ambassador John B. 
Ritch, “Global Cooperation In The Exploration Of Space: 
Fusing The UN Idea And Mankind’s Greatest Adventure,” 
UNISPACE III Conference, Vienna, Austria, 20 July 1999. 
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more than shoulders to the wheel and noses to the 
grindstone.  It is a no-nonsense national security 
dilemma, whose commercial, economic, and 
diplomatic dimensions are at least as relevant as its 
military content.  However clear it may be that 
military and diplomatic instruments of national 
power must be focused toward a common strategic 
end, U.S. policy has treated them in either-or terms 
for fifty years.  The naval analogy offers the best, 
perhaps only, exception to this pattern.  Now, 
because arms control will either enable or disable 
space control, space control strategists must learn to 
see beyond this tradition and take steps to create 
enforceable twenty-first century space law. 
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UNITED STATES POLICY UPDATE 
JAMES VEDDA 
 
This first installment of the Journal’s U.S. space 
policy update will recap significant developments 
since the beginning of the George W. Bush 
administration.  The formal mechanism chosen by 
the administration to deal with policy issues is the 
Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) system, 
composed of high-level officials from throughout 
the executive branch.  This system was 
established by National Security Presidential 
Directive (NSPD)-1, dated 13 February 2001, 
which set up 6 regional and 11 topic area PCCs, 
none of which addressed space issues. 
 
NSPD-1 gave the National Security Advisor 
authority to set up additional PCCs as 
appropriate.  A Space PCC (along with three 
others) was added in April 2001.  The enabling 
documentation and lines of authority make it 
clear that the PCCs were set up to address 
national security issues, only incidentally 
touching on other areas like civil and commercial 
space.  Although it is represented in the Space 
PCC, NASA is not one of its most powerful 
players. 
 
The PCC system bears a striking resemblance to 
the Senior Interagency Groups (SIGs) of the 
Reagan administration, which were not 
considered an effective mechanism for managing 
civil space issues.  SIG (Space) was disliked by 
Congress for its lack of transparency, apparent 
disinterest in outside input, and perceived goal of 
centralizing the nation’s space policy-making in 
the White House.  It operated in an environment 
that promoted interagency turf battles dominated 
by the top officials of the national security 
community.  The current Space PCC is viewed by 
some in a similar light. 
 
What follows is a timeline of key space policy 
events that have occurred since the beginning of 
the Bush administration. 
 
February 2001: In an act reminiscent of the early 
months of the Clinton administration, the White 
House directed NASA to make drastic changes in 
the International Space Station (ISS) program to 
curb cost overruns.  The ISS would lose a 
habitation module, a crew return vehicle, and the 
ability to accommodate long-term crews of more 
than three people.  Such changes directly affect 
agreements signed in 1998 with international 
partners. 
 
March 2001: NASA announced cancellation of 
the X-33 and X-34 experimental launcher 
programs.  (The Air Force’s decision in August 
2001 not to participate in X-33 ended hopes of 
reviving the project.)  Both programs were 
experiencing technical and cost problems before 
the arrival of the Bush administration, so their 
termination was not completely unexpected.  But 
the decision meant abandoning two high-profile 
efforts involving a combined NASA investment 
of over $1.1 billion. 
 
May 2001: NASA awarded its first round of 
technology development and study contracts 
under the Space Launch Initiative (SLI), 
amounting to $767 million.  Like the terminated 
X-vehicle programs, SLI also predated the Bush 
administration.  Moving ahead with these contract 
awards indicated that the administration was 
placing its confidence in SLI to provide NASA’s 
next generation of space access.  Later, in
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November 2002, NASA refocused SLI on 
development of an Orbital Space Plane. 
 
November 2001:  The White House announced 
the nomination of Sean O’Keefe as NASA 
Administrator.  The Bush administration’s long 
delay in appointing a new administrator, and its 
choice of a deputy director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) with no 
previous space experience, sparked speculation 
over what this meant for the space agency.  
Analysts saw this belated attention as an 
indication of NASA’s low priority in the 
president’s agenda.  The choice of Sean O’Keefe 
prompted some observers to see his mandate as 
little more than damage control, 
primarily for the troubled ISS 
program. 
 
February 2002: The president’s 
budget request for fiscal year 2003 
included funding for a major new 
NASA initiative in nuclear power 
and propulsion. 
 
April 2002: NASA ordered the 
termination of work on the X-38 emergency 
return vehicle prototype.  Space station partners, 
particularly the Europeans, expressed their 
displeasure at the apparent breach of agreement 
and the lack of prior consultation. 
 
June 2002: NSPD-15, “National Space Policy 
Review,” initiated a series of interagency reviews 
that lead to the formulation of new policies as 
noted below. 
 
February 2003: The loss of space shuttle 
Columbia and its crew forced the nearly 
completed draft of a new space transportation 
policy back to the drawing board.  The report of 
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 
released in August 2003, included tough criticism 
of NASA’s organizational culture, assigning it 
part of the blame for the accident. 
April 2003: The space policy review produced its 
first results with NSPD-27, “U.S. Commercial 
Remote Sensing Policy,” which superseded the 
Clinton administration’s Presidential Decision 
Directive-23.  While continuing the existing 
policy of encouraging U.S. industry while 
protecting national security, NSPD-27 also 
directed U.S. government agencies to “rely to the 
maximum practical extent on U.S commercial 
remote sensing space capabilities for filling 
imagery and geospatial needs for military, 
intelligence, foreign policy, homeland security, 
and civil users.”  The National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) was already 
beginning to implement this policy, having 
awarded the first of its ClearView contracts 
to DigitalGlobe and Space Imaging in 
January 2003. 
 
September 2003: DigitalGlobe won the 
first award in NGA’s NextView program, 
which put the imagery agency in the 
business of providing direct support to the 
next generation of U.S. commercial remote 
sensing satellites. 
 
January 2004: In a high-profile speech at NASA 
Headquarters, President Bush set a new course 
for the space agency by reviving a 50-year-old 
vision that set the nation’s sights on the Moon, 
Mars, and beyond – after returning the shuttle to 
flight status and completing the space station.  
NSPD-31, “U.S. Space Exploration Policy,” 
called for retirement of the shuttle (which was 
later set for 2010) and development of new space 
transportation capabilities that would support 
human missions to the Moon starting between 
2015 and 2020.  Meanwhile, U.S. research on the 
space station would be refocused to support space 
exploration goals.  Also, in the same week as the 
space exploration announcement, NASA 
Administrator Sean O’Keefe revealed plans to 
discontinue servicing of the Hubble Space 
Telescope other than preparing it for a safe de-
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December 2004: Two more space policies were 
released within days of each other.  NSPD-39, 
“U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and 
Timing Policy,” reinforced existing policy on 
sustaining operation of the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) and improving capabilities for 
denial of service to hostile users.  The policy 
recognized GPS as critical infrastructure for 
homeland security purposes.  NSPD-40, “U.S. 
Space Transportation Policy,” continued the 
pursuit of assured access to space, technology 
development, and a healthy U.S. commercial 
launch industry, and also called for demonstration 
of “operationally responsive” access to space.  
Decisions on the future of the Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program 
were deferred until 2010. 
 
April 2005: Mike Griffin took over as NASA 
Administrator, a move that elicited strong 
approval from around the community, including 
the Congress.  He pledged to revisit Sean 
O’Keefe’s unpopular decision to terminate 
servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope.  A 
month later, he sent Congress a revised spending 
plan that, among other things, cut funding for his 
predecessor’s nuclear power and propulsion 
program. 
July 2005: The Bush administration requested 
that the Congress grant relief from the Iran Non-
Proliferation Act of 2000 to permit NASA to 
purchase the services of Russian Soyuz and 
Progress vehicles to sustain the space station 
while the shuttle is grounded.  In response, 
Congress amended the Act (through Public Law 
109-112) in November 2005. 
 
September 2005: Just five months after taking 
office, NASA Administrator Griffin unveiled the 
transportation architecture that would be used for 
the return to the Moon.  As expected since mid-
summer, the architecture was substantially 
derived from space shuttle components. 
 
February 2006: The President’s proposed FY07 
budget for NASA disappointed many in the 
community due to its limited overall growth and 
its substantial cutbacks previously proposed 
funding for space science, Earth science, and 
aeronautics over the next few years. 
 
The Bush administration worked on a new 
National Space Policy from the beginning of 
2004 through mid-2006.  As this issue was going 
to press (October 2006) that policy was released 
and it replaced the 1996 National Space Policy of 
the Clinton administration (PDD-49).  For the 
next issue of Space and Defense, this section will 
focus on analyzing the new policy. 
 
 
Russian Space Policy Update 
William P. Barry, D. Phil. 
 
Russian Federation Space  
Policy:  Back to the Future? 
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, 
the Russian Federation found itself the inheritor 
of much of the Soviet space program.  However, 
this “new”country also had a new leadership that 
had little interest in a space effort that was viewed 
as tainted by its close association with the 
leadership of the Communist Party and its 
management through the Soviet defense industry 
bureaucracy.  In addition, the extraordinary 
budgets and priorities assigned to resources 
designated for space efforts were a luxury that 
Russia could now little afford.  In the face of 
these enormous challenges, the Russian Space 
Agency was created and Mr. Yuri Koptev was 
appointed to lead it.  Such an organization 
devoted to civil space was a new concept, 
although many of the Russian Space Agency’s 
officials, like Mr. Koptev, had previously served 
in the coyly named Ministry of General 
Machinebuilding – the ballistic missile and space 
ministry of the Soviet government.  For the 
remainder of the 1990s Russian space policy was 
largely ignored at the highest political levels and 
left to survive on meager (and frequently 
undelivered) fiscal rations, while Mr. Koptev 
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courted foreign assistance and struggled to build a 
space agency in the Western mold. 
 
Considering the circumstances Mr. Koptev was 
remarkably successful.  In the late 1990s, Russia 
retained its reputation as a “space power” (as 
tarnished as that reputation may have been) 
largely through the central role it came to play in 
the International Space Station (ISS).  The 
Russian government had also created (in 
September 1999) an organization parallel in title 
to NASA by handing Mr. Koptev control over the 
Russian aviation industry and creating the 
Russian Aviation and Space Agency 
(Rosaviakosmos).  (The 
aviation industry in the 
Soviet Union had 
always been managed 
as a separate Ministry.  
One of the interesting 
contrasts of the Cold 
War is the fact that the 
Soviet space program 
effectively grew out of the artillery industry, 
while in the U.S. the space program had its 
primary roots in the aviation industry).  However, 
the commitments to the ISS were consuming 
Rosaviakosmos.  As the substantial hardware 
reserves from the Soviet era were depleted, and as 
contractual payments from NASA were slashed 
after the passage of the Iran Nonproliferation Act 
of 2000, Russia’s ISS commitments grew to 
consume 48 percent of the Rosaviakosmos budget 
in 2001.  The simple fact that the Russian space 
program survived the break up of the Soviet 
Union and eight years of the Yeltsin 
Administration is a testament to the robustness of 
Russian space hardware, the dedication of its 
workers (often in the face of little or no pay), the 
adroitness of its leadership in adapting to new 
circumstances, and some good fortune in finding 
international partners.  Yet, as the new century 
dawned Mr. Koptev’s amazing balancing act was 
becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. 
 
Political change came just in time for the Russian 
space program.  After Vladimir Putin became 
President of the Russian Federation in 2000, his 
government began to face the financial gap 
between its space aspirations and the budget 
bottom line.  In 2000 Russia allocated a paltry 
$166 million for the Federal Space Budget 
(aviation was still funded under a separate budget 
line, and this figure is not believed to include 
military space  spending or  other   special   space 
programs that are funded separately (e.g., the 
GLONASS satellite navigation system).  Yet, in 
2002, the Russian Federal Space budget began a 
dramatic increase; rising by over fifty percent 
from the 2001 figure.  Much of the increase was 
applied to non-ISS spending (which doubled from 
$95 million in 2001 to $190 million in 2002).  
This budget growth trend has continued over the 
last five years, with dramatic growth in the 
overall budget, but larger part of the increases 
being allocated to non-ISS programs.  In fact, in 
the last three years the Federal Space Budget has 
more than tripled (2003 budget: $263 million; 
2006 budget: $793 million).  Economic stability 
and the influx of tremendous oil wealth have 
allowed such increases in spending, but in 
comparison to aspirations Russian funding levels 
remain very low.  Russia’s spending on space 
amounts to less than five percent of the NASA 
budget and Russia now ranks fifth in international 
spending levels on space (behind the United 
States, the European Space Agency, Japan, and 
China – just recently having moved ahead of 
India).   
 
While the financial turn-around began in 2002, 
structural and personnel changes took another 
two years.  As part of President Putin’s sweeping 
reorganization of the Russian government in the 
run-up to the spring of 2004 Presidential election, 
Rosaviakosmos was broken into its more 
traditional constituent parts.  Responsibility for 
space was vested in the Federal Space Agency 
(Roskosmos) and aviation responsibilities were 
assigned to a separate organization.  Mr. Koptev, 
the only leader the space agency had known, was 
President Putin 
referred to the 
space program 
as an engine to 
drive growth in 
high technology  
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replaced by the then-Commander of Russian 
Military Space Forces, Colonel-General Anatolii 
Perminov.  Retiring from military service, Mr. 
Perminov made his presence felt immediately 
throughout the Russian space program with a 
series of visits to Roskosmos facilities and 
contractors.  At Roskosmos headquarters, he 
overhauled the leadership team, bringing in a 
number of people with whom he had worked in 
the military.  Two years on, the continuing pace 
of change and increased energy is still evident at 
Roskosmos.   
 
The changes at Roskosmos reflected a significant 
shift in Russian leadership attitudes toward space.  
President Putin had begun to take a positive 
public position on space in the year prior the 
shakeup at Roskosmos by referring to the space 
program as an engine that could drive growth in 
the high-technology sector.  Yet, his more 
assertive attitude toward space became much 
more apparent after the appointment of Mr. 
Perminov in March 2004.  In a first for a Russian 
President, Mr. Putin visited Roskosmos 
Headquarters to make a speech and present 
awards marking Cosmonautics Day, 12 April 
2004.  During his speech President Putin noted 
that: 
 
Thanks to space research we joined the 
community of developed countries and 
established a firm foothold there.  It was this 
sphere of activity precisely that allowed our 
country to achieve leading positions in a 
range of hi-tech fields.  Moreover, since the 
very beginning of the space age we were 
aware of our special historic mission….[space 
should] become an arena for peaceful 
cooperation, based on trust, sober calculation 
and a clear-cut understanding of all national 
interests.     
 
President Putin’s support of the Russian space 
program is not simply a return to Soviet attitudes 
or a matter of nostalgia for the Soviet era.  On a 
purely practical level, the space program is one of 
Russia’s few world-class inheritances from the 
Soviet Union.  The current Russian political 
leadership recognizes that Sputnik and the space 
program were key factors that allowed the USSR 
to establish itself as a superpower.  Although the 
tone may be somewhat reminiscent of the Soviet 
era, President Putin’s accentuation of Russian 
space accomplishments over the last two years 
has not been focused on proving the superiority 
of his political system, as much as it has been on 
signaling the continued relevance of Russian 
power in the world.  This is evident in the 
increased, and less cynical, Russian domestic 
press coverage of the space program and by the 
rise in the use of space cooperation as a foreign 
policy tool.  For example, during the May 2003 
visit of President Putin to Malaysia, it was 
announced that Russia would fly a Malaysian in 
space as part of a $900 million deal to sell 18 
Russian Su-30 fighter jets.  Since the appointment 
of Mr. Perminov as head of Roskosmos in early 
2004, the visibility of the Russian space program 
at the diplomatic level and the pace of 
Roskosmos international activity has further 
accelerated.   
 
In another telling sign of leadership interest, 
space was one of fifteen long-term national 
“targeted programs” created for key economic 
development fields in 2005.  The “Federal Space 
Program 2006-2015” was approved by the 
Russian Government in late 2005.  It outlines the 
space goals for Russia over the next ten years and 
authorizes the expenditure of some $8 billion 
dollars.  Russian press reports indicate that the 
Roskosmos budget is expected to continue its 
upward climb until it reaches approximately $1 
billion per year (expected in approximately 
2010).  While the Federal Space Program 
represents a significant increase in political and 
financial recognition for Roskosmos, it falls far 
below the aspirations that Mr. Perminov 
suggested when the Program was first publicly 
discussed in the summer of 2005.  Like many 
other Russian government agencies, Roskosmos 
had evidently hoped for a significant slice of
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Russia’s new oil wealth.  Although the increases 
in planned spending over the next ten years are 
significant, Mr. Perminov himself has publicly 
acknowledged that the approved funding levels 
will be barely adequate to meet the rather limited 
goals of the Federal Space Program.  
(Interestingly, those goals have been publicly 
touted for their attention to services to Russian 
citizens, including the replacement and upgrade 
of long-neglected communication satellites, 
meteorological satellites, and remote sensing 
satellites.  The Program has very limited space 
science and exploration objectives, and evidently 
does not authorize a human spaceflight program 
beyond participation in the ISS.)  In fact, Russian 
government projections indicate that achieving 
the objectives of the Federal Space Program 
2006-2015 will likely cost approximately $12.5 
billion.  Thus, success of the Program will hinge 
on attracting a planned $4.5 billion in revenues 
from the sale of space goods and services to 
international customers over the next ten years.  
A lackluster launch services market and the 
growth of launch vehicle competitors will force 
Roskosmos to be very creative and aggressive if 
it hopes to supplement its 10-year budget by 
nearly fifty percent through what Russia refers to 
as “off-budget” sources.    
 
The last two years have been a time of significant 
change for Russian space policy, as the country 
has become more nationalistic and more capable 
of funding its own space programs.  Political 
expectations have increased and Russian space 
efforts once again enjoy pride of place in 
demonstrating national capabilities.  Yet, 
although funding increases have been generous 
by Russian standards, there remains a significant 
gap between funding needs and allocations.  
Success appears to continue to rely on obtaining 
funds from outside the country, while 
simultaneously acting in a way that might tend 
discourage significant “outside” investment.  This 
suggests that Russian space policy is now an 
interesting hybrid of Soviet style attitudes and 
objectives and post-Soviet approaches to funding.  
Whether this hybrid approach will be successful 
remains to be seen. 
 
European Space Policy Update 
Richard Buenneke 
 
Four decades after the first autonomous 
European satellite launch, Europe found itself at a 
crossroads regarding the course of its security 
space programs.  Facing continued struggles to 
develop dedicated military satellites at the 
national level, Europe considered a strategy based 
on dual-use technology and past successes in 
civilian launch and satellite programs.  This 
approach centered on a series of “great projects” 
for navigation, global monitoring, and space 
situational awareness. 
 
Despite early predictions by European military 
space enthusiasts, a range of political, strategic, 
and economic factors slowed the progress of 
these flagship programs.  By the mid-2000s, 
Europe’s ability to deploy capabilities that would 
approach those of the United States appeared 
doubtful.  At the same time, advances in satellite 
technology could give Europe the ability to 
develop capabilities that could either create new 
challenges for the Western alliance or contribute 




Among European nations, France continued to 
devote the most attention and resources – 
approximately $800 million per year – to 
dedicated military programs.  Evoking the 
policies of former President Charles de Gaulle, 
France launched the first of a new generation of 
Hélios reconnaissance satellites in December 
2004.  Looking to new mission areas, France’s
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General Armaments Directorate also 
demonstrated  a “swarm”  of   Essaim    electronic  
intelligence microsatellites.  As a result, France 
had the bulk of non-communications system in 
orbit by the middle of the decade (see table 
below) 
 
Comparison of U.S. and European Material 
Capabilities in Space* 
 
*Situation as of 1 May 2005 
 
Source: French Ministry of Defense, cited in French 
National Assembly, Commission on National Defense and 
Armed Forces, “Défense: Équipement des forces; Espace, 
communications, dissuasion,” Le projet de loi des finances 
pour 2006, Vol. IX, No. 2540. 
 
At the same time, budget constraints prevented 
France from developing an imaging radar system.  
To increase its access to all-weather intelligence, 
France and Germany agreed to a “pooled system” 
that permitted joint use of the electro-optic Hélios 
satellites and the German SAR-Lupe radar 
satellites by 2009.  France also partnered with 
Italy on the Optical and Radar Federated Earth 
Observation (ORFEO) program.  When fully 
operational later in the decade, his program will 
network the French Pleiades optical and the radar 
payloads of Italy’s Constellation of small 
Satellites for Mediterranean basin Observation 
(COSMO-SkyMed). 
 
The dual-use character of ORFEO was repeated 
in a number of other national and European 
programs.  At the national level, the German 
space agency began work on TerraSAR-X 
(scheduled for launch in late 2006) and the 
British Ministry of Defense launched in 2005 a 
TopSat minisatellite imaging demonstration. 
 
Budget constraints also led several European 
governments to leverage commercial technology 
and financing for their Military Satellite 
Communications (MilSatCom) networks.  On 
projects such as the United Kingdom’s (UK) 
Skynet 5 or Spain’s XTAR, defense ministries 
would agree to serve as anchor tenants for 
privately financed satellites.  While France, Italy 
and Germany opted for more traditional 
government-owned approaches for their 
Milsatcom systems, these countries also explicitly 
linked their purchases to national industrial 
policies. 
 
The emphasis on industrial policy sometimes 
complicated efforts to enhance interoperability 
among national European systems.  The closest 
integration occurred in MILSATCOM, where a 
team of UK, France and Italy was selected to 
provide capacity for NATO.  Coordination was 
less evident in reconnaissance satellite programs, 
where systems remained truly “national” with 





To fashion a grander design for military space, 
leading European military planners and aerospace 
executives sought to ensure space helped create 
an “ever closer union” of European nations.  They 




Optical imagery 3 satellites 2 satellites 
(Hélios) 
Radar imagery 3 satellites 0 
Military 
meteorology 
5 satellites 0 
Signals intelligence 15 satellites 2 
demonstrators 
(Essaim) 
Early warning 7 satellites 0 
Space surveillance 1 
demonstrator 
0 
Satellite navigation 30 satellites 0 
Telecommunications 31 satellites 12 satellites 
(including 2 
NATO) 
Data relay and 
secondary missions 
14 satellites 1 civil 
demonstrator 
(Artemis) 
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important role in supporting peacekeeping, 
humanitarian relief and homeland security 
functions as well as “out-of-area” military 
operations.  Enthusiasm for this approach was 
greatest among the technocracy of France, where 
President Jacques Chirac hailed France’s role as 
the “motive force” for ensuring that Europe did 
not become a “vassal” to an American space 
hegemon. 
 
By contrast, the UK remained skeptical of any 
space project that sought to bolster European 
Union military capabilities at the expense of the 
Atlantic alliance.  German officials also 
questioned calls by industry experts to double 
Europe’s military space budget, noting financial 
constraints. 
 
The focal point 
for this policy 
debate became 
Galileo, a joint 
program of the 
European 





navigation satellite system.  Galileo’s civilian 
positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities 
were relatively non-controversial and seen by 
many experts as a valuable augmentation to the 
U.S. Global Positioning System.  However, 
European plans for a dual-use “public regulated 
service” on Galileo raised more concerns about 
potential competition with GPS. 
 
The controversy over Galileo reached its peak in 
December 2001, when U.S. Deputy Defense 
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz wrote to EU defense 
ministers expressing concerns about potential 
interference of Galileo’s security signals with 
GPS military bands.  Although this specific 
technical issue was resolved in a US-EU 
agreement signed in June 2004, the controversy 
also highlighted a growing divergence of views 
between the United States and EU regarding the 
role of space in supporting “security” missions 
and European reliance on American-run “global 
utilities.” 
 
As the decade progressed, concerns about a 
potential transatlantic rivalry in space abated as 
overall relations between the United States and 
Continental Europe improved and the EU 
Constitution was rejected in French and Dutch 
referendums.  By early 2006, delays and cost 
overruns in the first phase of the Galileo program 
– combined with continuing controversies over 
China’s role as a minority partner in the program 
– cooled the ardor of many European 
governments for large, dual-use projects. 
 
By 2006, general pressures on government 
spending also suggested that a second space 
“flagship,” the Global Monitoring for 
Environment and Security program, would be 
stretched out to fit tighter budgets.  Although the 
EU Commission still sought to expand its role in 
space, these efforts were reoriented away from 
comprehensive European Space Policy and 
towards a more incremental “road map” that 
emphasizes interoperability and tighter 
integration into terrestrial homeland security 
missions. 
 
The renewed interest in integrated capabilities 
also may create opportunities for a more 
Atlanticist approach to military space.  One 
promising candidate for such integration could be 
Space Situational Awareness, where European 
space surveillance sensors and satellite 
monitoring capabilities could be integrated with 
U.S. military space networks to improve allied 
commanders’ understanding of friendly as well as 
potentially hostile space activities.  Transatlantic 
ties also could be strengthened  through 
cooperation between the U.S. and UK on 
operationally responsive microsatellites derived 
from the TopSat demonstration.
European leaders 
argued that space 
technologies could play 
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Perhaps more significantly, European nations 
expressed a growing interest in measures for 
protecting their space infrastructures.  These 
efforts – which include support for Russian and 
Chinese diplomatic initiatives for multilateral 
“transparency and confidence building measures” 
– challenge many of the Cold War Assumptions 
of U.S. policy for sharing space surveillance data.  
The result may be the creation of a “two-way 
street” for information sharing, thus extending the 
Security guarantees of the North Atlantic Treaty 
into outer space. 
 
 
CHINA AND ASIA 
SPACE POLICY UPDATE 




You can’t believe everything you hear about the 
Chinese space program.  I worked in Beijing in 
the late 1990s, and there I encountered a man 
named Mr. Li.  Mr. Li spoke good English, 
appeared well educated, and claimed to have been 
in the Chinese Air Force.  He would sometimes 
talk with me about the Chinese space program, 
particularly about the Chinese space launch 
facility in Tibet where they were preparing for a 
mission to the Moon some time before the end of 
1999.  The purpose of the mission, he said, was to 
crack open the Moon to allow the Earth to pass 
through it and enter the next century.  The story 
pretty much went downhill from there.  
Eventually I had to break off my relationship with 
Mr. Li, explaining that his version of reality and 
mine were too far apart. 
 
The real Chinese space program has recently 
entered a new and exciting phase:  manned 
spaceflight.  The Chinese successfully put 
astronauts in Earth orbit in 2003 and 2005.  This 
makes them only the third country in the world to 
develop this level of space technology.  These 
launches have sparked tremendous popular 
enthusiasm and pride in China for their space 
accomplishments, and they look forward to 
greater achievements.  Unfortunately, anyone 
searching for reliable information on the future of 
the Chinese manned space program will likely be 
frustrated by the lack of credible information.   
 
The only published space policy document was 
done in 2000, long before the first manned 
mission.  It contained few concrete details.  Since 
then, while there is plenty of speculation in the 
popular press, real government information on the 
manned space program has largely been limited 
to brief statements, little more than sound bites, 
by government or space industry officials.  The 
Chinese are not very free with information in 
some areas, and since the space program is 
viewed as connected with their military, it is a 
sensitive topic.  Such public statements as have 
been made can be woven together into an outline 
of sorts on China’s plans.  The question remains, 
however, how closely this outline matches 
China’s actual intentions. 
 
China could prove either a competitor or a partner 
with the United States in developing manned 
space capabilities.  It is therefore important to 
know, as best we can, what China’s policy is for 
manned spaceflight.  The starting point for such 
knowledge should be what Chinese officials have 
said their program consists of.  Then, later, as 
they progress in their activities, we can get a 
sense of the reliability of this data by comparing 
words and actions. 
 
Initial Policy Statement: The 2000 
White Paper 
 
The closest that the Chinese have come to a 
public space policy is the State Council 
publication of “China’s Space Activities: a White 
Paper,” in November 2000.  This was a first-ever 
public government outline of their space 








programs and enumerated the following 
development targets: 
 
• The short-term development targets (for the 
next decade) are: 
- To build up an earth observation system 
[including] meteorological satellites, 
resource satellites, oceanic satellites and 
disaster monitoring satellites.   
- To set up an independently operated 
satellite broadcasting and tele-
communications system [with] geo-
stationary telecom satellites and TV live 
broadcasting satellites. 
- To establish an independent satellite 
navigation and positioning system.  
• The long-term development targets (for the 
next 20 years or more) [include]: 
- To establish a multi-function and multi-
orbit space infrastructure composed of 
various satellite systems and set up a 
satellite ground application system. 
- To establish China's own manned 
spaceflight system and carry out manned 
spaceflight scientific research and 
technological experiments on a certain 
scale. 
- To upgrade the overall level and capacity 
of China's launch vehicles.  
- To realize manned spaceflight and 
establish an initially complete R and D 
testing system for manned space projects. 
- To establish a coordinated and complete 
national satellite remote-sensing 
application system. 
- To develop space science and explore 
outer space by developing a scientific 
research and technological experiment 
satellite group of the next generation, 
[and] carrying out pre-study for outer 
space exploration centering on the 
exploration of the moon.”1 
                                                
     1The Information Office of the State Council, China's 
Space Activities, a White Paper, 22 November 2000, 
emphasis added. 
In sum, the Chinese published ambitious space 
goals including manned spaceflight, manned 
space experimentation, and lunar exploration.  
Discussions about the final goal have been 
somewhat ambiguous and controversial but later 
sources have clarified that the manned space 
program includes manned lunar missions.  The 
formal adoption of these programs was made 
public by Luan Enjie, Administrator of the China 
National Space Agency (CNSA), in a 2001 report 
indicating that space science, deep space 
exploration and manned space flight were part of 
China’s development targets for the Tenth Five-
Year Plan (2001-2005).2  
 
Since that time, there has been 
no comprehensive government 
statement of policy for China’s 
space programs.  The CNSA 
website currently has a link 
called “Space Policy,” but 
clicking there will lead the 
reader to a copy of the 2000 White Paper.  Those 
interested in China space policy today are 
generally left to piece together statements by 
government or space program officials, most of 
which reveal little more than one or two nuggets 
at a time.   
 
From these statements a sort of policy can be 
assembled, or at least an outline of the declared 
space program can be seen.  What follows is a 
summary of what has been said from 2003 into 
2006 by officials in the program or other 
government spokesmen.  Although fragmented, 
the collection of such statements expands on this 
initial outline and provides a basis for tracking 
the development of manned spaceflight 
technology.  In the near term, the focus of such 
statements has been on plans for the next 
missions in the Shenzhou (Divine Vessel) 
                                                
     2Luan Enjie, Administrator of CNSA, “Policy and 
Prospects for the Development of China's Space 
Technology,” Aerospace China, Winter 2001, emphasis 
added.  
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program that has included the two manned 
missions to date. 
 
Future Shenzhou Missions 
 
During the months leading up to and especially 
after the successful flight of Shenzhou 6 in 
October 2005, Chinese space officials apparently 
felt more confident in making predictions for the 
future of this program.  Yang Yiwei, China’s first 
astronaut was quoted by People’s Daily in August 
2005 as saying that Shenzhou 7 would fly in 2007 
and include a space walk.  He also said that 
Shenzhou 8 would leave a cabin in space for later 
docking activity by Shenzhou 9, but he gave no 
timetable for these missions.1  The Director of the 
Manned Space Engineering Office, Tang 
Xianming, gave a statement in October 2005 that 
said a spacewalk would in fact occur in 2007 and 
that manned docking would take place in 2009-
2012.2   
 
By early 2006, however, the planned launch date 
for the Shenzhou 7 mission had been pushed back 
to 2008.  The new Director of the Manned Space 
Engineering Office, Wang Zhougui, announced 
the change and that “the space walking astronauts 
will walk in the [Chinese-made] space suit and do 
some space experiments.  Our initial plans are to 
have 1 or 2 astronauts walk in space for about 
half an hour.”3  This shift was confirmed a week 
later by Huang Chunping, chief consultant for 
China’s manned launch vehicle system, in a 
Xinhua interview.  “There is nothing wrong,” said 
Huang, “We just need more time to prepare for 
the mission.”4   
Also by early 2006, the space-dock mission was 
being connected to the Shenzhou 8 flight.  Wang 
Zhougui was again the source of this.  He was 
                                                
     1People’s Daily Online, 12 August 2005. 
     2Xinhua, People’s Daily Online, 17 October 2005.   
     3China Daily: Spacewalk Mission Set for 2008: Official, 
24 February 2006, FBIS CPP20060224074023.  
     4Beijing Xinhua, “China to Delay Launch of Shenzhou-7 
Spacecraft to 2008,” 4 March 2006, FBIS 
CPP20060304054017.   
quoted by China Daily as saying that “Shenzhou 
8, with the mission of a space dock, will be 
launched around 2009 to 2011.”  It was not clear 
from his remarks what equipment from which 
missions would be part of the space dock 
operation.  He said only that “space docks refer to 
those between two space flights or between a 




Beyond the Shenzhou program itself, Chinese 
officials have revealed an interest in two manned 
orbiting systems.  Remarks on these systems go 
back at least to the enthusiastic days after the 
Shenzhou 5 launch, when Zhang Qingwei, 
Deputy Commander of China’s manned space 
program, said China “would strive for 
breakthroughs in space rendezvous and docking 
technology for launching a space lab and 
eventually a manned space station.”6  Details on 
what China means by a space lab have been few.  
In early 2006, however, a presentation to the 
National People’s Congress on the space program 
stated that the construction of a “sky lab” was 
part of the Five-Year Plan for 2006-2010 
submitted to the Congress for approval.7 
 
Chinese Manned Space Station 
 
As mentioned above, Zhang Qingwei referred in 
2003 to the plan for a Chinese space station.  
Such a craft would “enable China to carry out 
large-scale scientific experiments and 
applications in space,” said  Zhang, as  part of the  
manned space program originally laid down in 
1992.  He further stated that such space-based 
infrastructure as the space lab and station would 
                                                
     5China Daily, “Spacewalk Mission Set for 2008: 
Official,” 24 February 2006, FBIS CPP20060224074023. 
     6Xinhua News Agency, 16 October 2003, emphasis 
added, China to Develop Space Lab, Space Station. 
     7Xinhua, People’s Daily Online, 7 March 2006, China's 
Space Program Seeks New Breakthroughs in Five Years. 
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serve as a platform for deep space probes.8  The 
inclusion of a space station in the manned space 
program was confirmed in late 2003 by the 
deputy director of CNSA.   
 
In 2003, the Chinese were saying that a space 
station would take “about 15 years” to complete.  
Wang Yongzhi, described by Xinhua as chief 
designer of China's manned space program since 
1992, made this statement in a speech to a group 
of high school students.9  Huang Chunping of the 
launch vehicle program said in February 2004 
that China would have a space station by 2015.10         
 
Again, with practically no expansion on details of 
the program, Chinese space officials in late 2005 
and early 2006 were still stating that a space 
station was in the plan.  Zhang Qingwei was 
saying no more than that China would 
“eventually” launch a manned space station to 
carry out large-scale experiments.11  Wang 
Zhougui included a Chinese space station in his 
February 2006 review of the manned space 
program, but he likewise gave no indication of 
when they might launch such a station.12  Hu 
Shixiang, described as “a former senior 
commander” in China’s manned space program, 
stated in March 2006 that the space station was in 
the 11th Five Year Plan submitted (with the sky 





                                                
     8Xinhua News Agency, 16 October 2003, China to 
Develop Space Lab, Space Station 
     9Hong Kong Hsiang Kang Shang Pao, “China’s Lunar 
Probe, Aerospace Development Programs,” 18 October 
2003, FBIS CPP20031213000078. 
     10Hong Kong Wen Wei Po, “China To Set Up Space 
Laboratory Before 2009 and Space Station Before 2015,” 
30 March 2004, CPP20040410000026. 
     11Xinhua, People’s Daily Online, 13 October 2005. 
      12China Daily, “Spacewalk Mission Set for 2008: 
Official,” 24 February 2006, FBIS CPP20060224074023. 
     13Xinhua, People’s Daily Online, 7 March 2006,  China's 
Space Program Seeks New Breakthroughs in Five Years 
Unmanned Lunar Probes 
 
Chinese officials have repeatedly stated that 
travel to the Moon is part of their space program.  
While most of the discussion of near-term 
missions has been about unmanned probes, 
several public statements have pointed to manned 
lunar missions in the future as well.     
 
Following the first successful Shenzhou mission, 
press reports were predicting lunar missions.  In 
2003, Qinghua University and the State Robot 
Research Center were reportedly already working 
on the manufacture of lunar landing 
vehicles.14  Late that same year, Zhang Qingwei 
was quoted by Xinhua as saying China was to 
“launch its first Moon probing satellite in the next 
three to five years.”15  In November 2004, Hu 
Hao, described as “Director of the Lunar 
Exploration Engineering Center,” presented an 
outline of the lunar program in a conference.  He 
said the program was divided into three stages: 
orbiting the Moon in 2007, an unmanned landing 
on the Moon carrying a “Moon rover” by 2012, 
and the use of lunar vehicles on the Moon to 
collect samples of lunar soil from then to 2017.  
(Other statements by space program officials 
clarified that this third stage involved the return 
of samples to Earth.16)  Hu stated that the first 
craft in China’s lunar exploration program, the 
Chang’e-1 satellite, would be sent to orbit the 
Moon in 2007 from the Xichang Satellite Launch 
Center.17 
 
As of 2005, this same three-stage program was 
still being described as well as the steps 
underway to bring it about.  The Lunar 
Exploration Engineering Center was opened in 
August in Beijing, with the opening ceremony 
                                                
     14Shanghai Jiefang Ribao, “China’s Lunar Probe, 
Aerospace Development Programs,” 17 October 2003, 
FBIS CPP20031213000078.  
     15Xinhua News Agency, 1 November 2003, China to 
Launch Moon Probiing Satellite in 3 to 5 Years.  
     16People’s Daily Online, 22 November 2004. 
     17People’s Daily Online, November 08, 2004. 
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presided over by Zhang Yunchuan, minister in 
charge of the Commission of Science, 
Technology and Industry for National Defense 
(COSTIND), which has authority over the lunar 
program.18  A spokesman for the China 
Aerospace Science and Technology Group 
(CAST) said in October that his company was 
involved in the research and development for the 
Chang’e-1 lunar probe.19  By January 2006, 
COSTIND had listed the manned space program 
and the lunar probe program as two of its five 
major tasks for the 2006-2010 timeframe.20 
 
Manned Lunar Missions 
 
Several reasons have been 
given by the Chinese for 
lunar missions, to include 
exploration and exploitation 
of resources on the Moon, the 
further development of 
spaceflight technology, and 
prestige: “stimulating 
national spirit and cementing 
national cohesion.”  An 
article in PLA Daily in April 
2004 further stated that 
“China will complete the 
unmanned moon exploration in about 20 years 
and then launch and fulfill a manned moon 
landing.”21  Luan Enjie repeated in 2005 that the 
lunar probe missions were designed to “provide 
data for manned lunar missions and for choosing 
a site for a lunar base.”22 
  
The timing of China’s planned mission to the 
Moon remains vague.  Ouyang Ziyuan, an 
academician of the China Academy of Sciences 
and chief scientist of the Moon-probe program, 
claimed in November 2005 that “China will make 
                                                
     18Xinhua, People’s Daily Online, 23 August 2005.  
     19Xinhua, People’s Daily Online, 17 October 2005. 
     20Xinhua, People’s Daily Online, 6 January 2006. 
     21PLA Daily, in People’s Daily Online, 9 April 2004.  
     22China Daily, in People’s Daily Online, 16 August 
2005. 
a manned moon landing at a proper time, around 
2017,”  He further claimed that a goal of such 
missions would be to report on the presence of 
“Helium-3.”23  At about the same time, Hu 
Shixiang was saying that he thought a Chinese 
manned lunar landing would occur “in about 10 
to 15 years.”24  The latest comment by Luan Enjie 
of CNSA, in December 2005, sounded like a plea 
for patience.  “Sending a man to the Moon?  It 
would be a one-way ticket if we do it now, given 
[that] the thrust of our rockets at present is not 
strong enough.”25   
 
The Chinese Program: How Serious? 
 
To sum up, Chinese government and space 
program officials have collectively described a 
manned spaceflight program that includes space 
walks by 2008, space docking attempts by 2011, 
a space lab in orbit by perhaps 2012, a Chinese 
space station in orbit by perhaps 2015, and a 
manned mission to the Moon by around 2017.  
There have been remarks on other programs – a 
mission to Mars, Chinese “space tourist” launches 
– but these seem far off, speculative, and not part 
of a real program.   
 
Two questions arise about the declared elements 
of the program as we understand it.  First, does 
this outline reflect the actual Chinese plan?  
Second, is the plan real in the sense that the 
Chinese will be able to execute it in anything like 
the timeframes described?  An additional 
question might be: how do we make reasonable 
judgments on the first two questions? 
 
In the first case, it may not be possible to know if 
the outline above is the real plan until we have 
access to the real plan.  It is possible that the 
                                                
     23China Daily/agencies, in People’s Daily Online, 5 
November 2005. 
     24Reuters/China Daily, in People’s Daily Online, 28 
November 2005. 
     25China Daily, in People’s Daily Online, “Chinese Man 
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Chinese will update their White Paper and make 
the program contents and timetable more explicit.  
Short of that, a careful watch on future public 
statements can give a sense of consistency or 
fluidity in the declared program.  Major 
fluctuations in timing or contents, as they appear 
in future statements, may suggest that the public 
plan and the real plan are quite distant from one 
another.  Of course, tracking actual spaceflight 
activity will eventually tell us if these 
declarations were made in good faith.  It will 
likely be a matter of some years before we can 
compare this outline with actual progress.  In the 
near term, the launch of a lunar probe and the 
accomplishment of a Shenzhou space walk by 
2008, as declared, would argue that declarations 
to date have been about the real plan.    
 
In the second case, the question of whether this is 
an executable plan, access to the technologies 
being developed and knowledge of the resources 
available and allocated to this plan could help 
determine if they can achieve the stated goals.  
The Chinese are more likely to be open about the 
first of these.  There is already a certain level of 
openness in scientific journals’ coverage of 
research for space programs in general.  Since the 
manned program carries such prestige, they are 
likely to trumpet the achievements made in 
technologies that contribute to this program.  The 
manned program is also more public and less 
sensitive than some other space programs such as 
reconnaissance, geopositioning, and military 
communications satellites.   
 
Following the money is more challenging 
because, as with their military budget, the 
Chinese are anything but open and seem to 
calculate expenditures in very different ways 
from the West.  There have been a few general 
statements on space budgets for the manned 
programs, such as the claim in 2004 that U.S. 
$2.18 Billion had been spent on the manned space 
program in the preceding 11 years.26  Beyond 
                                                
     26People’s Daily Online, “China to Launch Space 
Station in 15 Years,” 18 May 2004. 
such sweeping statements, little detail is 
available.  We are left to guess whether Chinese 
spending is sufficient to achieve stated goals in 
the times given publicly. 
 
Looking at the program in the larger sense, we 
can see that the Chinese are at a point when the 
technologies needed for manned spaceflight are 
now available to them and they believe 
achievements in manned space exploration are 
within their grasp and important to national pride.  
They are serious in that they have set goals for 
themselves in space and are working toward 
them.  Manned space missions play a prominent 
role in their plan.  Their accomplishment of the 
set goals of a Chang’e lunar probe and Shenzhou 
space walk/space docking missions should tell us 
whether they are serious enough to make the plan 





                                                                               
 
 
